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Rust v. Sullivan and the 
Control of Knowledge 
Dorothy E. Roberts* 
Prologue: Three Stories About Oppression and Knowledge 
[My mistress] finally became even more violent in her opposition 
to my learning to read than was Mr. Auld himself. Nothing now 
appeared to make her more angry than seeing me, seated in some 
nook or corner, quietly reading a book or newspaper. She would 
rush at me with the utmost fury, and snatch the book or paper 
from my hand, with something of the wrath and consternation 
which a traitor might be supposed to feel on being discovered in a 
plot by some dangerous spy. The conviction [was] thoroughly es-
tablished in her mind, that education and slavery were incompati-
ble with each other. 1 
* * * 
In Derrick Bell's "Chronicle of the Slave Scrolls," the narrator, 
Geneva Crenshaw, finds a model slave ship on a desolate beach 
* Associate Professor, Rutgers University School of Law-Newark. B.A. 1977, Yal e 
Coll ege ; J.D. 1980, Harvard Law School. Prior drafts of this Article were presented at 
the Rutgers University School of Law-Newark Facu lty Colloquium and the Fourth An-
nual Critical Race Theory Workshop. I would like to thank the participan ts , particularly 
Norman Cantor, Peggy Davis, Alan H yd e. Eric Neisser, Annamay Sheppard. and Kendall 
Th omas, for their suggestions. I am especially grateful to my colleagues Jim Pope and 
George Thomas for their detailed comments and generous encouragement. Sherley 
Ayala, Jeanne-Marie DeRobertis, Deborah Reid, J ea n Stewart , and Guy \Vimers pro-
vided valuable research ass istance. 
l. fREDERICK DOU GLASS, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF FRED ER ICK DOUGLASS 74 (Citadel 
Press 1983) (1841). 
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during a pilgrimage to Ghana. 2 Inside she discovers three parch-
ment scrolls containing a testament from African slaves in which 
they answer the mystery of their survival in America: " 'What 
tools of the spirit were in their hands with which to cut a path 
through the wilderness of despair?' " 3 Returning to America , Ge-
neva begins to teach the Slave Scrolls' lessons of overcoming the 
burdens of racial oppression. Blacks who attend the prescribed 
"healing groups" are enabled by the knowledge of their ances-
tors ' survival to discard their oppression mentality and rapidly 
transform their communities into centers of industry and achieve-
ment. The reaction of whites is swift and brutal : they ban the 
healing sessions through "Racial Toleration Laws. " 4 They resort 
to violence and economic threats to suppress the teaching of the 
Scrolls. In the end, thousands of Blacks are forced to renounce 
publicly their rediscovered knowledge . 5 
* * * 
In 1992 a young Black woman named Mary received the results 
of her pregnancy test at a federally-funded family planning clinic 
in her neighborhood: she was pregnant. 6 Mary was scared and 
confused, but she knew that she did not want to have the baby. 
She wasn't sure if it was too late to have an abortion or where she 
could obtain one . She had heard about another woman in her 
neighborhood who had been rushed to the hospital bleeding from 
a perforated uterus after getting an abortion at a storefront doc-
tor 's office. She wasn ' t sure if her diabetes would make it more 
dangerous to go through the procedure. 
Mary was grateful to be able to turn to the clinic for help be-
cause she had no health insurance and could not afford to visit a 
private gynecologist. When sh e addressed her concerns to the 
counselor, the counselor refused to give her any information 
about abortion. 7 She would not even tell Mary where she could 
2. See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NoT SAVED: T HE ELuSIVE QuEsT FoR RAC IAL 
j USTICE 2 15-21 ( 1987). 
3. !d. at 2 17 (quoting Dr. Howard Thurman, On Viewing the Coast of Afnca, In FoR 
TH E INWARD j ouRNEY: THE WRITI NGS OF H owARD THURt-.IAN 199-200 (Anne T hurman 
ed. , 1984)). 
4 . !d. at 220. 
5. !d. at 22 1. 
6. Title X o f the Public H ealth Service Act, Pub. L No. 9 1-57 2,84 Stat. 1506 (codi-
fi ed as amended at 42 U.S. C . § § 300-300a- 41 (1 982)), enacted in 1970, provides federal 
grants to public and non-profit organizations " to assist in th e establishment and opera-
tion of vo luntary famil y planning proj ects." 42 U.S.C. § 300(a). 
7. In 1988 the Department o f Health and Human Services iss ued regula ti o ns which 
pro hibited family-planning clinics tha t rece ive Ti tle X fun ds fro m p roviding their pa-
t ie nt s with info rmatio n about abortio n. See 42 C.F.R . § § 59.2 , 59.7-. 10 ( 1989). I will 
refe r to these regulations throughout thi s Article as "the regulations. " Newly e lec ted 
President Cl inton repealed the regula tions on J an uary 22, 1993-the twenti e th ann iver-
sary of the Roe v. J-l'ade decision . See Robin Ton er, Clinton Orders Reversal of/lbortzon Re-
strictwns Left by Reagan and Bush, N.Y. TIMES , Jan . 23, 1993, a t I . 
For a description o f the legislative history and summary of the regulatio ns, see C . 
Andrew McCarthy, The Prohibition on Abortion Counseling and Referra l In Fedemlly-Fun ded 
Family Planning Clin ics. 77 CAL . L. REv. 11 8 1, 11 83 -88 ( 1989). 
Specifi call y, the regula tio ns banned Title X proJeCts from cou nselin g the ir pa tie n ts 
about abortion, refe rrin g a pregnant woman to an abort ion p rovide r , a nd even from 
info rming her where thi s informati on m ay be obtained. See 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(l) 
(1 989). T he regulations a lso pro hibited Title X projects from engaging in act ivities that 
"encourage , promote or ad voca te abortion as a method of family p lanning ," id. 
588 [VOL. 61:587 
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find a safe and inexpensive clinic that performed abortions. In-
stead, the counselor gave her a selective list of clinics and hospi-
ta ls providing prenatal care. 8 She told Mary that some of these 
facilities might also perform abortions, but she could not identify 
them. When Mary insisted that she had made up her mind to ter-
minate the pregnancy, the counselor responded: "this project 
does not consider abortion an appropriate method of family plan-
ning and therefore does not counsel or refer for abortion. " 9 Mary 
left the clinic even more bewildered, wondering where to turn 
next. 10 
Introduction 
T he Supreme Court in Rust v. Sullivan 11 upheld the regulations 
that prohibit employees of Title X-funded clinics from discussing 
abortion with their patients. The Court rejected the First and Fifth 
Amendment challenges brought by clinics and their doctors, reason-
ing that the regulations were merely a constitutional refusal by gov-
ernment to subsidize the delivery of abortion information. 12 
According to the majority, the "government is not denying a benefit 
to anyone, but is instead simply insisting that public funds be spent 
for the purposes for which they were authorized." 13 Although the 
regulations subsequently were repealed, the Rust decision remains a 
powerful defense of government restrictions on speech. 14 
§ 59.10(a), and required that Title X projects remain "physically and financially sepa-
rate" from pro hibited abortion activities. !d. § 59.9. 
8. The regulations required Title X projects to provide their pregnant patients 
with a referral list of health care providers " that promote the welfare o f mothe r and 
unborn child," but which did not include any health care providers that otfered a bo rtion 
as th e ir "principal business." See 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(2)-(3). 
9. See id. § 59.8(b) (5). 
10. My story about Mary is h ypothetical because a federal judge enjoined th e goY-
ernme nt from e nforcing the regula tions prior to their repeal. See Nationa l Family Plan-
nin g & Reprod. Health Ass'n v. Sullivan , No. 91-935, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7043 
(D.D. C. May 28 , 1992) , aifd, 979 F.2d 227 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The stori es o f wome n who 
have end ured unwanted pregnancies and suffered mutilation from bo tched abo rtions 
arc, however, real. See, e.g., Tama r Lewin, Hurdles Increase for :\lanv Wo111 en Seeking .1bor-
ttons. N.Y. TI MES, Mar. 15, 1992 , at AI, Al8 (telling the sto ry of 23-vear-o ld Marv 
Jived e n , a divo rce d , une mplo yed mother, who traveled to three c ities in a n unsuccessful 
and expensive a ttempt to get an abortion); Robert D. McFadd e n , .-l bDrt lo n ,\1/!ls Tfm ulng 
Behilld Secrecy and Fear, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24 , 1991, at Al, A36 (telling the story of Doris 
Olivo, a 29-vea r-old une mployed , Dominican mothe r of two children , who received a 
botche d aborti o n from a doctor she read about in a newspa pe r ad vertisement). Thus, 
even th o ugh th e Tille X directives were not ultimate ly enforced, these s to rie s illu s trate 
that women d esperatelv need m o re information about abortion and o ther a spects of 
reproduction. 
11. Ill S . C t. 1759 (1991 ). 
12 . See id a t 1771-78. 
13 . !d. at 1774. 
14 . Indee d , the Bush administra tion aggressivel y used Rust in court Cl nd befo re Con-
gress to suppo rt several limitatio n s on gove rnment-funded speech. Sec David .-\ . Kaplan 
& Bob C ohn , Take the ,\-Ioney and Shut Up-': Th e Governm ent's 1\'ew Efforts to R egula te Speech, 
1993] 589 
This Article is about the struggle over knowledge. It examines 
how the Court in Rust aligned with the side of the powerful on two 
fronts. We live in a society in which poor Black communities are 
isolated geographically in inner cities and excluded from the bene-
fits of society. 15 Rust upheld regulations that deliberately withheld 
from women in these communities knowledge critical to their repro-
ductive health and autonomy. By promoting ignorance among 
these women, the Court erected one more layer of the "structural 
entrapment" that keeps poor Black women at society's margins.I 6 
T he Court 's reasoning also excluded them from the concern and 
compassion of the rest of society, by portraying Title X patients as 
undeserving of the care to which affluent women are entitled simply 
because poor women are dependent on the government 's charity. 
The Court's logic foreclosed the possibility of an alternative consti-
tu tional interpretation that requires affirmative protection of Title X 
patients' right to self-determination. Poor women of color live in 
communities hidden from sight. The Court 's legal discourse hides 
them from the mind, as well. 
T his Article has two goals. The first is to critique the Court's First 
Amendment analysis in Rust. The Court' s rhetoric, which focused 
on the abstract equality of ideas, masked the violence that the regu-
lations inflicted upon women. It failed to recognize that the govern-
ment's control of knowledge available to poor Black women not 
only suppresses an idea, it also represses a people. My second goal 
is to use this analysis as the foundation for an alternative vision of 
the government's role in nurturing individual liberty and achieving 
racial justice. I am more interested in the way that we think about 
dependency and government control of knowledge than in manipu-
lating current First Amendment doctrine to reach a more desirable 
outcome. My particular task is to articulate an affirmative govern-
ment obligation to provide abortion counseling to Title X patients. 
I see this project as part of the broader inquiry into the relationship 
between constitutional liberties and the distribution of wealth. 
Rather than present a generalized entitlement theory, however , I 
defend a narrower claim by people dependent on government aid to 
a particular resource-information necessary fo r self-d etermina-
tion. 17 I t is my hope that my explanation of this particular claim to 
NEWSWEEK, J a n. 20, 1992, a t 55 (explainin g, fo r example. how th e Rust d ec isio n is o r 
co uld be used to d efend the National Endowme nt fo r the Arts ' withdrawal of fun ds fro m 
an a rti st' s co ntroversial p erforman ce , or to defend de nial o f fu nding for AID S educa tio n 
m a teri als di scussing h o m osexua lity). 
15 . See DouGLAS G . G LASGOW, T HE BLACK U NDERC LASS: PovERTY, UNE MPLOY MENT, 
M.JD ENTRAPM ENT O F G HETTO YouTH l-15 (1980) (di scuss ing ins titutions that m aintain 
the s tat us o f lo n g-te rm, pe rsis te ntl y poo r, and immob il e Blacks); Lo'ic J.D . W acq ua n t & 
W ill iam J. W ilso n , The Cost of Racial and Class Exclusion In the Inner Ci ty, 50 l ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. Po L. & Soc. SCI. 8 , 8-l 0 , 25 (1 989 ) (a ttribu tin g the " underclass" to the un p rece-
den ted social, economic, and spat ial m a rg ina li za ti on of poor Blacks , ra the r than to a 
cu lture o f pove rty). 
16. See Wacquant & W ilso n , supra n o te 15, a t 25. 
17. A number of lega l scho lars have e labo ra ted theo ries of minima l en titl emen ts 
based on th e Co n stitu tion and on principles o f d ist ributive j us ti ce . See, e.g., C. Edwin 
Bake r, Outco lll e Equality or Equality of Respect: The Substantive Con/en/ of Equal Protection, ! 3 1 
590 [VOL. 6 1:587 
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information will illuminate the need to change the negative constitu-
tionalism that has supported unjust relationships of power. 
One of the most important contributions of critical race scholars 
is their vision. Their negative critique of liberal and universalist 
doctrine refuses to remain mired in a deconstructionist mode. They 
have added to critical scholarship the historical ability of people of 
color to criticize the law while embracing an aspirational vision of 
the law. 18 Their critique of critical legal scholars' failure to recog-
nize that the oppressed experience the law as both alienating and 
liberating has helped to advance progressive legal thought to a 
more positive, reconstructive plane. 19 Scholars of color have 
U. PA. L. REv. 933, 959-98 (1983) (describing an "equality of respect" model of state 
guarantees "designed to provide everyone the opportunity fully to participate in com-
munity life and to have a meaningfu1life as understood by the community"); Thomas C. 
Grey, Property and Need: The Welfare State and Theories of Distributive justice, 28 STAN. L. REv. 
877, 888-901 ( 1976) (arguing "that individuals who cannot meet their essential materia l 
needs thro ugh free transactions have a right, which should be enforceable through law, 
to have these needs met out of the assets of others"); Frank I. Michelman , The Supreme 
Court, 1968 Term: Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 
HARV. L. REv. 7, 13 (1969) [hereinafter Protecting the Poor] (proposing a vision of social 
justice in which citizens are entitled to "minimum protection against economic hazard"); 
William H. Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 Mo. L. REv. 1, 16 
(1985) (describing a distributive premise of need that " permits sufficient participat io n in 
the mainstream activities of the community to enable the person to be regarded and to 
regard herself as a member"). These entitlements have been conceived either as a spe-
cific welfare guarantee-a right to provision for a certain need, such as food, shelter, 
education or medical care-or as a right to a minimum income that protects agains t 
excessive inequality of wealth. See Frank I. Michelman, In Purswt of Constitutwnal ll'elfa re 
Rights: One View of Rawls' Themy of justice, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 962,966 (1973) (interpret-
ing Rawls' theory of justice to support a structured set of priorities that assures specil1c 
needs of liberty and self-respect before reaching the question of generally amplifying 
one's income). 
18. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. 
REv. 581 , 584 (1990) (discussing the complex dialogue between the asp irational vo ices 
of liberalism and the voices of real people); Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: 
Afultiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential !vfethod, 11 WoMEN 's RTs. L. REP. 7, 8 (1989) (o b-
serving that outsider lawyers and scholars must often adopt a "dualist approach" that 
incorporates an elitist legal system and the concept of rights while seeing the world from 
the standpoint of the oppressed); Dorothy E. Roberts , Purushing Drug Addicts Wh o Hrwe 
Babies: rvome71 of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 141 9, 1464 
( 1991) (recognizing the tension between rel ying on th e "liberal rhe toric of choice ," 
while acknowledging " the fallacy of choice for poor women of color") . 
19. See, e.g. , Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: Th e Recons tmctwe Th eo iogy 
of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. , 103 HARV. L. REv. 985, 986 (1990) (arguing that rh e Critical 
Legal Studies ' (CLS) theore tical critique of liberal society failed "to appreciate the roie 
the state can play in neutralizing and eradicating ubiquito us racial oppress ion" ); Mari j. 
Matsuda , Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REv. 323, pasmn (1987) (describing lessons that critical legal studies can learn from 
" looking to the bottom"); cJ. Ed Sparer, Fundamental Human R1~r;hts, Lega l Entitlements. and 
the Sana! Struggle: A Friendly Cntique of the Cri tical Legal Studies Movem ent, 36 STAN. L REv. 
509, 552-60 ( 1984) (criticizing critical lega l theorists for preseming the negative a ttack 
on liberal lega l doctrine as the principal path to libera tion, and for di sco unting the af-
firmative relat ionship of law to social movements). Mark Tushnet, one of criti ca l lega l 
s tudies ' most ardent rights-trashers, has suggested recentl y that th e minority and fe mi-
nist critique of CLS may force CLS to adopt " classi cal social theory" by "stressmg the 
1993] 591 
pushed forward the frontiers of legal inquiry by insisting that, 
"[a]lthough theoretical deconstruction is important, the ultimate 
goal of critical theory should be the reconstruction of community 
from the debris of theoretical deconstruction. " 20 
In this Article, I hope to advance the discussion among cntiCal 
legal scholars, feminists, and critical race theorists by applying criti-
cal and reconstructive methods to the particular context of govern-
ment-funded information. I attempt to move beyond theoretical 
deconstruction and the call for reconstruction to the project of 
fleshing out the vision for social change. 21 This undertaking rests on 
the faith that the relationship between power and knowledge is not 
unidimensional. The tales of oppression and knowledge in the Pro-
logue do not tell the whole story. Our understanding of human lib-
erty is not simply imposed on us by the ideology embodied in the 
Rust decision. We can resist and imagine and struggle for a better 
way. On the contested field of power and knowledge, I want this 
Article to be a volley on the side of the dispossessed. 
Part I of this Article sets out the context in which the Rust decision 
must be understood. It explains the violence that the regulations 
would inflict on poor women-especially poor women of color-and 
the ways in which the Court made their suffering invisible . Part II 
presents a critique of the Court's First Amendment analysis. I 
demonstrate how the Court's two theories of free speech-the mar-
ketplace of ideas and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine-
used neutral principles to avoid confronting the political signifi-
cance of the government's control of knowledge. 
Parts III through V examine the role that the control of knowl-
edge plays in the oppression and liberation of subordinated groups. 
I rely primarily on Black people's historical struggle for knowledge 
in America to illustrate the relationship between knowledge and 
power. I discuss three aspects of this relationship-the determina-
tion of social meaning, education, and the control of sources of in-
formation. Part II I examines how the powerful use knowledge to 
limits tha t social circumstances place on the accomplishment o f substantia l change while 
acknowledging tha t people do indeed . .. m ake history with will and co nsc iousness." 
Mark T ushnet , Critical Legal Studies. ,..J Political His tory, 100 Y.-\LE L.J. 1515 , 1538 (1991). 
20 . Cook , supra no te 19, at 993 . Feminist legal scholars a lso have asse rt ed the need 
w appl v our scho la rship in positive ways. See, e.g. , Drucill a Corn e ll , Sexual Dljference, the 
Feminine. and Eqwvalency: A Critique of .\1acKuwon 's Tow.-\R D A FEMI NIST TH EORY OF TH E 
STATE , I 00 YALE L.J. 2247, 2248 ( 1991) (" Of course , we need a program that legally 
d e leg itimates the gender hierarchy and exposes the seriousness o f sexual abuse. But we 
a ls o need a more expansive , pos itive program . .. . " ); Robin W es t, jurisprudence and Gen-
der. 55 U. C m . L. R Ev. I , 72 (1 988) [hereinaft e r vVest , J unspmdence] (" Fe minism must 
en visio n a po st-pa tria rchal world , fo r witho ut such a visio n we have littl e direc tion. " ); 
Ro bin W est, Rela tivism, Objectwity, and Law, 99 YALE L.J. 147 3, I SO 1-02 (1 990) [hereinaf-
ter \tV es t, Relatwism ] (s uggesting th e need fo r th eories aim ed toward actio n ra ther than 
criti cism). 
21. See. e. g., Cook, supra no te 19, a t 988 (d escribing Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. 's 
"philosophical praxis" which inco rporated " theoretical decons tructio n , experienti a l 
deconstruction , reconstructi ve th eorizing, and co llccti\-c ac ts o f tran sfo rmati ve socia l 
stru ggle " ). 
592 [vo L. 6 1:587 
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secure their superior position. Part IV discusses the connection be-
tween the oppressive control of knowledge and dependency on gov-
ernment charity. Part V explores how the oppressed recreate 
knowledge as a means of liberation. 
Finally, Part VI attempts to connect this account of the oppressive 
and liberating potential of knowledge to the reconstructive project. 
I focus on two features of a liberating constitutional vision. First, I 
suggest that this theory would seek to provide poor women of color 
with the information necessary to enable them to struggle against 
their subordination. Second, liberation requires a radical change in 
the prevailing concept of dependency and its ideological connection 
to human freedom. 
I. Uncovering the Violence OJ Rust 
A. The Violence of the Rust Decision 
In his compelling article, Violence and the Word, Robert Cover re-
minds us of a reality about legal interpretation that judges work so 
hard to obscure: "[T]he interpretive commitments of officials are 
realized, indeed, in the flesh. " 22 Because Rust v. Sullivan was an 
opinion about ideas , it is easy to overlook its imprint on the flesh: 
The regulations upheld by the Supreme Court violated the minds 
and bodies of real women. 
Congress enacted Title X in 19702 3 to give millions of poor and 
low-income women access to reproductive health services that 
otherwise would not be available to them. 24 T itle X-funded clinics 
are a critical source of medical care for poor women,2 5 given that 
these clinics are often the only provider of medical services and 
health information that their patients can afford. 26 Congress recog-
nized that T itle X projects would serve as a point of entry into the 
22. Robert M. Cove r, Violence and the IVord, 95 Y.:...LE LJ. 16 01, 1605 (1986): rf Cor-
nel W est , Tlze Role of Law In Progresswe Politics, 43 VA ND. L. R Ev. 1797, 1803 (199 0 ) (com-
m e nding the C LS movement fo r linking the " intell ec tual blinders o f America n liberal 
legal scholarship " to " the actual b lo od th a t has Row e d beca use of the hidden rea lities" ). 
23 . Title X of the Public H ea lth Service Act, Pub. L. No. 91-572,84 Stat. 1506 (codi-
fi ed as amended at 42 US. C. §§ 300-300a-4l (198 2)) . 
24. SeeS . REP. No . 1004, 9 l s t C ong ., 2d Sess. 3 (1970) , reprinted 111 116 CoNe. RE c . 
S24, 095; H.R. REP. No . 1472 , 9lst Co n g ., 2d Sess. 4 (1970), repnnted 111 1970 
U.S. C. C.A.N. 5068, 5074. 
25 . In 198 7 , Title X suppo rt ed nearl y fo ur tho usand clinics natio m vide tha t served 
o ve r fo ur milli o n poo r and low-income wo m e n. S teve n V. Ro be rts , L ·.s. Proposes Cu rb on 
Climes G1 u1ng A bortlon .-J dv1ce, N.Y. TIMES, J u ly 31 , 198 7, at A I. Title X is the sin g le larg -
est source o f federal funding fo r familv pla nning a nd reproductive h ea lth care , provid-
in g support to seventy-se'.-cn p e rcent of a ll fa mil y-planning cli n ics in th e nati on . Ga rv :-\. 
Winte rs , L'nconstltu tlonal Condltlom as ".\ 'onsubsldles ". 1\'hen is Defermce !nappropnate ?_ 8 0 
C EO . L.J. ! 3 1, 159 n.l 38 (199! ) (c iting Brieffor Pe titioners a t 2 & n .2, Rust\. Sulliva n, 
Ill S . Ct. 1759 (1991) (No. 89 -1 391)). 
26 . U NITED STATES DEP.-\RTMENT or Ht.ALTH AND HuMA N SERVIC ES , PRoGRA r.t G urnr.-
LI NES FOR P ROJ ECT GRANTS FOR FAM ILY PLANN ING SERVI CES § 9 .4 (39:\.) (1 98 1 ); see a/so 
1993] 593 
health care system. 27 These clinics provide, in addition to contra-
ceptive information and services, related medical tests, such as gen-
eral physical examinations and counseling.28 
The government's stifling of medical information endangered the 
health and lives of low-income women. The regulations prohibited 
clinics from discussing abortion or from providing women with the 
names of accessible, low-cost clinics that perform abortions.29 
Some pregnant women would interpret the clinic's failure to discuss 
abortion to mean that abortion is not a safe and legal alternative.3o 
This obfuscation of referrals would mean dangerous delays in ob-
taining an abortion. 31 
In addition, pregnancy may accelerate the progression of certain 
serious medical conditions, such as heart disease, hypertension, dia-
betes, sickle cell anemia, cancer, and AIDS.32 For example, a wo-
man with diabetic retinopathy who becomes pregnant may go 
blind. 33 The regulations prohibited doctors from advising women 
suffering from these conditions that abortion may reduce the long-
Nadine Brozan, Poor are Rocked by Closing of Gynecological Clinics, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 
1991, at B 1 (describing the difficulty of poor and low-income women in New York City 
in finding subsidized family-planning and gynecological care). Ninety percent of clinic 
clients have incomes below 150% of the poverty level. Alexandra A.E. Shapiro, Title X, 
The Abortion Debate, and the First Amendment, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 1737, 1738 (1990). 
27. See SPECIAL SuBCOMM. ON HUMAN RESOURCES, SENATE CoMM. ON LABOR AND 
PUBLIC WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE SuB-
MITTING fiVE-YEAR PLAN FOR fAMILY PLANNING SERVICES AND POPULATION RESEARCH 
PROGRAMS, 92d Cong., I st Sess. 318 (1971) ("[F]amily planning is often the point of 
entry into a fragmented health care system for many individuals."). 
28. S. REP. No. 29, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1975), repnnted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
469,517. 
29. See supra note 8. This limitation typically means that the only abortion providers 
that the referral list may include are hospitals and private physicians, which are often 
financially or geographically inaccessible to poor women. Brief of Amicz Cunae The 
American Public Health Association, The American College of Physicians, eta!., in Sup-
port of Petitioners at 12-13, Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. I 7 59 ( 1991) (Nos. 89-1391, 89-
1392) [hereinafter Amici Curiae Brief for Petitioner]. Poor women often lack information 
about abortion providers; they turn to sources such as newspaper advertisements that 
may steer them to an expensive and unsafe abortion mill. See supra note 10. Many poor 
women in New York, for example, are unaware that they live in one of the few states that 
cover abortions under Medicaid. McFadden, supra note I 0, at 36. 
30. Many women are unaware of their legal right to obtain an abortion. See NA-
TIONAL ABORTION RIGHTS ACTION LEAGUE, HICKMAN-MASLIN PoLL FOR AMERICAN VIEW-
POiNT 4 (! 987) (finding that 367a of American adults believe that, during the first three 
momhs of pregnancy, abortion is allowed only under "extreme circumstances" or not at 
all). 
31. The mortality risk for abortion increases 50% and the risk of major complica-
tions increases 307a ;vith each week after the eighth week of pregnancy. AmlCl Cunae 
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 29, at 13-14. 
32. See, e.g .. ABORTION, MEDICINE, AND THE LAw 251-54 Q. Douglas Butler & David F. 
Walbert eels., 1986); MATERNAL-FETAL MEDICINE: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 734-1!49 
(Robert K. Creasv & Robert Resnick eds., 2d ed. 1989); OBSTETRICAL DECISION MAKING 
86-166 (Emanue!' A. Friedman eta!. eds., 2d ed. 1987) . But see Howard L. Minkoff, Care 
of Pregnant !Vomen Infected with Human lmmunodeficzency l'irus, 258 JAMA 2714 ( 1987) (criti-
cizing studies that demonstrate the effect of pregnancy on HIV disease progression). 
33. ,-Jmici Cunae Brief for Petitioner, supra note 29, at ~ 9 (declaration of Dr. David A. 
Grimes). 
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term risks to their health. 34 Moreover, the recommendation of pre-
natal care may give the false impression that pregnancy does not 
jeopardize these women's health.3 5 
The regulations also had broader implications for the health care 
services available in poor communities. Many clinics would find it 
economically unfeasible to separate their family-planning facilities 
from those for abortion services, and, therefore, would eliminate 
one part of their program.36 Some clinics would refuse the condi-
tioned federal funding altogether for ethical reasons and would be 
forced to cease operations .37 The regulations, thus, might have cre-
ated a serious reduction in the provision ofhealth care-beyondjust 
abortion counseling-for poor women. 
The regulations violated more than the flesh. Scholars of oppres-
sion have explained that the violence imposed by oppressive re-
gimes injures the mind, as well as the body.38 Oppression includes 
34. See id. at ~ 9. Physicians should advise patients with a dangerous m edica l condi-
tio n about abortion, as well as prenatal care. See id. at ~ 10. Other situations where 
abortion counseling is medically indicated include pregnancy wherein the mother has an 
immovable IUD in place and pregnancy involving the possibility of severe genetic or 
congenital problems with the fetus. !d. at ~~ 11-14. See generally ABORTION, MEDICINE, 
AND THE LAw, supra no te 32, at 251-57 (discussing diseas es and disorders suffered by 
pregnant women and fetal abnormalities that may indica te therapeutic abort ions) . I 
highlight these medical complications because they provide a reason for considering 
abortion that the pregnant woman herself may not be aware o f. Of course, women have 
non-medical reasons for considering abortion, as well. See, e.g., West,junspmdence, supra 
note 20, at 30-32 (describing women's experi ences of unwanted pregnancy) . 
35. See Brief of Amici Curiae NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund and 117 Orga-
n izations Committed to Women 's Equality in Support of Pe titio ners, Rust v. Sullivan, 
111 S. C t. 1759 (1991) (Nos . 89-139 1, 89-1392). 
36. See Massachusetts v. Secretary o f HHS, 889 F.2d 53 , 59-60 (l st Cir. 1990) (en 
bane) (acknowledging the argument that " the new regula tions would require many clin-
ics eithe r to give up their Title X funding or to te rminate famil y planning se rvices alto-
ge the r. ") ; see also Tamar Lewin , Latest Administration Ta ctic Ma kes Abortion Fight a Free 
Speech Issue, N.Y . TIMES, Feb. 7, 1988 , at E7 (noting tha t it would cost Planned 
Parenthood of New York an estimated one million dollars to segregate its abortion 
coun seling from its other family planning activities). 
37. See Carole I. Chen·in, The Title X Family Planning Gag Rule. Can the Govenz men t Buy 
Up Constitutional Rights?, 41 STAN. L. REv. 40 I, 408 (1989) (citing telephone interv iew 
with Sco tt R. Swirling, executive direc tor of National Family Planning and Reproducti ve 
Health Association, predicting that a m aj ority of current Title X programs would refu se 
to withhold abo rtio n info rmation fro m their clients); Linda Greenhouse, 5 Justices Upho ld 
U. S. Ru le Curbing Abortion Adv ice, N.Y. TIMES , May 24 , 199 1, at A I (s tating Planned 
Parenthood clinics will n o t withhold info rmati on because th e ir doctors fear legal liabil-
ity); Congress, Agencies l!'restle with Abortion Regulatwns, SEATTLE T IMES, july 21, 199 1, at AS 
(s tating Caiifornia state family-planning clinics will probab ly tu rn d own Title X fundin g 
because of the belief that th e federal ban on counseling amounts to m edical 
malpract ice). 
38 . See, e.g. , FRA NZ FANON , THE WRETCHED Of TH E EARTH 249-3 11 (1963) (describ-
ing men tal di so rders in victims of vio lence imposed by op press ive regimes); PAULO 
FREIRE. PEDAGOGY Of THE OPPRESSED 28 (Myra B. Ramo trans., 1970) (sta tin g that an 
unjust o rder stimulates violence in the oppressor and , in turn , dehumani zes the 
oppressed). 
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the brutal control of the mental processes necessary for self-deter-
mination and personhood. "Any situation in which some men pre-
vent others from engaging in the process of inquiry is one of 
violence .... [T]o alienate men [and women] from their own deci-
sion-making is to change them into objects." 39 The regulations in-
flicted this form of mental violence by dominating poor women's 
deliberations about pregnancy. 
T he regulations' violence would be most dramatic in the Black 
community. Black women are more likely than white women to rely 
on publicly funded clinics because they are less likely to have health 
insurance, sufficient income to pay a private physician, or a regular 
source of medical care.40 Of the nearly four million women in 1988 
who used a Title X clinic for their last family-planning visit during 
the previous year, twenty-eight percent were Black.4 1 This number 
represented fifty-three percent of Black women, compared to thirty-
two percent of white women. 4 2 These figures demonstrate not only 
that a large number of Black women would be denied information, 
but also that the Black community as a whole would feel the depriva-
tion most. 43 T his significant impact is bound to increase as the 
number of Blacks who are desperately poor continues to grow.4 4 
Moreover, the medical consequences of the regulations would be 
gravest for Black women. Black women are more likely than white 
women to suffer from the heal th conditions that are aggravated by 
pregnancy. 4 5 They also are more likely to experience difficulties in 
39. FREIRE, supra note 38, at 73. T h e respect for autonomous d ecisionma king is, o f 
course, a cen tral tene t of liberalism. See RoNALD DwoRKIN , TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 
272 (1977) ("Governme nt must treat those who m it governs ... with respect, that is , as 
human beings who are capable o f formin g and ac ting on inte lligent conceptio ns of how 
the ir lives sh o uld be live d. "). For the classic liberal defe n se of p e rsonal auto n o my, see 
j OH N STUART MILL, O N LIBERTY 77-79 (Gertrude Himme lfaub ed. , Penguin Publishing 
1974) (1 859) ("Over himself, over his own bod y and mind , the individual is sovereign. ") 
40. William D. Mosher, Use of Family Planning Services 111 the United Stales: 1982 and 
1988, VITAL AN D H EA LTH STATISTICS, Apr. 1990, a t 3. In 1984, 32.3';7o of Black women 
lived in po verty as compared to 11.5% o f white women. Julie B. Wilson , Women and 
Poverty: A Demog·raphic Ovennew, in WoMEN, HEALTH AND PovERTY 21, 26 (Cesa r A. Per-
a les & Laure n S . Young eds. , 1988). The poverty ra te of Black children is even mo re 
staggerin g. In 1987, almost ha lf of a ll Black children (45.6 ';7o of Black childre n under 
age eighteen and 49 ';7o of Black childre n under age six) lived in poverty. CE NTER ON 
BUDG ET .-\NO PO LICY PRIORITIES , STILL FAR FROM T HE DR EAM: REC ENT DEVELOPMENTS IN 
BLACK INCOME, EMPLOYM ENT AND POVERTY v (1988). 
4 1. Mosher, supm note 40, at 2-3. 
42 . ld. 
43 . l\!y focus on the group as a wh o le is different from dis proport io nate impact anal-
ys is which focuses o n the p e rce ntage of a ll pa ti ents a ffec ted who are Black, compared to 
the percentage who are white. Mv p o int compares the percentage of Blacks as a group 
who use Title X clinics w·ith the percentage of whites as a g roup who use them. 
44. Blacks in the "poores t of the poor" category , with inco m es below h a lf the p ov-
e rty line (be low $4,528 for a familY of three in 1987), increased b y 69 percent in the 
perio d be tween 1978 a nd 1987. CE:--:TER ON BuDGET A:--JD PoucY PRIORITIES , supra note 
40, a t vii. 
45. See Laurie Ns ia h-Jefferson , Reproduclrue Laws, ll"omen of Color, and Low-Income !! 'o-
men, in REPRODUCTIVE LAws FOR THE 1990s, a t 23. 27 -2 8 (S he rrill Coh e n & Nadine T aub 
eds ., 1989) ("For exam ple, b lac k wom en have hi gher rates of di abe tes , card iovascular 
di seas e, cervical cancer , and hi gh blood pressure ."). In 1988, AIDS killed nin e times as 
m a n y Black women as whit e wo men. Susan Y. C hu et a l. , Impact of the Hum an lmmu-
nodejiciencv Virus Epidemic on .\lorlohty in ll'omen of Reproductive .-lge, United Stoles, 264 JAM A 
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obtaining abortions because of other obstacles to abortion 
services.46 
Race is significant in the Rust decision at a less obvious level. 
Although the Reagan and Bush administrations could not succeed at 
imposing a ban on all abortion counseling in America, they did suc-
ceed at imposing such a ban on women dependent on government 
assistance. Of course, the latter was doctrinally more feasible; but 
why was it politically acceptable? Race may help to explain the gov-
ernment's willingness to exclude Title X patients from the privileges 
that other women enjoy. It may help to explain the Court's refusal 
to require that the government provide equal access to medical care. 
Race generally has proven to be a barrier to social reform in 
America. White Americans have been unwilling to pay for subsidies 
perceived to benefit primarily Blacks. As economist Robert Heil-
broner noted, the "merging of the racial issue with that of [social] 
neglect serves as a rationalization for the policies of inaction that 
have characterized so much of the American response to need."47 
Whites' stake in their privileged racial identity-their property right 
in their superior status48-is a powerful incentive to leave the ex-
isting social order intact.49 Derrick Bell has concluded that whites in 
225, 226 (1990). Black women are also three times more likely to die from complications 
of pregnancy and childbirth than are white women. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 1989, at 33 (1990). It is equally 
important, however, that physicians and government policies do not deny pregnant wo-
men of color the choice of continuing a pregnancy. See, e.g., Taunya L. Banks, IVomen and 
AIDS: Racism, Sexism, and Classism, 17 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 351, 358-63 ( 1990) 
(arguing that abortion counseling of HIV-infected women occurs within a coercive at-
mosphere and discriminates against poor women of color); Roberts, supra note 18, at 
1462-76 (discussing the constitutional protection of Black women's decisions to bear 
children). 
46. Nsiah-Jefferson, supra note 45, at 30-33 (listing financial, cultural, social, and 
geographic factors contributing to the difficulty in obtaining abortions). 
4 7. Robert L. Hei1broner, The Roots of Soczal .Veglect zn the Cnited States, in Is LAw 
DEAD? 288, 296 (Eugene V. Rostow ed., 1971). 
48. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 549 (1896) (conceding, for the purposes of 
that case, that "the reputation of belonging to the dominant race" is the "property" of 
the white man). 
49. See Derrick Bell, £1fter We're Cone: Prudent Speculations on Amenca zn a Post-Racial 
Epoch, 34 ST. Lours U. L.J. 393, 402-03 (1990) (suggesting that the failure to address 
racial inequities is based on both whites' incentive to preserve their "superior" status 
and the need for white America to have a scapegoat); Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, Reform, 
and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitzmation zn Antzdiscrwunatwn Law, 101 HARV. L. 
REV. 1331, 1380-81 ( 1988) (observing that viewing the Black condition as illegitimate 
would require whites to be convinced that the free market system is flawed and that 
equal opportunity is a myth); Margaret]. Radin & Frank Michelman, !'ragmatzst and Post-
structuralist Critzcal Legal Practzce, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1019, 1039 (1991) (discussing the 
"knowledge of peoples of color ... that it is not just legal consciousness but racial con-
sciousness that supports ... the prevailing pmver dispensations in American society"). 
For a discussion of how racism blocked social reform during Reconstruction, sec vV.E.B. 
Du Bars, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION 700-01 ( 1976). Du Bois explained that whites resisted 
labor reform because "the white group of laborers, while they received a low wage, were 
compensated in part bv a sort of public and psychological wage." ld at 700. 
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America believe that they gain from continued economic disparities 
that leave Blacks at the bottom: "Even those whites who lack wealth 
and power are sustained in their sense of racial superiority by policy 
decisions that sacrifice black rights."50 
The Court made no mention of the particular meaning to Black 
women of its decision. Although litigants acknowledged the regula-
tions' disproportionate impact, no one suggested that it made any 
difference to the analysis of the constitutionality of the regulations. 
Prevailing legal doctrine tends to conceal the racial implications and 
origins of social practices that do not overtly discriminate on the 
basis of race. 51 This omission is consistent with the practice of dis-
cussing the maldistribution of wealth in the nonracial terms of pov-
erty and class. 52 Professor Gary Peller attributes this myopia to 
society's embracing an integrationist ideology that "has signified the 
broad cultural attempt not to think in terms of race at all. " 53 
B. The Court's Reconstruction of Patients' Lives 
How was it that-despite the regulations' violent impact on wo-
men's lives-the Court was able to conclude that "[t]here is no 
question but that the statutory prohibition contained in [section] 
1008 is constitutional"?54 How is it that the Court's opinion does 
not mention the pain and confusion that women would experience 
because of the regulations? How did the Court make their suffering 
invisible? The Court avoided the question of whether the doctor-
50. Bell, supra note 49, at 402. A corollary of Professor Bell's thesis is the principle 
of "imerest convergence," which posits that "( t)he interest of blacks in achieving racial 
equality wi .\1 be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites." 
Derrick Bell, Brown and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, in SHADES OF BRowN: NEw PER-
SPECTIVES ON ScHOOL DESEGREGATION 9\ , 95 (Derrick Bell ed., 1980) (hereinafter 
SHADES OF BROWN). Professor Bell supports this claim by demonstrating tha t civil rights 
ga ins have taken place only when they do not threaten white supremacy. See Derrick A. 
Bell, Jr., Bakke, J'vfinority Admissions, and the Usual Pnce of Racial Remedies, 67 CAL. L. REv. 3, 
14-16 (1979). 
51. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis , 426 U.S. 229, 237-45 (1976) (requiring proof of 
discriminatory intent, not just a showing of disproportionate impact, in equal protection 
cases arising under the federal constitution). See generally T. Alexande r Aleinikoff, A Case 
for Race-Consciousness, 91 CoLUM. L. REv. I 060, I 086-87 ( 1991) (arguing that the law has 
o ft en "denied the presence of blacks and the issue of race in American hi story and cul-
ture"); Crenshaw, supra note 49, at 1335 (criticizing critical legal scholarship for over-
looking the relationship of racism to hegemony); Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Toward a Black 
Legal Scholarship: Race and Origmal Understandings, 1991 DuKE L.J. 39, 77 (arguing that 
"( l)egal scholars have virtually ignored the issue o f race in thinking about what is impo r-
tant in the formulation of legal theory ") ; Neil Gotanda, A Cntique of "Our Consti tution is 
Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REv. 1, 16-23 (1991) (arguing tha t "color-blind" nonrecogni-
tion of race is self-co ntradictory and a llows racial subordination to continue). 
52. See Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DuKE L.J. 758, 845 (arguing that "fi l-
ter[ing) the discussion of the wide disparities between African American and white com-
munities through the nonracial language of poverty and class" embraces 
integrationism); cf Gerald Torres, Local Knowledge, Local Color: Critical Legal S!udies and the 
Law of Race Relations. 25 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1043, 1053 (1988) (stating that the current 
racially id ent ifiable distribution of social resources is the legacy of histori cal 
subordinat ion). 
53 . Peller, supra note 52, at 845. 
54. Rust v. Sullivan, IllS. Ct. 1759, 1772 (1991). 
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patient relationship should enjoy special First Amendment protec-
tion, similar to that enjoyed by publicly funded universities, 55 by 
inventing a legal fiction to define the clinic doctor-patient relation-
ship. 56 The Court reasoned that the regulations did not constitute 
enough of an impingement upon the doctor-patient relationship: 
Nothing in [the regulations] requires a doctor to represent as his 
own any opinion that he does not in fact hold . Nor is the doctor-
patient relationship established by the Title X program sufficiently 
all-encompassing so as to justify an expectation on the part of the 
patient of comprehensive medical advice. 57 
Both of these observations distort the nature of medical treatment 
in the lives of poor women. 
First, the Court incorrectly assumed that patients will not trust 
their doctors' advice. In fact, patients expect more than neutral 
medical consultation; they expect their physicians to provide com-
prehensive counsel directed toward the patient's best interests. 58 A 
doctor is more than someone we objectively consult for pieces of 
55. See id. (recognizing that " the university is a traditional sphere of free expression 
so fundam ental to the functioning of our society that the Government 's ability to control 
speech within that sphere by means of conditions attached to the expenditure of Gov-
ernment funds is restricted by the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines of the First 
Amendment"). In Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1 967) , for example, th e 
Supreme Court struck down a statute tha t conditioned the employment of professors in 
th e S ta te University of New York upon compliance with a plan designed to eliminate 
"subvers ives" from public education . See also Board of Trustees of Stanford University 
v. Sullivan , 773 F. Supp. 472 , 476-77 (D.D.C. 1991) (distinguishing Ru.st in declaring 
unco nstitutional a confidentialit y clause in a National Institute of Health research 
contract). 
56. See Rust , 111 S. Ct. at 1776. Courts sometimes invent lega l fictions to support a 
deci sion that wo uld seem unjust if it were based on the rea l circumsta nces of people's 
lives . On fictions invented by the law, see generally LoN L. FuLLER, LEGAL FrcnoNs 
(1967) (exam ining the use oflegal fictions-i.e. assumptions, implica tio ns, characteriza-
tions and analogies-as instruments in human thinking); Aviam Soifer, Reviewzng Legal 
Fictions, 20 GA . L. REv. 871, 914 (1986) (observing legal fi cti ons' potential to do "great 
harm by narrowing thought and deed.") ; Ibrahim J. Wani , Tmth, Strangers and Fictwn. 
The Illegitimate Uses of Legal Fiction in Immig-ration Law, II CARDOZO L. REv. 5 1, 53 ( 1989) 
(a rguing tha t lega l fictions in immigra tio n law are often " di stort io ns and misrepresenta-
tio ns" which are " used to achieve ends that would be unthi nkable in o ther areas of 
American law and popular be lief'). 
57. Rust , Ill S. Ct. at 1776. 
58. Just ice Blackmun, in dis sent , disagreed with the maj orit y's assumption, statin g 
that "[a] woman seeking the services of a Title X clinic has every reason to expect, as do 
we a ll , that her physician will no t withhold relevant information regardin g the very pur-
pose of her visit." !d. at 1782 n. 3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See genera lly GEORGE J. 
ANNAS, THE RIGHTS OF PATIE NTs: THE BASIC ACLU Gu iDE TO P.-\TlENT RIGHTS 83-l 00 
(2d ed . 1989) (d is cussin g the importance of the doctrin e of informed consent) . The 
trust th at pat ients repose in the ir doctors need not be coextensi ve with the belief that 
doc to rs can act o n their behalf. Rather, it may be an expectation o f hones t and complete 
information tha t enables pa ti en ts to participate in the m edical decisionmakin g process. 
See.J.w K.-nz, THE SILE NT WoRLD OF DoCTOR AND PATIE NT 85-103 ( 1984). Professor Katz 
rejects the trad itio nal model of trust. based on parent-child inte rac tio n, that e mphasizes 
the doctor's autho rity. He proposes instead a co nversational mod el in which phys ici zm~ 
assist patients in making their own decisions. !d. at 100-02 . 
1993] 599 
information. We faithfully turn to our doctors in a time of need for 
uncompromised guidance so that we may make informed decisions 
about our health. The physician' s failure to discus s abortion as a 
legal option is likely to lead at least some patients to conclude incor-
rectly that abortion is not such an option. 59 
Second, the Court wrongly assumed that Title X patients have the 
ability to seek other medical advice . In fact, these women may en-
counter numerous obstacles in attempting to obtain reproductive 
health services elsewhere.60 Indigent women may simply lack the 
resources to afford private medical counsel. 61 Low-income patients 
may be forced to rely exclusively on the T itle X doctor' s advice in 1 
order to conserve limited funds. ~ 
Finally, the Court's narrow focus on the private exchange be-
tween physician and patient concealed the full significance of the 
regulations which affect more than the words exchanged be tween a 
woman and her doctor. Although the regulations do violate doctor-
patient confidentiality, they more clearly impact the ability of poor 
women to de termine their own destinies and to participate fully in 
society. The Court's nearly total privatization of the regulations' 
realm of influence obscured the broader political meaning of the 
Court's decision which this Article addresses. 
C. The Court's Doctrinal Blindfold 
More insidious than the Court 's misrepresentation of women's 
experience was its misuse of doctrine. The Court not only fa iled to 
acknowledge or consider the pain in women's lives; it affirmatively 
manipulated legal rhetoric to obscure the existence of that pain. 
Perpetrators of official violence commonly blur the suffering that 
they cause by carefully cultivating the justifica tion for their ac-
tions.62 A frequently us ed technique is to " focus[] our attention on 
abstraction, when it is particularity and real-world detail that alone 
59. See Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Sullivan. 9 13 F.2d 1492, 1500-01 (1Oth 
Cir. 1990) . T hree fed eral courts of appea ls considered the constitutio nality o f the regu-
lations . The First and T enth Circuits struck down the regulations as a vio lati o n o f Title 
X patients' right to make informed decisions concerning abo rtio n and the ir phys icians' 
First Amendment rights to advise them properly. See id.; Massachuse tts v. Secretary of 
HHS, 899 F.2d 53 (1st Cir. 1990) (en ban e) . A di vided pane l of the Seco nd Circuit 
upheld the regula tions. See New York v. Sullivan, 889 F. 2d 401 (2d Cir. 1989). 
60. See generally Ruth Colker, -'In Equal Protection ,·lnalysis of Cnited States Reproductive 
Health Policy; Gender, Race, Age, and Class, 199 1 DuKE L.J. 324 , 340-50 (d escribin g the 
unava ilability of contraception and sex educa tion , p renatal care, and aborti o n for poor 
or adolescent females). 
61. See Margaret T. Orr & Jacquelin e D. Forres t, The ,.J. vailabillty of Reproductive Health 
Services f ro m U.S. Priva te Physicians, 17 FAM. PLAN. P ER SP . 63 , 67-68 ( 1985) ("S ubstantia l 
proportions o f physicians who provide reproductive health serv ices are in accessib le to 
th e poor, because they will not accep t Medi ca id re imbursements o r redu ce th eir fees ." ). 
In considering petitioners ' Fifth Amendment argument, th e Court did ackn owledge p e-
titioners' con temion that mos t Title X clien ts a re too poor to consu lt with ano the r 
hea lth ca re provider for abortio n-rela ted services. R ust, Ill S. C t. at 1778. T he Court 
simply dismissed thi s claim on the ground that th e pat ients' inab ility resu lted from ind i-
gency ra ther than from government restrictions on access to abo rti o n. !d. 
62. See Cover, su,IJra note 22, at 1629. 
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move us."63 This technique is part of a discourse that makes the 
current social order seem fair and natural. 64 The power wielded by 
the Court in Rust was evident not only in its ability to punish those 
who violate the regulations, but also in its "capacity to persuade 
people that the world described in its images and categories is the 
only attainable world in which a sane person would want to live."65 
Legal doctrine provides an important language through which the 
powerful justify their immense share of society's wealth. It also en-
ables them to ignore the suffering caused by the material inequali-
ties from which they benefit. It allows us all to tolerate the 
lawfulness of the intolerable. 66 
The Court's doctrinal blindfold was the distinction it drew be-
tween direct state interference with a protected activity and the 
state's mere refusal to subsidize a protected activity.67 The former, 
the Court conceded, raises a constitutional issue because it involves 
63. Richard De lgado, Nonns and Normal Sczence: Toward a Critique of Nonnativity in 
Legal Thought, 139 U. PA. L. REv . 933, 956 (1991) (describing how judges use normative 
lega l theory as permission to ignore suffering); see also RoBERT M. CovER, JusTICE Ac-
CUSED : ANTISLAVERY AND THE jUDICIAL PROCESS 154 (1975) ("National evils are only 
cured by ho lding m en 's eyes open, and forcing them to gaze on the hideous reality.") 
(quoting WENDALL PHILLIPS, A REVIEW OF LYSANDE R SPOONER's UNCONSTITUTIONALITY 
OF SLAVERY 3-4 (184 7)). Pro gressive legal scholars can help force our society to "gaze 
upon the hideous realities" of our tim es by stripping away the veil of abstract ion. See, 
e.g., Katharine T. Bartle tt , Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REv. 829 (1990) (describ-
ing the feminist legal method of attending to the particu lar experiences of women in-
volved in cases); Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, An tldiscn.minatlon Law, and a 
Ju rispmdence for the Last Reconstruction, I 00 YALE L.J. 1329, 1394 (!991) [here inafter Mat-
suda, Voices] (describing the work of progressive scholars as "unmasking" exercises of 
power disgu ised as science, history, and law); C harles A. Re ich, The Individual Sector. 100 
YALE L.J. 1409, 1445 (1991) (proposing the study of individual libe rty as an area of 
factual and scientific knowledge, rathe r than m erely one of p hilosophy and p rinciple). 
Two examples of progressive scholarship tha t have a ttempted to remove the lega l 
inte rpretat io n of "free speech" from the realm of abs tract rhetoric are Ca tharine MacK-
inno n's d esc ription of pornography and Mari Matsuda's description of racist speech 
which treat these forms of speech as violence to women and people of co lo r , respec-
tive ly, rather than the mere express ion of ideas. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FE!\li-
NISM UNMOD IFIED: DISCOURSES ON LrFE AND LAW 158-62 (1987); Mari J. Matsuda, Pu blic 
Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victzm's Story , 87 MIC H. L. REv . 2320, 23 56-6 1 
( 1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Raost Speech J. 
64. Critica l lega l scholars refer to thi s process as the law's " legitimation func tion ." 
See T ushne t, supra note 19 , at 1527 . 
65 . Robert W. Gordon, Cntzral Legal His/on es , 36 STAN. L. RH. 57, 109 (1984). 
66. See Robe rt M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, Foreword: Nomos and .\'ana-
live, 97 HARV . L. REV. 4, 39 ( 1983) (describing the genesis of utopian constitutionali sm 
as the "inability to bea r the dissonance of the lawfuln ess of the into lerable"); see also 
T h omas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Th eir lmm ma!ity, Our Helplessness. 79 Gc:o. LJ . 1499, 
1546 (199!) (a rguin g that " [ t]h e rheto ri c of poverty shelters us from our choices ... [by] 
allow[in g] us to imagine that the suffe ring o f the poor is just or that we arc he lp less to 
end it"). On the law's "dismissal of women's gender-s pecific su~Te ring," see Rob in L. 
West, The Difference in Women's Hedonzc Lives: ,-1 Phenomenologica l Critique of Fenums t Legal 
Theory, 3 \V1s. WoMEN 's Lj. 8 1,82 (1987). 
67. Rustv. Sull ivan, 111 S . Ct .1 759, 1772(1991). 
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state action, whereas the latter was characterized as a constitution-
ally insignificant failure to act.68 Embedded in this distinction is a 
concept of constitutional protections that is limited in three ways. 
First, the prevalent view holds that the Constitution protects only an 
individual's "negative" right to be free from unjustified intrusion, 
rather than the "positive" right to actually lead a free life. 69 Second, 
this view restricts constitutional protection to interference by the 
state. 7° Finally, this view measures government action and inaction 
against a baseline of the current arrangements of wealth and privi-
lege: "Decisions that upset existing distributions are treated as 'ac-
tion'; decisions that do not are thought to stay close to nature and 
thus to amount to no action at all." 71 The prevailing conception of 
the Constitution, therefore, does not recognize any affirmative gov-
ernment obligation either to ensure the social conditions and re-
sources necessary for individual liberty or to protect the individual 
from degradation inflicted by social forces other than the state. It 
often fails to recognize, as well, the ways in which the government 
uses its authority to fortify private relationships of power. 72 
The Court's distinction in Rust serves three purposes: It fore-
closes serious inquiry into the standard of review, it insulates judges 
from the violence they inflicted, and itjustifies the unequal distribu-
tion of medical care. First, in considering the regulations, many 
judges deemed women's reliance on government funds to obviate 
68. !d. (" 'A refusal to fund protected activity, without more, cannot be equated 
with the imposition of a "penalty" on that activity.' ... 'There is a basic difference be-
tween direct state interference with a protected activity and state encouragement of an 
alternative activity, consonant with legislative policy.'") (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 
U.S. 297, 317 n.19 (1980), and Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,475 (1977), respectively). 
69. See Frank I. Michelman, Liberties, Fair Values, and Constitutional A1ethod, 59 U. CHI. 
L. REv. 91,96 (1992); Robin L. West, Reconstructing Liberty, 59 TENN. L. REv. 441 (1992); 
see al-<o Susan Bandes, The Negatwe Constitution: A Cntique, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2271 (1990) 
(critiquing the prevailing conception of the Constitution as solely a charter of negative 
liberties). 
70. Michelman, supra note 69, at 96; West, supra note 69. See generally Gotanda, supra 
note 51, at 7-16 (discussing the public-private distinction in the context of racial discrim-
ination); Symposium, The Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1289 (1982) (ana-
lyzing the past, present, and future of the public/private distinction). 
71. Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law ( iVith Specwl Reference to Pornogm-
phy, Abortion, and Sunogacy), 92 CoLUM. L. REv. l, 2 (1992); accord Martha Minow, The 
Supreme Court, 1986 Term, Foreword: jwtice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REv. 10,56-57 (1987) 
(discussing the Supreme Court's assumption that critical features of the status quo-
general social and economic arrangements-are "natural and good"); David A. Strauss, 
Due Process, Government Inactwn, and Private Wrongs, 1989 SuP. CT. REv. 53, 53-54 (criticiz-
ing the Supreme Court's distinction in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of 
Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989), between government action versus failure to act). 
The Supreme Court has employed this narrow view of liberty to deny welfare claims 
and other forms of government aid. See, e.g., DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196 ("[O]ur cases 
have recognized that the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to 
governrnemai aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, libertv, or prop-
erty interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual."); Lindsey 
v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) ("[T]he Constitution does not provide judicial reme-
dies for everv social and economic ill."). 
72. Cass ·sunstein, for example, agrees that the First Amendment concerns only the 
exercise of public power, but criticizes courts for failing to acknowledge that legal struc-
rure5 restricting speech, such as a right of exclusive ownership in a television network, 
are created by the exercise of this public authority. Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Xow, 59 
U. CHI. L. REv. 255, 263-77 (1992). 
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automatically any need for critical thinking about the regulations' 
effects. They indicated that when claimants depend on a govern-
ment gratuity, their claims become "constitutionally irrelevant."7 3 
The phrase "mere refusal to subsidize" served as an often-invoked 
talisman , enabling courts to ignore whether the refusal warranted 
heightened scrutiny as a denial of rights. 74 As Justice Blackmun 
noted in his Rust dissent, "the Court, for the first time, upholds 
viewpoint-based suppression of speech solely because it is imposed 
on those dependent upon the Government for economic 
support." 75 
Second, by characterizing the government policy it upheld as in-
action, the Court distanced itself from the violence of its decision. 76 
Judges would not be directly inflicting pain on women who receive 
inadequate or harmful medical care as a result of the regulations. 
These women's suffering results from the circumstances of poverty, 
for which the judges hold no responsibility. Because the brutality 
was carried out in health care clinics by means of physicians' omis-
sions-not the typical brute force of a tyrant-the law did not recog-
nize it as official violence. Thus, the language of government 
inaction fulfilled the law's mesmerizing role: "Those in power sleep 
well at night-their conduct does not seem to them like 
oppression. " 77 
Finally, the Court's distinction between action and inaction al-
lowed it unabashedly to impose separate standards of justice for the 
rich and the poor. The dichotomy rendered " equal" the plainly un-
equal system that ensures full medical advice for the wealthy, while 
denying it to the indigent. This inequality is especially strikin g in 
73. See, e.g., New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401 ,4 11 (2d Cir. 1989) C'(S]o long as 
no affirmative legal obstacle to aborti o n services is created by a denial of the usc of 
governmental mo ney, facilities , or personnel , the practical effect of such a denial o n the 
availability of such services is const itutio nally irrelevant. ''). 
74. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Fed 'n of Am. v. Sullivan, 91 3 F.2d 1492 , 1506 n.4 
(lOth Cir. 1990) (Baldock, J. , dissenting in part) (" H ow ... can the first amendme nt be 
read to pro hibit a res tri ct io n on the dialogue between a phys ician and patie nt , when the 
physician and patient rely on federal funding to carry on such dial ogue)") ; New York v. 
Bowen, 690 F. Supp. 126 1 (S.D.N .Y. 1988) . 
75. Rust v. Sulli van , 111 S. C t. 1759 , 1778 (1991 ) (Blackmun,J., di ssen ting). 
76. See Cover, supra note 22, at 1628 (describing the social organization of vio lence 
through which responsibility fo r offi cia l violence is shared). 
On the o ther hand, th e Court's willingness to uphold the regula tions without clear 
congressional approval of the Secretary's constructio n of Title X, and despite the se ri-
ous constitutional questions that constructio n raised , can be seen as a Aagrant vio lation 
of the principles ofj udicial restraint. See The Supreme Court, 1990 Tmn: Leading Cases, 105 
HARV. L. REv. 177 , 397-99 (a rgu ing that the Rust Court should have set asid e the regula-
tions o n sta tutory grounds and awa ited a clear demonstration of congress iona l intent); 
see also R usi, 111 S. Ct. a t 1788-89 (O'Connor, J., di ssenting) (sam e) . 
77. Ri chard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: .-J Plea for Nanative, 87 
M I C H. L. REV. 24 11 , 24! 3-14 ( !989). 
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the courts' recognition that the same restrictions would pose a con-
stitutional problem had they applied to women who could pay for 
medical care. The Second Circuit, for example, explicitly acknowl-
edged that it would be a matter of judicial concern if the regulations 
restricted abortion advice given to private patients who used a clinic 
receiving Title X funds. 78 
T he Court's reasoning can be challenged either by accepting its 
action/ inaction dichotomy or by rejecting it. First,-accepting the 
action/inaction dichotomy-petitioners very persuasively argued 
that the regulations did constitute government action. 79 Petitioners 
portrayed the government's offer to poor women of pregnancy test-
ing, medical advice, and referrals as affirmative conduct. O nce in-
side the clinics, most patients would rely solely on the counseling 
mandated by the regulations which was intended to deter them from 
obtaining an abortion. Had the government not provided this ser-
vice, some of these women might have managed to receive full and 
accurate information about abortion elsewhere . I t is arguable that , 
even if they could not afford to pay for alternate advice, they would 
be in a better position to judge their medical options without the 
biased information dispensed at Title X clinics.80 In this sense , pa-
tients are worse off than if the government had not become involved 
in family planning at all. "Lured into Title X clinics by the apparent 
promise of reliable health care, indigent women leave the clinic not 
merely unenlightened but affirmatively misled. " 8 1 
An alternative challenge is to reject the constitutional significance 
of the Court 's action/inaction dichotomy altogether. Indeed, the 
ease with which the regulations can be characterized alternatively as 
a mere failure to subsidize abortion counseling or as the affirmative 
manipulation of women's choices demonstrates the futility of the ac-
tion/inaction distinction as a basis for judging the regulations . We 
can easily recharacterize government omission as affirm ative inter-
ference: The sta te actively protects the rights of affluent women 
through laws that require informed consent, while deliberately pro-
moting ignorance of medical information among poor women. 82 As 
78. See New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401,413-14 (2d C ir. 1989). 
79. See Brief for Petitioners at 19, Rust (Nos . 89-1391). 
80. See Brief of Amici Curiae Planned Parenthood Federa tio n of America and the Na-
tional Fam il y Planning and Reproducti ve Health Associa tion in Support o f Pe titio ners a t 
17 , Rust (Nos . 89-1391 , 89-1392); cf David A. Strauss , Persuasion, Autonomy. and Freedom of 
£.,pression, 9 1 COLUM. L. REv. 334, 356-60 (1991) (arguin g that a ma nipulative res triction 
of acces s to informati o n, like a li e , violates individual autonom y) . 
8 1. Brief for Petitioners at 12, Rust (No. 89-1 39 1); accord Planned Parenthood Fed 'n 
of Am. v. Sullivan, 9 13 F.2d 1492 , 1500-01 (lO th Cir. 1990). 
82. The Constitution does con ta in guarantees of affirmative government protection. 
See Akh il R. Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse .·Is Sla ve1y: :1 Thirteenth .-lmen dment Re-
sponse to DeS haney, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1359, 138 1 (1992) (arguing th at th e a bsence of a 
stat e ac tio n requirement in the Th irteenth Amend ment implies tha t certain state inac-
tion is prohibited) ; David P. Curri e, Positive and .Vega tive Constitutional Rzghts. 53 U . CHI. L 
R ~::v. 864 , 87 3-80 ( 1986) (giving examples of a rguably positiYe governm ent duti es found 
in the primari ly negative Constitution): Steven J. Heyman , The First Duty of Coc•ern ment: 
Proteciion, Liberty and the Fourteenth :lmendment, 199 1 DuKE LJ 507, 512- 45 (trac ing the 
origins and develo pmenl of th e positive right to go ve rnm ent pro tec tion in Anglo -,\me ri -
ca n constitmional ism); Sunstcin, supra note 71, a t 9 (no ti ng that pri\·atc proper! \' and 
604 [ VOL. . 61: 58 7 
Rust v. Sullivan 
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW 
the regulations demonstrate, the welfare state wields as much power 
by withholding benefits as by coercive force. 83 In a society where 
survival depends on inclusion in an economy dominated by govern-
ment welfare of one sort or another, the consequences of exclusion 
may be more devastating than criminal punishment.84 
Changing the perspective from which we view government policy 
destroys the traditional significance of the action/inaction dichot-
omy. A constitutional lens that looks at the broader impact of gov-
ernment conduct on the status of subordinated groups diminishes 
the importance of that distinction. The critical questions become: 
Is the state perpetuating existing hierarchies of power?85 Does the 
government's policy further alienate an already-outcast community 
from society's privileges? 
II. Critique of Rust's First Amendment Analysis 
The contest in Rust rested on two First Amendment theories-the 
marketplace of ideas and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. 
Both theories assert that the aim of the Constitution's guarantees is 
government neutrality. This focus on neutrality cannot illuminate 
the regulations' injury to Black women because it fails to recognize 
the significance of speech and government restrictions on speech 
within the context of relationships of power. 
contract rights are positive because they depend on state enforcement of trespass laws 
and contractual arrangem ents). Professo r Sunstein gives two examples of the pos itive 
dimensions of current First Amendment law-government's obligation to protect speak-
ers from a hostile private audience and constitutional constraints on the common law of 
libel that , in effect , compe l those who are defamed to subsidize speech through the lo ss 
o f their own reputation. See Sunstein , supra note 72 , at 273-74. 
83. See Se th F. Kreimer , . .Jllocal!onal Sanctions: The Proble111 of .\'egatwe Rights in a Pos r-
twe State, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293, 1295-96 (1984); Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Cn constitu-
twnal Conditions Doctrine is an . .Jnachroms111 (with Particular Reference to Rehgwn, Speech, and 
..Jbortron) 70 B.U. L. REv. 593-603 (1990) (arguing that the subsidy/penalty di stinctio n 
cannot be sustained in light of the omnipresence of government spending and fundin g); 
Note , Cn constitutwnal Conditwns, 73 HAR V . L. REv. 1595 , 1609 (1960) (arguing tha t " the 
po wer to impose conditi o ns is not a less er pan of the greater power to withh o ld, but 
instead is a distinct exercise of power which must find its own justifica tion"). 
84. See Reich, supra note 63, at 1438. Charles Reich described the ways in which 
government la rgess increases the politica l and legal bas es for gove rnment power in hi s 
landmark article , The .\'e;u Property. Chie f among the m is the government's abilitv to 
"purchase" the abandonment of constitutional ri ghts . Charles A. Reich, The .\'no Prop-
erty, 73 YALE L.J. 73 3 , 764 (1964 ). Government funding also in creases governmental 
power bv expanding administrative di sc re tion in poli cymaking and inte rpreting legisla-
tive policy. !d. at 749. 
85. See Ro bin \Vest , Progressrve and Conserva ti ve Cons l!tutwna!islll , 88 ~v1rcH. L. RE\'. G4 l, 
693 ( 1990) ("The targe ted ev il IS no t irra ti o nal state ac tion , but state ac tion o r inacti o n , 
ra tional o r not .... that perpe tuates the damaging social, economic, do mestic o r p ri va te 
dominatio n of some gro ups b y· others." ) 
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A. The Marketplace of Ideas 
The freedom of speech theory framing the arguments in Rust was 
the marketplace of ideas model. The marketplace metaphor 
originated in Justice Holmes' dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United 
States, 86 which invoked "free trade in ideas" as the theoretical foun-
dation for freedom of speech. 87 It has since dominated the 
Supreme Court's interpretation of the First Amendment. 8 S The 
marketplace of ideas theory provides that speech should be pro-
tected from government interference because exposing the public 
to different viewpoints is the best way to discover truth. The theory 
posits that truth will prevail ultimately in public debate wherein all 
ideas are allowed to compete freely.s9 
Both sides in Rust viewed the regulations as government partici-
pation in the market's public debate on abortion. The point of con-
tention was whether interjecting the government's antiabortion 
viewpoint distorted an otherwise rational and fair marketplace.9o 
Petitioners argued that the government's participation in the mar-
ketplace potentially could drown out other viewpoints. 91 The gov-
ernment failed to see any distortion of the marketplace at all but saw 
merely the government's effort to add its voice to the debate. The 
test that both the majority and the dissent used to answer the ques-
tion of government distortion was whether the regulations violated 
the principle of viewpoint neutrality.92 The danger in the regula-
tions was that they breached the touchstone of First Amendment 
86. 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes,]., dissenting). 
87. See id. at 630; see also Lamont v. Postmaste r General , 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) 
(Brennan , J. , concurring) (using for the first time the phrase "marketplace of ideas" to 
support the right to receive ideas). Milton 's Areopagitica, which based freedom of expres-
sion on the search for Truth , foreshadowed Holmes's metaphor of the free trade in 
ideas. See JoHN MILTON , AREOPAGITICA (1644), repnnted in THE TRADITION OF FREEDOM 
28 (Milton Mayer ed., 1957); see also David Cole, Agon at Agora: Creative lv!isreadings in First 
Amendment Tradition, 95 YALE L.J. 857, 876 (1986) (pointing out Milton's foreshadowing 
o f Holmes' concept of free trade in ideas). 
88. For a description of the Supreme Court's consistent use of marketplace imagery 
in its discussions of fr eedo m o f speech, see C. EDWIN BAKER, HuMAN LIBERTY AND FREE· 
DOM OF SPEECH 7-12 (1989). 
89. See, e.g. , Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J. , dissenting) ("[T]he best test o f 
tru th is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market 
. . .. " ); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 , 375 (1927) (Brandeis , J., concurring) 
("[ F]reedom to think as yo u will and to speak as you think are means indispensabl e to 
the di scovery and spread o f po litical truth .... " ), ovemded by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 
U .S . 444 (1969). 
90. See generally Robert D. Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied Political Establish-
men t Clause, 67 CAL. L. REv. ll 04 (1979) (proposin g political establishment clause, 
impli ed from the First Am endment, that would prohibit government advocacy of polit-
ica l vi ewpoints that distorts the marketplace of ideas). Co mpare MARK G. YuDOF, WHEN 
G o vE RNMENT SPEAKS 204 ( 1983 ) (observing that government expression may distort citi-
zen judgment and drown o ut o pposing messages ) with Frederi ck Schauer, Is Government 
Speech a Problem~. 35 STAN . L. REv. 373 (1983) (re viewin g YuooF, supra, and discounting 
the impact of governme nt speech o n public opinio n). 
9 1. Brief for Pe titio ners a t 23-24, Rust v. Suliivan, ll I S. C t. 1759 (1991) (No. 89-
139 1 ) . 
92. See Rust, Ill S . C t. a t 1772, 1780. But see generally Paul B. S(ephan III , The First 
, Jmendment and Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. REv. 203 ( 1982) (suggesting " that a b road 
conten( neutrality rul e no t onl y obscures free speech ques tio ns , but is antithetical to an y 
rat io nal analysi s of freedo m of expression"). 
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doctrine-" equality of status in the field of ideas."93 By refusing to 
fund family-planning projects advocating abortion, petitioners ar-
gued, the government targeted a particular ideological viewpoint 
and forced doctors to be instruments for fostering public adherence 
to the opposite orthodoxy.94 This First Amendment analysis fo-
cused on the individual and on ideas. The constitutional evil was 
perceived as suppression of abortion advocacy. The right at stake 
was the individual's right to be free from imposition of the state's 
viewpoint. 
One weakness of the marketplace approach is that constitutional 
answers can vary, depending on the delineation of the "market-
place." Petitioners presented the marketplace as the limited forum 
in which poor and low-income women can obtain medical counsel 
and information-in other words, the Title X project itself.95 This 
marketplace is monopolized entirely by the government. Petition-
ers' construction of the marketplace recognized that poor communi-
ties have fewer resources to challenge the government-sponsored 
view. Respondents, on the other hand, described the government 
as a participant in a bigger marketplace of diverse ideas. 
An analogy in respondents' brief illustrates this distinction. Re-
spondents likened the regulations to a government grant to produce 
93. Chicago Police Dep't v. Mosley , 408 U.S . 92, 96 (1972) (quoting ALEXANDER 
MEIKELJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 27 
( 1948) ); see also Kenneth L. Kars t, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U . 
CHI. L. REv. 20, 28 (1975) (asserting that "Mosley is a landmark first amendment deci-
sion" because it declares that "the essence of the first amendment is its denial to govern-
ment of the power to determine which messages shall be heard and which suppressed"). 
94 . See Brief for P~titioners at 18-21, Rust (No. 89-1391); see also Rust, IllS. Ct. ac 
1782 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (using same argument). 
The free speech values raised in Rust illustrate the tension between individualistic and 
communitarian interpretations of the Constitution. While a liberal focus on autonomy 
questions the power of governmen t speech to influence individual choice, a communi-
tarian pe rspective recognizes the community's need to inculcate its members with a set 
of shared values. In contrast to the liberal opposition to th e regulations ' interferen ce in 
women 's abortion decisions, the community's competing interes t might support greater 
gove rnment power to impart its antiabortion message. For discussions of the tension 
between individualistic and communitarian speech values in o the r contexts , see Staniey 
In gber, Rediscovering the Communal Worth of Individual R1ghls: The First Amendment in !nslltu-
tlonal Corziex/s, 69 TEx. L. REv. l, 24-46 ( 1990) (discussing the tension between individu-
a li st ic and communitarian traditions and suggesting a First Amendment analysis that 
includes the communal worth o f individual rights);James C . O'Brien, The Promise of Pico: 
A :\lew Dejinitwn of Orthodoxy, 97 YALE L.J. 1805, 1823 (1988) (proposing an expanded 
app roach to orthodoxy tha t reso lves "the conflict between schoo ls' inculcative fun ct ion 
and the need to equip students for self- government") . 
For arti cles arguing that the government need no t remain id eologically neu tra l and 
shouid contribute its voice to the public debate over abortion policy. see Theodore C. 
Hirt , Why the Government Is !Vol Required /o Subsidi:e A. borlion Counseling and Referral, l 0 1 
H.-\RV. L. REv. 1895 , 1906 (1988); Edward G. Reitl e r , The Tit le X Family Plann ing Subsidies: 
The Government 's Role in Moral issues, 27 HAR V. J. ON LEGIS. 453 (1990). Sef generally Jo-
SEPH Tuss rvL\N, GovER>IMENT AND THE MIND ( 1977) (defending the government 's legiti -
mate , co nstitutional power to influence citizens' mind s) . 
95. See Brief for Petitioners at 22, Rust (No. 89-1391). 
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a television documentary that discusses family-planning techniques, 
but not abortion.96 The government may decide simply not to enter 
the market of abortion documentaries. In respondents' hypotheti-
cal, a lack of absolute control over the available information is what 
makes the government a market participant rather than a regulator 
of expression. Other producers remain free to present alternative 
views, including documentaries about abortion. 
T he government's analogy, however, mischaracterized the regula-
tions' overwhelming impact on patients' access to abortion informa-
tion . Nor was the proper analogy a solely government-owned 
station that forces all citizens to imbibe the state's message. The 
hypothetical that more accurately illustrates the injustice of the reg-
ulations is a society where the dispossessed only have access to a 
government television channel that broadcasts limited, mislead-
ing-even harmful-information, while the privileged have their 
pick of channels that provide a wealth of information. 
Petitioners' focus on neutrality among abstract ideas also limited 
the force of their argument. T he logical extension of this neutrality 
perspective is that government must stay out of the marketplace of 
ideas altogether and fund no viewpoint, or it must fund each and 
every viewpoint equally. T his approach has two immediate short-
comings. First, the Court pointed out that petitioners' assertion 
would mean that, if government chooses to subsidize one protected 
view, it also must subsidize all counterpart views.97 If the govern-
ment sponsored programs aimed at dissuading people from drink-
ing alcohol, for example, it must also fund programs that encourage 
drinking. State funding of messages promoting racial harmony 
would require funding for hate speech. This logical extension of the 
neutrality argument is undesirable both because the costs are pro-
hibitive and because we do want the government to be somewhat 
selective in its funding decis ions. 9 s 
Second, under the neutrality approach, the constitutional wrong 
was that the government suppressed only one of two reproductive 
options-abortion and not childbirth. T he government's "neutral" 
elimination of all pregnancy counseling would remedy this view-
point discrimina tion. T he government's to tal retreat from the mar-
ketp lace of reproductive information , however, would have a 
devastating impact on the health of poor women. 99 T hus, neither 
96. Brief for the Respondent at 22-23, Rust (Nos. 89-1 39 1). In fact, the federa l gov-
e rnment spends hundreds of milli o ns of dollars each year o n films, TV pro grams, and 
rad io broadcasts. Yuoor, supra n ote 90 , at 7. 
97 . Rust, Ill S. Ct. at 1772-73. 
98. See, e.g., Bob J ones Univ. v. Un ited States, 461 U .S. 574 (1983) (upholding se lec-
tive government subsidi es of non-racist educational instituti o ns) . 
99 . Mos t poor wom en of co lor bee financi a l and other barriers to receiving proper 
prenata l care. See C HILDREN's DEFE:-JSE FuND, THE H EALTH OF AMER ICA's C HILDREN 43-
-18 (1991) (di scussing women' s ina bilit y to pay fo r hea lth-ca re services); Ma ry A. Curry, 
>:onfinancial Ba1Tiers to Prenatal Care, 15 Wo~tEN & H EALTH 85-87 ( 1989) (d iscuss ing tra ns-
portat ion and ch ildca re problems that limit access to hea lth ca re sit es); Ruth E. Zam-
brana, A Research Agenda on Issues .·lifectzng Poor and .\!lnonty ll'omen: .·1 .\lode/ for 
L'nderstanding Thm Health Xeeds . 14 WOMEN & HEALTH 137 , 148-50 ( 1988) (d iscuss ing 
cultura l barriers to prenatal care) . In 1986. only half of all p regnant Black wome n in 
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solution to the problem framed as viewpoint discrimination-gov-
ernment funding of all viewpoints or government funding of none-
adequately addresses the harm caused by the regulations . 
The marketplace of ideas assumes not only a marketplace in which 
ideas trade freely, but also one which is open to all citizens who seek 
knowledge. 100 It is based on the fiction that prohibiting government 
restrictions on access to knowledge is enough to ensure access to 
everyone. The negative protection against government interference 
alone, however, overlooks the effect of existing inequalities of re-
sources in the marketplace. 101 It also ignores that many people are 
silenced by social domination on the basis of race, gender, and 
class. 102 A laissez-faire market inevitably will produce an exchange 
America received adequate prenatal care. See CHILDREN's DEFENSE FuND, supra, at 4 (ta-
ble 1). For my argument that the government has an obligation to provide poor women 
with prenatal care, see Roberts , supra note 18, at 1479. 
I 00. The Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional "right to receive informa-
tion " which limits the government's ability to restrict public access to information. See, 
e.g., First Nat') Bank v. Bellotti , 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) (sta ting that the First Amend-
ment "prohibit[s] government from limiting the stock of info rmation from which mem-
bers o f the public may draw"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 38 1 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) 
(sta ting that the government "may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amend-
ment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge"); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 
381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) ("It would be a barren marke tplace of ideas that had only 
sellers and no buyers."); cf. Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Withou t Romance: Public Choice 
and the First Amendment, 105 HARV. L. REv . 554, 568 , 573 (1991) (showing that public 
choice theory , which views information as a public good, suggests a government duty to 
promote speech). But see Benjamin S. DuVal , Jr. , The Occasions of Secrecy, 47 U. P1·rr. L. 
REv. 579 ( 1986) (defending government restrictions on the acquisitio n and dissemina-
tion o f knowledge) . See generally William E. Lee , The Supreme Court and the Right to Remve 
Expression, 1987 SuP. CT. REv. 303 (noting the Warren Court' s recognition of a First 
Amendment right to receive express ion); Note, The Rzghts of the Public and the Press to 
Cather Information, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1505 (1974) (discussing the free flow of information 
as an o bj ec tive of the First Amendment). The Court, however, has never interpreted 
this limita tion as a positive right of citizens to compel the government to provide infor-
mat ion. See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S . 1, 15 (1 978) ("Neither the First 
Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a ri ght of access to government 
informat io n or sources of informa tio n within the government's control. ") ; San Antonio 
Indep. Sch. Dis t. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 (197 3) (" (W]e have never presumed to 
possess e ither the ability or the autho rity to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective 
speech o r the most informed electo ral choice.") . 
l 0 I. See, e.g., Daniel H. Lowenstein , Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent 
Expenence, Public Chozce Theory and the First Amendment, 29 UCLA L. REv. 505, 608 ( 1982) 
(arguing that "the power of some groups to raise enormous sums of money to oppose 
ballot propositions, without regard to ... popular feelin g, seriously interferes with the 
ab ility of o ther groups to use the institutions of direct democracy for their intended 
purpose") ; Carl E. Schneider, Free Speech and Cmporate Freedom: A Comment on First Na-
tio nal Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 1227, 1287 (1986) (discussing th e 
Co urt 's unwillingness to acknowledge that institutions con trollin g large clusters of 
wealth pose First Amendment problems). See generally Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of 
Ideas: A Legitunating Myth, 1984 DuKE L.J. 1, 5-6 (de mons trat ing that the marketplace 
inevitab ly supports entrenched power structures and id eologies). 
102. See MACKINNON, supra no te 63, at 158 ("For women , the urgent issue of freed o m 
of speech is not primarily the avo idance of state inte rvent io n as such , but findin g an 
affirma tive means to get access to speech for those to whom it has been denied .") . The 
government often is implicated in this private silencing by gran ting to private citizens 
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of ideas dominated by those with the most economic and social 
power. The monopoly of mass media ownership and the difficulty 
of organizing participation by less powerful groups compound mar-
ketplace failures. 103 Government involvement may be necessary to 
counterbalance the overwhelming communications power wielded 
by corporate and wealthy interests. 104 The poor often must depend 
on the government to express or subsidize their views. 105 Thus, 
government intervention may broaden, rather than distort, the spec-
trum of views expressed. 
The focus on neutrality is one of the chief instruments of legal 
legitimation. It provides the conceptual means for concluding that 
"particular social practices are fair because they are objective and 
unbiased." 106 Liberal discourse concerning racial discrimination 
uses neutral principles in a similar way. Its assumption of a realm of 
the legal authority both to harm others through speech and to limit the speech of others. 
See J .M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 
1990 DuKE LJ . 375, 414; Sunstein, supra note 72, at 277. 
103 . BAKER, supra note 88, at 38; cJ. CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, PoLITICS AND MARKETs: 
THE WORLD's POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 173 (1977) (describing business' dispro-
portionate influence on government decisions in capitalist polyarchies) . Knowledge has 
become a valuable commodity, appropriated by private interests and sold by private 
enterprise only to those who can afford to pay its price. This privatization of informa-
tion fosters increased restrictions on access to knowledge, because this is the way that 
the market economy ensures information's profitability. SuE C. jANSEN, CENSORSHIP: 
THE KNOT THAT BINDS PowER AND KNOWLEDGE 168-69 ( 1988); cJ. Farber, supra note 100, 
at 579 (arguing that First Amendment protection provides nonfinancial motivation to 
encourage the production of information) . For a legal history of the confli cting ap-
proaches to information as a public resource and as a fo rm of private wealth, see Diane 
L. Zimmerman , Information as Speech, Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on ivlarketplaces 
and the Bill of Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 665, 674-724 (1992). 
104. See Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IowA L. REv. 1405, 1415-24 
( 1986) (arguing that the Court should encourage state intervention that enriches public 
debate); see also Owen M. Fiss, State Activism and State Censorship, 100 YALE LJ. 2087, 2104 
(1991) ("[A] decision of the state not to act-to go out of the fundin g business alto-
gether-might itself be a form of action prohibited by the First Amendment."). 
The Supreme Court generally has rejected government restrictions on speech 
designed to ensure a more balanced public debate . See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 
1, 48-49 ( 1976) (overturning campaign spending restrictions ; stating that " [ t]he concept 
that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in o rder to 
e nhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment"). In 
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, however, the Court for the first time uph eld limits 
on corporate campaign speech as a means of correcting "the corros ive and distorting 
effects of immense aggregations of wealth." 494 U.S. 652, 660 ( 1990); see also David 
Cole, First Amendment Antitrust: The End of Laissez-Faire m Campaign Finance, 9 YALE L. & 
PoL'Y REv. 236, 264-77 (1991) (discussing the potentially revolutionary repercussions of 
A us tin's recognition of the systemic distorting effects of wealth). 
105. See Balkin, supra note 102 , at 412 (proposing governmental investment in com-
munication technologies as a means of enhancing the substantive liberty of speech); 
Thomas I. Emerson, The Affirmative Side of the First Amendment, 15 GA. L. REv. 795, 799 
( 1981) (distinguishing between government promotion of the system of freedom of ex-
pression-facilitating expression by private individuals or groups-and government par-
ticipation in the system); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) 
(upholding the fairness doctrine which required broadcasters to present public issue 
programming, giving time to each side). 
106. Peller, supra note 52, at 775; see also Delgado, supra note 77 , at 2421 (describing 
the use of neutral, procedural terminology to submerge substan tive questions of subor-
dination). For an examination and critique of the prevailing concept of ne utralit y rooted 
in exis ting distributions of power in the context of a wide ran ge of constitution al issues , 
see Sunstein, supra note 71 . 
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"neutral" social practices developed outside the influence of racial 
history parallels the marketplace-of-ideas doctrine's focus on gov-
ernment distortion of an otherwise rational exchange of ideas. Ra-
cism, like viewpoint discrimination, is viewed as isolated incidents 
deviating from an otherwise rational decisionmaking process. 107 
Although conservatives and liberals differ as to the extent of desira-
ble race-consciousness, both embrace neutrality-or color-blind-
ness-as meritorious and divorced from social power. 108 Similarly, 
both the liberal and conservative positions in Rust relied on the 
principle of viewpoint neutrality to judge the regulations without 
considering their relationship to the distribution of power in 
America. 
Identifying neutrality alone as the First Amendment ideal accords 
with the claim that Enlightenment- "the free use of reason"-can 
abolish the bond between knowledge and power. 109 According to 
this view, it is possible to separate theory from practice, form from 
content, and to attain free inquiry and objectivity. It presumes the 
possibility of achieving "epistemological humility" by removing 
government censorship. 110 Government neutrality eliminates coer-
cion, allowing ideas to be judged on the basis of rational argument 
alone. The Enlightenment view, however, mistakenly assumes that 
reason-and not power-will determine the debate within the mar-
ketplace, as long as neutral rules are followed. 111 
It is important to rethink the fixation on viewpoint neutrality by 
107. See Peller, supra note 52, a t 779; see also Crenshaw , supra note 49 , at 1344 
(describing the "restrictive view" of antidiscrimination law that assumes that a raciall y 
equitable society already exists); Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discnmination 
Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MrNN. L. REv. 
1049, 1054 (1978) (describing the prevailing perception of racism as disconnected acts 
of "blameworthy individuals who are violating the otherwise shared norm"). 
l 08. See Peller, supra note 52, at 772-79 . Reliance on the supposedly neutral criterion 
of merit is used to justify the exclusion of Blacks and disguises the way that racism still 
influences decisionmaking. See Patricia]. Williams , The Obliging Shell (An Informal Essay on 
Formal Equal Opportunity), in ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 98, 98-110 (1991). See gener-
ally Go tanda , supra note 51 (explaining how the Supreme Court 's co lor-blind constitu-
tionalism fosters white domination) . Similarly, Mari Matsuda has demonstrated how 
employers ' use of a purportedly neutral standard to determine intelligible accents is 
ac tually a hidden exercise of power. See Matsuda, Voices, supra note 63 , at 1394. 
109. See .J ANSE1\, supra note 103, at 4-6; Gary Peller, The JV!etaphysics of American Law, 73 
CAL . L. REV. 1151,1159 (1985). 
110. See Martin H. Redish & Gary Lippman, Freedom ofExpression and the Civic Republz-
can Revival in Constitutional Themy: The Ominous Implications, 79 CAL. L. REv. 267, 281 
( 1991) (arguin g that the essence of freedom of expression is the doctrine of "episte mo-
logical humility," which protec ts autonomous decisionmaking from government 
interfe rence). 
I ! i. Contrary to liberal principles, neutrality is not necessa ril y th e critical prerequi-
site for auto nomous decisionmaking. Joel Handler, for exa mple, explains tha t in social 
work prac ti ce " client self-determinatio n justifies the abandonment of neutralit y." Joel F. 
H andler, Dependent People, the State, and the J\.Jodem/Postmodem Search for the Dialogzc Commu-
m!y, 35 UCLA L. REv. 999,1099 (l988);seealso Simon , supra note 17 , at 2-23 (describing 
the welfare jurisprudence developed by social workers during and after the New Deal); 
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considering the social and political context of government speech. 
An alternative approach examines the effect of government control 
of information on relationships of social power. It does not allow us 
to use the shield of neutral principles in order to avoid confronting 
inequalities in the power to communicate. This view rejects the illu-
sion that we can achieve knowledge without the taint of power. 
Rather, it purposefully examines how the relationship between 
knowledge and power operates in our society. It asks how knowl-
edge functions to secure the powerful and how it might serve to 
liberate the oppressed. This analysis reveals the real evil of the reg-
ulations: The government's control of knowledge not only sup-
presses an idea, it represses a people. This inquiry then calls us to 
determine what information is essential for self-determination and 
demands that the government provide this information to people 
who are dependent on government aid. 
B. Unconstitutional-Conditions Doctrine 
The other theory framing the First Amendment analysis in Rust is 
the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine. This doctrine provides 
that the government may not condition the conferral of a benefit on 
the beneficiary's surrender of a constitutional right, although the 
government may choose not to provide the benefit altogether. 112 
The doctrine rests on a negative vision of the Constitution. It 
presumes that the state has no affirmative obligation to fund the ex-
ercise of rights, but asks whether its conditional offer of a benefit 
requires stricter scrutiny than its denial of the benefit. 113 
Both sides in Rust accepted the premise that "[n]o one has a right 
to a subsidy for the exercise of rights to speech and privacy." 114 Pe-
titioners argued, however, that once the government had chosen to 
cJ. Margaret]. Radin, lv!arket-inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849, 1886-87 (1987) (re-
jecting the liberal position of neutrality as to the good life for human beings and advo-
cating instead an ideal of "human flourishing"). 
In Joel Handler's dialogue between social worker and client, the concern for client 
empowerment overcame any adherence to formal neutrality: 
[T]he workers were not expected to be neutral in this dialogue. This did not 
mean lack of respect for client autonomy; rather, it was a recognition of the 
possibility that the social context was conditioning the client ' s perception of 
her own interests. Neutrality would inhibit the dialogue and the ability to 
challenge the client to develop her own ideas as to her interests. It was also 
important for the worker to show herself as a distinct individual who had 
ideas and was capable of empathy and feelings of solidarity. Disdaining neu-
trality did not mean embracing paternalism. It was the client's choice to en-
gage in the dialogue and to make whatever decisions emerged. 
Handler, supra, at 1097. Ironically, in Rust, the isolated appeal of neutrality justified the 
abandonment of client self-determination. 
112. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1413, 1415 
(1989); Sunstein, supra note 83, at 593-94 n.2. Legal scholars have posited numerous 
theories to determine when a beneficiary's agreement to accept a conditioned benefit 
should be unenforceable. See Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Const ra int on Land Use Exactions: 
Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctnne, 91 CoLUM. L. REv. 473, 485-504 ( 1991) 
(cataloguing five unconstitutional-conditions theories). 
113. Sullivan, supra note 112, at 1425. 
114. Brief for Petitioners at 11, Rust (No. 89-1391); see also Brief of the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts, the Center for Constitutional Rights et al. as Amici Curiae in 
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subsidize family planning, it could not exact adherence to its an-
tiabortion orthodoxy through the imposition of viewpoint-based 
conditions on its largesse. 115 The Court rejected petitioners' un-
constitutional-conditions argument on the ground that the regula-
tions did not deny a benefit to anyone, nor did they prevent 
grantees from engaging in First Amendment activities outside the 
scope of the federally funded project. 116 The regulations simply re-
quired that Title X funds be spent on the purpose for which they 
were intended-establishing and operating projects that provide 
preventive family-planning services. 
Framing the First Amendment problem as an unconstitutional 
condition is also a demand for government neutrality. 117 This ap-
proach recognizes the potential for government use of conditions 
on benefits to prefer one constitutionally protected viewpoint over 
another. 118 As the Supreme Court noted in Speiser v. Randall, "the 
denial of [funding] for engaging in certain speech necessarily will 
have the effect of coercing the claimants to refrain from the pro-
scribed speech. The denial is 'frankly aimed at the suppression of 
dangerous ideas.' " 119 As with the marketplace-of-ideas model, ine-
qualities of communications power caused by social and economic 
disparities are beyond the doctrine's reach. 120 
One failing of the unconstitutional-conditions approach in Rust is 
that it focused on the wrong distinction. The doctrine classifies po-
tential beneficiaries into two groups: those who comply with the 
Support of Petitioners at 14, Rust (Nos. 89-1391, 89-1392) ("[A]mici do not suggest that 
the government is affirmatively required to provide women with information regarding 
their post-pregnancy reproductive options."); see also Sullivan, supra note 112, at 1497 
(stating that "a right against government distortion need not entail a right to govern-
ment equalization"). 
115. See Brief for Petitioners at 18, Rust (No. 89-1391). 
116. See Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1759-74. 
117. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 112, at 1506 (stating that the doctrine "preserves 
spheres of private ordering from government domination and ensures that citizens re-
ceive appropriately evenhanded treatment from the government"); Sunstein, supra note 
83, at 60 I ("[T]he current constitutional mainstream[] sees the unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine as an effort to preserve legal requirements of governmental neutrality 
under different social and economic conditions."). 
118. See Sullivan, supra note 112, at 1496-97. 
119. 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958) (quoting American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 
339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950)). 
120. See Sullivan, supra note 112, at 1497 n.359; see also Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of 
Rights: Toward a Positive Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions, 75 CoRNELL L. REv. 1185, 
1219 (1990) (placing the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine in the context of constitu-
tional rights that "function to prevent the State from imposing various deterrents ... 
above and beyond those economic deterrents that are a natural concomitant of a market 
economy"); cf. RoGER M. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 254-
55 (1985) (discussing the rational liberty position that regards the inequalities of market 
society as legitimate, but demands strict scrutiny where public measures exacerbate the 
significance of economic difference in ways that endanger basic liberties). 
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condition and receive the benefit and those who do not. 121 The crit-
ical inequality created by the regulations was not between those pro-
vided with government aid-i.e., clinics that do not advocate 
abortion-and those denied aid-i.e., clinics that do. The violence 
of the decision was not suffered by the physicians whose speech was 
restricted, but by their patients, the third-party beneficiaries of Title 
X. 122 Moreover, the violence did not consist solely of the distinction 
the government made between ideologies. Rather, the regulations' 
injustice lies in the distinction they allow between the powerful-
who attempt to control knowledge-and the dispossessed whose 
status is maintained through that control. 123 
The tortured history of the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine 
also raises questions about its utility as a test of constitutional legiti-
macy. Scholars have noted the use of the doctrine to justify irrecon-
cilable decisions. 124 Different justices have manipulated the 
doctrine to achieve desired results based on their respective sub-
stantive ideals. 125 T he doctrine was "invented by a laissez-faire 
Court bent on dismantling progressive legislation that reduced the 
liberty of corporations, but then perpetuated by a Court seeking 
strong protections for personal liberties." 126 T he Court more re-
cently has disregarded the doctrine, as it did in Rust, to weaken 
these very protections .12 7 
12 1. Sullivan, supra note 112 , a t 1496. 
122 . See Chervin, supra no te 37, a t 425 (recognizing the interdependence be tween 
unconstitutional conditions and the third parties they affect). 
123. Cf Sullivan, supra note 112 , at 1489-99 (discussing three distributive concerns 
that unconstitutional conditions present); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Uncons titutional Condi-
tions and the Distribution of Liberty, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 327, 334-3 5 (1989) (applying 
these distributive conce rns to the Title X regulations). Professor Sullivan's theoretical 
foundation for the d octrine centers on the "sys temic effect o f conditions on the di stribu-
tion of rights in the polity as a whole ," including the constitutional casce created by 
discrimination among rightholders on the basis of their relative dependency on a gov-
ernment benefit. Sullivan, supra n o te 112, at 1421. This sys temic approach recognizes 
that the regulations' unequal trea tment extends beyond discrimination between ideas 
about abortion: The regulations divide pregnant women into two "constitutional 
cas tes." !d. According to thi s view, the critical hierarchies of power are those created by 
the government condition itself-either vertical hierarchies between government and 
rightho lders or horizontal hierarchies among rightho lders-rathe r than by preexisting 
arrangemen ts of social power. An accurate account of the balance of societal power, 
however , must examine how the government condition fun ct ions in the part icular con-
text of race, gender, and class rela tionships. 
124. See, e.g., Sullivan , s·upra no te 112, at 1440-41. 
125. Compare United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. I (1936) (prohibiting Congress from 
using its spending power to purchase state compliance with federal agricultural policy) 
with South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (upholding conditioning of fed era l high-
way funds on state adoption of minimum drinking age); compare Sherbert v. Verner, 374 
U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that denial ofunemployment benefits to persons who refuse to 
work on Saturdays for religious reasons violates the First Amendment) with Lyng v. In-
ternational Union , UAW, 485 U.S . 360 (l 988) (holding denial of foo d stamps to strikers 
does not violate the First Amendment); compare Arkansas Writers' Projec t, Inc. v. 
Ragland , 48 1 U.S . 221 (I 987) (striking down selective exemption of specialty journals 
from state taxation) w1th Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (uphoiding selective state 
subs idy of only childbirth, no t abo rtion, expenses) . 
126. Sullivan , supra note 11 2, a t 1505. 
127. T hese conflicting uses of the doctrine contradict Professor Sullivan 's conclus ion 
that "(t]he doc trine occupi es a demilitarized zone between d ifferent substan tive theories 
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Kathleen Sullivan defends the unconstitutional-conditions doc-
trine as a useful method for identifying "a characteristic technique 
by which government appears not to, but in fact does burden . . . 
liberties ." 128 The state, however, appears not to burden liberties by 
conditioning benefits only if we accept the premises of the action/ 
inaction and positive/negative rights discourse. 129 The unconstitu-
tional-conditions doctrine explains the harm of government condi-
tions within the constraints of this discourse; thus, abandoning the 
prevailing use of these dichotomies would dispense with the need 
for the doctrine altogether. 130 We would then face squarely the crit-
ical question ignored by the Court: How can the governmentjustify 
its denial of information to people who rely on government aid? By 
addressing directly the issue of dependency and the opportunity it 
creates for oppressive government control of knowledge, we may 
develop a stronger claim to the government's affirmative 
obligations. 
The Court's reliance on neutral principles to address the First 
Amendment questions raised in Rust masked the regulations' vio-
lence and overlooked broader issues of social power. I have sug-
gested the need for an alternative approach that rejects the 
exclusive focus on neutrality with respect to ideas and considers the 
political implications of government speech. How does this critique 
sugges t a path for transformation? After explaining how Critical 
Legal Studies has freed us to conceive of and to create more just 
communities, Professor Anthony Cook asks a number of questions 
about the task that critical scholars face: 
of consti tutional law because it identifies a powerful technique of government manipula-
tion." !d. at 1505. I do no t believe that there is such a safe zone in constitutional theory 
unaffec ted by the struggle fo r substantive vision. Examining techniques of government 
power is an important part o f understanding the politics of law. The unconstitutional-
conditions doctrine , however, does not encompass the realm of power relationships in 
which government wields those techniques. 
128. /d. atl419 . 
129. See Sunstein , supra note 83 (advoca ting the abandonmem of the unconstiw-
tional-conditions doctrine as an antiquated conception of the regulatory/welfare sta te). 
Sunstein suggests that we replace the doctrine with an inquiry into "first , the nature of 
the incursion on the relevant right , and second, the legitimacy and strength of the gov-
ernment 's justifica tion for any such incursion ." !d. at 620-21 ; cf. Albert J. Rosenthal , 
Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REv. 1103, 1123 (1987) (re-
jecting uncons titutional-conditions principles as "far too blunt to serve as tools to sepa-
rate valid from invalid conditional spending"). 
130. The unconstitutional-conditions doc trine is necessary only to explain how a gov-
ernment condition on fu nding could possibly be unconstitutional when the government 
has n o obligation to provi de fundin g in the first place. If the government may constitu-
tionally deny the grant altogether, why should recipients be heard to complain about a 
res triction ? The doc trine a llows some protec tion aga inst such government interference 
with ri gh ts, while preserving the trad itional view that the Constitution confirms no af-
firmati ve claim to government subs idies. If the government were required to subsidize 
certain pro tened activities, however, there would be no need for a special doctrine to 
p rohi bit government condit ions that threa te n these ac ti vities. 
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How do we begin this reconstructive enterprise? What use do we 
make of our newfound liberation? If we are free to define collec-
tively our existence and to transcend our present context, are we 
any better equipped to act than before? How do we know that the 
community to which we aspire is better than the social order we 
transcend? . .. In short, what values and concerns will guide us in 
this reconstructive moment?l 3I 
We must move towards a theory that draws upon and cntiques 
current legal jurisprudence, but does not attempt simply to fit the 
experiences of Blacks and other dispossessed people into existing 
legal doctrine. 132 The task is to study the form and methods of op-
pression and to develop legal theories that seek to end it. Stated 
positively, we need a law of liberation. We will benefit in this pro-
ject from studying the works of scholars of oppression and libera-
tion, as well as progressive legal scholarship. The following three 
parts explore the role that the creation of knowledge plays in the 
oppression and liberation of subordinated groups. I rely primarily 
on Black people's historical struggle for knowledge in America to 
illustrate the relationship between knowledge and power. 
III. Oppression and the Control of Knowledge 
The regulations banned from publicly funded clinics information 
vital to a woman 's well-being, autonomy, and participation in the 
community. From the perspective of the people most affected , the 
regulations deliberately promoted ignorance among poor Black wo-
men.1 33 T hey are an example of the control of knowledge that helps 
to maintain the existing structure of racial domination. 
To understand the political implications of the state's promotion 
131. Cook, supra no te 19, a t 99 1. 
132 . See, e.g., Culp , supra note 5 1, a t 97-99 ; Alex M. Johnson , Jr. , The New Voice of 
Color, 100 YALE L.J. 2007, 2032 (1991 ); cf. Cook , supra note 19 , at 101 4 (stating as to 
Martin Luther King, Jr. 's multidimensional critical ac tivity, that "[d]rawing from the bes t 
o f liberalism and the bes t o f Christianity, King forged a vision of community that tran-
scended the limita tions of each and built upon the accomplishments of bo th " ); Robert 
Staples, What is Black Sociology ?, in THE DEATH or W HITE SociOLOGY 161 , 168 Uoyce A. 
Ladner ed ., 1973) (" If white sociology is the science of oppression, Black sociol ogy must 
be the science of liberation "); Cornel West , The Dilemma of the Black Intellectual, I CUL-
TURAL CRITIQUE I 09 , 122 ( 1985) (describing the "insurgency model" for Black intell ec-
tual work). 
Drucilla Cornell 's caution against over-reliance on tradition is relevant to thi s tas k: 
" We should not pretend that there is a better view of law and politics in the traditi on 
than is actually operati ve under even the most generous interpre tation. We must always 
be clear that we are bringin g out the pote ntial of the might have been. " Drucilla L. Cor-
nell , Jnstitutionalizatzon of Meaning, Recollective hnaginatzon and the Potential for Transfonnative 
Legal Interpretation, 136 U . PA . L. REv . 11 35 , 1205 n .225 (1 988) . For examples offeminist 
theory that reject patriarchal doctrine and methodology, see AUDRE LoRD E, The !'vi aster 's 
Tools IVlll Never Dismantle the 1'vlaster's House, in SISTER OuTS IDER 110 ( 1984); MAcK INNON , 
supra note 63, at 32- 45; Bartle tt, supra n o te 63 . 
133 . See supra no tes 40-43 and accompanying tex t; see also Brief fo r the NAACP Legal 
Defense and Educa tional Fund, Inc. , and Other Organizations as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Petitioners at 8, Rust (Nos. 89-1 391 , 89-1 392) ; Massachusetts v. Bowen , 679 F. Supp. 
137, 146 (D. Mass 1988) ("In its a ttemp t to implement a health ca re po licy which pro-
motes childbirth , the defen dant has devi sed a sys tem which res ts in large part on keep-
ing Title X clients in ignorance." ). 
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of ignorance, it is helpful to look at theories about oppression and 
the control of knowledge. The Brazilian scholar Paulo Freire illumi-
nated the relationship between education and oppression in his 
book, Pedagogy of the Oppressed. 134 Freire defines oppression as any 
situation in which one person hinders another's pursuit of self-affir-
mation as a responsible person, thus interfering with "man's onto-
logical and historical vocation to be more fully human." 135 The 
chief preoccupation of oppressors is to prevent the oppressed from 
taking steps to change their status. It is in the interest of those in 
power to keep the oppressed in a state of "submerged conscious-
ness," impotent to critique and transform their situation. 136 The 
powerful are so afraid that critical thinking will lead to revolution 
that they instinctively use any means , including physical violence, to 
keep the oppressed from this enterprise. 13 7 
The most critical weapon of oppressors, then, is the control of 
knowledge . Those in power control knowledge in three intercon-
nected ways: They attempt to determine social meaning; they rein-
force their dominance through education; and they stifle sources of 
information available to subordinated groups. These methods of 
oppression may operate outside the conventional political and legal 
processes. Their repressive function is not always curtailed by legal 
doctrines, such as the marketplace-of-ideas and unconstitutional-
conditions doctrines , which promote neutrality. The most potent 
instruments of domination go unnoticed in opinions such as Rust v. 
Sullivan. 
A. Social Meaning and Oppression 
T he most powerful mechanism for controlling knowledge func-
tions at the level of social meaning. This view of knowledge recog-
nizes the inextricable bond between knowledge and power. 138 In 
contrast to the Enlightenment claim of objective truth , this model 
134. FREIRE, supra note 38. 
135. fd. at 40-41; see a/.so MA UR ICE CORN FORTH , TH E TH EORY OF KNOWLEDGE 197 (3d 
ed. 1963) (asserting that oppress ion includes denying the oppressed " the opportunity of 
utili sing for their own inte res ts the knowledge and power whi ch ex ist in society"). 
136. FREIRE, supra note 38 , at 3 7. 
137 . !d. at 146; see also BELL, supra note 2, at 221-2 2 (d iscuss in g examples of Black 
leaders wh o were persecuted because they "p laced a hi gh priority on ridding blacks of 
their slave mentality") . 
138. See MICHEL FoucAULT, DISC IPLINE .-\NO PuN ISH: Tm: BIRTH OF THE PRI SON 27 
( 1977) (hereinafter , Fo ucAULT, DI SC IPLINE] ("[T]h ere is no po \\"Cr re lat io n without the 
correlative cons titutio n o f a fi e ld o f knowledge. nor any knowl edge that does no t pre-
suppose and cons titute at the same time power relation s"); i'vli che1 Foucault , Tmth and 
Power, in PowER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTF:R\'IEWS .-\ND OTHER vVRITINGS 1972-1 977, 
at 109-33 (Colin Gordon eel., 1980). 
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posits that knowledge is a social construct that emerges from rela-
tionships of power. 139 Power constitutes the interpretation of real-
ity through disciplines and institutions that permeate every aspect of 
our lives. How we experience the world-our very categories of 
thought-is determined by our social relationships. Thus, the regu-
lations contributed to shaping society's understanding both of abor-
tion and of the government's role in a way that supports existing 
social arrangements. By banning the mention of abortion, they de-
fined it as a degrading and dangerous experience. 140 They also re-
inforced the dominant view that poor women of color are not 
capable of self-determining activity or worthy of society's support. 
Those in power seek to preserve their sovereignty by creating and 
enforcing definitions of social reality that maintain the current social 
boundaries, excluding others from the privileges they enjoy. 141 
This epistemological function operates in the minds of both the op-
pressor and the oppressed. The powerful invent stories that create 
a shared reality in which their domination seems fair and natural. 142 
As we have seen, the law is a critical aspect of ideology that obscures 
the suffering of the oppressed and relieves the oppressor of his 
complicity in that suffering. 14 3 
The dominant culture tries to transmit this "wisdom" to 
subordinated groups as they interpret their own experiences. By 
teaching the oppressed the official story, those in power hope to 
snuff out rebellion at its inception. The oppressed learn that the 
present social arrangements are actually in their best interest and 
that change is inconceivable. 144 In this way, the oppressor attempts 
139. For a description of the sociology of knowledge, see KARL MANNHEIM, IDEOLOG Y 
AN D UTOPIA: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SoCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1936) . Its principal 
thesis is tha t modes of thought can only be understood by examining their social origins. 
!d. at 2; see also CoRNFORTH, supra note 135, at 3 (describing the Marxist s tudy of knowl-
edge, which asks "how ideas actually arise, develop and are tested in the co ncrete condi-
tions of real human life, in the material life of societv"). 
140. Stephen J. Schnably, Beyond Griswold: Foucduldian and Republican Approaches to 
Privacy, 23 CoNN. L. REv. 861,914 (1991). For a discussion of the constitutive struggle 
over abortion, see id. at 910-17. 
141. See, e.g., Minow, supra note 71, at 61 (1987) (discussing feminist recognition of 
the "power of naming" which takes "a male as the reference point and trea t[s] women as 
. 'different,' [and] 'deviant'") ; Martha Minow , When Difference Has Its Home: Group 
Homes for the 1\1entally Retarded, Equal Protection & Legal Treatment of Difference, 22 HARV. 
C. R.-C. L. L. REv. Ill , 179 ( 1987) (discussing feminist recognition " that knowledge a nd 
identity are forged in social relationships"); Peller, supra note 109, a t 1274-85 (discuss-
ing the representation of social hierarchies through a language "which es tabli shes the 
ca tego ries through which the rel a tion with the social other is mediated ") ; cJ Matsuda, 
Vozces, supra note 63 , at 1398 (explaining how accent is a social constructi on that e nforces 
soc ial boundaries). 
142. See Delgado, supra note 77, at 2412-13 ("The stories ... told by the ingro up 
remind it of its identity in re lation to ou tgro ups, and provide it with a form of shared 
reality in which its own superior position is seen as natural." ). 
143. See supra notes 62-66 and accom panying tex t; see also Peller, supra note l 09, at 
1289 (describing lega l thou ght as a "po liti ca l act of power'' in that " it institutio na li zes 
socially crea ted metaphors for th e representat ion o f social life"). 
144 . For a desc riptio n of Antonio Gramsci's conce pt of hegemony, the p revail ing 
consciousness that is internalized by the masses and supports the establi shed order , see 
CARL BoGGS, GRAMScr's MARXISM ( 19 76). According to Gramsc i, hegemony "en-
couraged a sense of fatalism and passivity toward political action; an d it justified every 
type of system-serving sa crifice and depriva tion. In short, hegemony worked in ma n v 
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to erase from the minds of the oppressed any memory of a dignified 
heritage or vision of a just future. 
American slavery epitomized the oppressive control of knowl-
edge. The brutality of enslavement was not limited to physical re-
straint; its captive power operated in the realm of the imagination. 
Slavery's critical tool of social control was to transform the African's 
identity from a human being into an object of property. Slavemas-
ters made slaves more vulnerable to subjugation by extinguishing 
the Africans' collective memory of liberty. 145 A Louisiana doctor, 
Samuel W. Cartwright, attributed runaways to a disease of the mind 
peculiar to Africans, which he called Drapetomania. 146 His cure for 
Drapetomania-which included medical advice and whipping-em-
braced slavemasters ' need to stifle their slaves' dream of 
freedom. 147 
Racial ideology is the particular manifestation of the control of 
knowledge to oppress Blacks in America. 148 The American psyche 
holds a set of consistent beliefs about the superiority of whites and 
the inferiority of Blacks that legitimate Black subjugation. Kimberle 
Crenshaw describes the hegemonic function of racist ideology em-
bodied in an "oppositional dynamic, premised upon maintaining 
Blacks as an excluded and subordinated 'other.' " 14 9 Under this 
pattern of oppositional categories, whites are associated with posi-
tive characteristics (industrious, intelligent, responsible), while 
Blacks are associated with the opposite negative qualities (lazy, ig-
norant, shiftless). 150 T he dominant society blames Blacks, rather 
ways to induce the oppressed to accept o r 'consent' to their own exploitation and daily 
misery." !d. at 40. As I exp lain in Part V , this unidimensional view of kno wledge and 
power neglects the ways in which people use knowledge to res ist their oppress ion. 
145 . Cook, supm note 19, at I 01 5 . The practices of forbidding slaves from speaking 
their native language, prohibiting the practi ce of African customs, and separa ting slaves 
with similar backgrounds reinforced the brutal detachment from Africa n socie ty. !d. at 
n.86 . See generally ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AN D SociAL DEATH: A Co:vtPA RATIVE 
STUDY ( 1982) (describ in g the rituals of enslavement in various cultures that contrib uted 
to the slave's soc ial dea th). Professor Patterson terms th e obliteration of slaves' genea-
logical and cultural roo ts, " natal alienation," which created a "socially dea d person." !d. 
at 38 . 
146. See KENNETH M. STAM PP, THF. PECULI AR IN STITUTION : SLAVERY IN THE ANTE- BE L-
LUM SouTH I 09 ( 1956). 
147 . !d. 
148. See RoBERT STAPLES , INTRO DUCTI ON TO BLAC K SoC IOLO GY 260-6 1 ( 1976). On the 
historical development of Black stereotypes, see GEORGE M. FREDRI CKSON, THE BLACK 
IMAGE IN THE WHITE ~'liND 256-82 ( 197 1) (discu ss ing the propagation of theo ri es o f 
Black inferiority and degeneracy at the turn of the century) ; jOEL WILLIAMSON, T HE CRu-
CIBLE oF RACE: BLACK-\-YHITE RE LATIONs IN TH E AMERICAN So uTH SI NCE EM,\NCIPATION 
111-51 ( 1984) (discussin g the prevalence of theories ncar the turn of the century that 
Blacks, fre ed fro m slavery, were re turnin g to thei r " natural state of bes tialit y") . 
149. Crr~nshaw, supra note 49 , at 1381; accord Lynn D. Tros t, IVes/ern .\Ie!aph)•sica! Dual-
ism as ,in Element in Racism, in CU LTUR.-\L BASF.S OF RACISM AND GROUP OPPRESSION 49, 49-
84 U ohn L. Hodge et a!. ed s., 197 5) (observing the "dualistic nature· ' of raost beli efs ). 
150. See Crensha w, supra note 49, at 1370-71 & n.151. 
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than racism, for the state of the Black community. Descriptions of 
the degeneracy and disintegration of the Black family, for example, 
have explained Black poverty, crime, and unemployment. 151 Popu- ~-· 
lar mythology degrades Black women and has reinforced the sys-
temic, institutionalized denial of their reproductive freedom. 152 
These images deny the humanity of Blacks, obscuring Black pain 
and the need for social change. 153 
Racial ideology also operates at a deeper level. The dominant so-
ciety constructs categories of thought that appear objective and di-
vorced from race, but which operate in conjunction with racial 
stereotypes to rationalize white domination. The universalist con-
cepts of free will and meritocracy support the belief that Blacks' ine-
quality results from their own disabilities rather than from racism. 154 
Eldridge Cleaver demonstrated how the white cultural dichotomy 
between reason and desire was another example of the language of 
power. 155 Cleaver emphasized the particular manifestation of this 
mind/body dichotomy in the "white supremacist discourse that de-
picted whites as rational and civilized, and blacks as irrational and 
lustful." 156 White culture's sexual repression manifested its deep 
fear of Black sexuality that both determined white identity and justi-
fied white domination over Blacks. 157 Cleaver's thinking suggested, 
"the very definition and content of rationality itself represented an 
ideology rooted in the sexual politics of race." 158 
B. Education and Oppression 
Education also serves the interests of those in power. In contrast 
to the liberal view of public education as a means of social mobility, 
radical educators have theorized that schools function to reproduce 
the dominant social structure, ideology, and culture . 159 Black schol-
ars similarly have seen public schools as vehicles for inculcating 
151. See J ewell H. Gresham, White Patriarchal Supremacy: The Politics of Family in Amenca, 
NATION , ju1y 24/31, 1989, a t 116, 11 8-19. 
152. Roberts, supra n o te 18 , at 143 7 (describing "how several popular images deni-
grating Black mothers-the licentious J ezebel , the ca reless , incompe tent m o the r , the 
domineering matriarch , a nd the lazy welfare m o the r-have reinforced and legitimated 
their d evaluation" ). 
153. See G resham, supra note 151, at 120 (describing the d o min a nt society 's r es ist-
ance to the concept of Black people as "vulnerable human beings") . 
154. STAPLES, supra no te 148 , at 260. See generally CuLTURAL BASES OF RACISM AND 
GROUP OPPRESS IO N, supra no te 149 (examinin g the concepts, va lues a nd structures of 
traditio nal Western culture, particula rl y Western duali s t tho ug ht, that support rac ism); 
John 0. Calm o re, E.\ploring the Significance of Race and Class 111 Representing the Black Poor, 61 
OR. L. REV. 201' 207 (I 982). 
155. See ELDRIDGE CLEAVE R, So uL ON IcE 155-92 ( 1968) ; j o hn L. Hodge , .\find, Body 
and Soul on l ee. in CuLTURAL BASES OF RACISM A:'\D GROUP OPPR ESSION, supra no te 149, at 
9 0 (di scuss ing Cleaver's ana lys is o f mind-bo dv dua li s m in Western th o ught); cf Kenneth 
L. Karst, Boundanes and Reasons: Freedom of E\presswn and the SubordinatiOn of Croups, 1990 
U. ILL. L. REv. 95 , 107-1 25 (discuss in g the dominan t culture's u se of the soc ia l con-
structs of Reas on and U nreason to subordinate Blacks). 
156. Pe ll er, sup ra note 52, at 805 (c itin g CLEAVER , supra note 155, a t 145-7 3). 
157. !d. 
158. !d. (citing C LEAVER, supra note 155, a t 145 -73). 
159 . Cu LTURAL AND EcON OMIC REPRODUCTIO :-J 1:-.: EDUC.H IO " (M ichael W. App le e el. , 
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Black children with the dominant white world view. 160 
Henry Giroux explains that schools reproduce the dominant so-
cial structure, ideology, and culture in three ways. First, schools im-
part to different social groups the particular knowledge and skills 
they need to occupy their assigned position in the labor force, ac-
cording to their class, race, and gender. 161 Jonathan Kozol's recent 
report on American public schooling reveals a two-tiered system 
that prepares Black children for inferior status through disparate 
funding. 162 He contrasts schools in affluent suburbs that provide 
1982); Henry A. Giroux, Theories of Reproductwn and Resistance in the New Sociology of Educa-
tion: A Critical Analysis, 53 HARV. EDUC. REv. 257, 257-58 (1983) [hereinafter Giroux, 
Reproduction in Educatwn]. Examples of the radical critique of schooling based on the 
concept of reproduction of the dominant society include HENRY A. GIROUX, IDEOLOGY, 
CULTURE & THE PROCESS OF SCHOOLING (1981) [he reinafter GIROUX, IDEOLOGY OF 
ScHOOLING]; IDEOLOGY AND PRACTICE IN ScHOOLING (Michael W. Apple & Lois Weis 
eds., 1983). For discussions of how legal education supports existing hierarchies of 
power, see Kimberle Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal Educa-
tion, II NAT'L BLACK L.j. I , 3 ( 1989) (describing the "perspectivelessness" require d of 
minority law students, who "must participate in the dis cussion as though they were not 
African-American or Latino , but colorless legal analysts"); Nancy S. Erickson, Sex Bias in 
Law School Courses: Some Common Issues, 38]. LEGAL EDuc. 101 (1988); Duncan Kenne dy, 
Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE PoLITICS OF L;,_w: A PROGRESSIVE CRI-
TIQUE 40-64 (David Kairys ed., 1982). 
160. See, e.g., Stephen Arons & Charles Lawrence III, The :v!anipulation of Consciousness: 
A First Amendment Critique of Schooling, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 309, 330-41 (1980); 
STAPLES, supra note 148, at 35-36. 
161. Giroux, Reproduction in Education, supra note 159, at 258. Standardized tes ting 
plays an important role in tracking Black and Latino students into an educational pro-
gram that limits their employment opportunities. See Arons & Lawrence, supra note 160, 
at 332-37; see also jACQUELI NE]. IRVINE, BLACK STUDE NTS AND ScHOOL FAILURE: PoLI CIES, 
PRACTICES, AND PRESCRIPTIONS 9-12 ( 1990) (citing studies demonstrating that tracking 
disproportionately places Black students in educat io nal programs that limit their 
achievement). For discussions of schooling and its reproduction of gender rol es, see 
Gail P. Kelly & Ann S. Nihlen , Schooling and the Reproductwn of Patnarchy: Unequal Work-
loads, Unequal Rewards, in CuLTURAL AND EcoNOMIC REPRODUCTION IN EDUCATION, supra 
note 159, at 162 (examining how schools reproduce th e sex rol e division of labo r in 
United States society); Terry N. Saario e t a l., Sex Role Staeotyping in the Public Schools, 43 
HARV. Eouc. REv. 386 ( 1973) (demonstrating how elementary school books, educational 
achievement tes ts, and differential curricular requirements contribute to sex rol e stere-
otyping); Linda Valli, Becoming Clerical Workers: Busmess Educatzon and the Culture of Femi-
ninity, in IDEOLOGY AND PRACTICE IN SCHOOLING, supra note !59, at 213-34 (describing 
how a high school office education progra m taught working-class g irl s a " feminin e work 
identity"). 
For a description of h ow the public school movement reinforced class di vis ions in 
nineteenth century industrial America, see jANSEN, supra note I 03 , at 155-56 (discussing 
MICHAEL B. KATz, CLASS , BuREAUCRACY, AND ScHooLs: THE ILLUSION oF EDUCATIONAL 
C HANGE IN AMERICA 3-55 (1971 )). Public schools resocialized children of the laboring 
classes to fit the demands of industrial production , while private academ ies prepared 
children of privilege for positions of leadership. !d. In 1828, the Boston School Com-
mittee described the benefic ia l effects of Lancasterian " manufacturi es ·· on students as 
"'disposing their minds to industry, to readiness of attention , and to subordination 
thereby creating in early life love of order, [and] preparation for business.'" !d. (quot-
ing Boston School Committee). 
162. See joNATHA N KozoL, SAVAGE INEQUA LiTIES: C HILDRE:-.: Ii'i .-\ MERicA's ScHOO Ls 
( 1991); see also Abbott v. Burke , 575 A.2d 359, 395-403 (N.J. 1990) (describing fa c tors 
that contribute to the "inferi o r qualitY of ed ucation in poorer urban districts" in New 
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wood-panelled libraries, computers, and seminar- size classes, with 
overcrowded inner-city schools that offer fragmentary curriculums, 
inadequate supplies, and decaying facilities. 163 For example, de-
spite twenty-three years of court challenges, per-pupil spending in 
San Antonio, Texas ranges from $2000 in the poorest districts to 
$ 19,000 in the richest. 164 
Second, schools attempt to reproduce the dominant culture by 
transmitting and legitimating dominant forms of knowledge, values, 
language, and style. 165 The curriculum organizes bodies of knowl-
edge in a hierarchy subordinating information about women, people 
of color, and the poor and working class. 166 T eachers reward stu-
dents who mimic the linguistic style and other aspects of the ruling 
Jersey, including disparities in curriculum, equipment, and phys ica l facilities) ; Brenna B. 
Mahoney, Children at Risk: The Inequality of Urban Educatio n, 9 N.Y.L. Sc H. J. HuM . RTs. 
161 , 165-73 (1991) (citing findin gs of reports on inequities in the quality o f urban edu-
ca ti on) ; Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal Duty fo r Urban Public Schools: Effective Education in 
Basic Skills, 63 T Ex. L. REV. 777 , 787-94 (1985) (describing the failure of urban public 
schools to provide adequate education, particularly to poor, minority students). 
Th e United States Supreme Court has upheld school finan cing schemes based on lo-
cal p ropert y tax bases that create these gross disparities among schools. See San Antonio 
lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 4 11 U .S. 1, 55 (1 973) (holding that the T exas school-
finan cing sys tem did not vio late the equal pro tection clause). Sta te cons titutions may, 
however , provide a stronger claim to equal educa tion . See, e.g., Abbo tt v. Burke, 575 
A.2d 359 , 408-10 (1990) (striking down New Jersey school-aid formula as a vio lation of 
the sta te constitution and manda ting increased fundin g for poor distri cts); Serrano v. 
Pries t, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) (ho lding that educa tion is a fundamental inte rest 
under the s tate constitution and applyin g stri cter scrutiny to educa tional di sparities), 
cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 ( 1977). See generally J ohn E. Coons e t al., Educational Opportunity: 
A Workable Constitutional Test fo r State Financial Structures, 57 CAL. L. REv. 305 (1 969) (pro-
p os in g a strict scrutiny standard fo r constitutional rev iew of ed uca tional finan cing); Ma-
honey, supra, at 171-96 (discussing recent sta te court decisions strikin g down school 
finance sys tems) . 
163 . See KozoL, supra no te 162, at 40-13 2 (comparing suburban and inner-city public 
educa tion in Chicago and New York City). 
164. ! d. a t 223 . 
165. Gi roux , Reproduction zn Education, supra no te 159, a t 258; see also Robert Dreeben , 
The Contribution of Schooling to the Learning of Nonns, 3 7 HA RV. Eouc. REv . 2 1! ( 1967) (ana-
lyzing how the social structure of schooling contributes to the socializati on of students). 
The Supreme Court views the inculcation of va lues as the proper fun ctio n o f publi c 
educa tion . Richard L. Roe , Valuing Student Speech: The Work of the Sch ools as Conceptua! 
Development, 79 CAL. L. REv. 1269, 1274 (1 991 ); see, e.g. , Hazelwood Sch . Dist. v. 
Kuhlmeie r, 484 U.S . 260 (1 988) (upholdin g rest ri ctions on stud ent speech in schoo l-
sponsored ac tivities that contradicts the schoo l's bas ic educational missio n); Bethel Sch. 
Dist. No . 403 v. Frase r, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (same) . T he Co urt 's o nly res tric tions of 
schools' inculcation of values have been limited largely to religio us issues. Arons & 
Lawrence, supra no te 160, a t 3 19; see, e.g. , Lee v. Weisman , 11 2 S. Ct. 2649 (1 992) (ho ld-
ing that the non-sectarian invoca tion of God at a public school grad ua tion ceremonv 
violated the Establishment Clause); Wisconsin v. Yoder , 406 U. S. 205 (19 72 ) (requirin g 
the sta te to exempt Amish children from co mpul so ry hi gh school a ttendance rul es be-
cause those rul es violated the right to free exerci se of religion); School Dis t. v. Schempp . 
374 U.S . 203 (1963) (holding uncon stitutio nal Bible reading an d p raye r in th e 
classroom). 
166. See Giroux, Reproduction in Education. supra no te 159, a t 268-69. H istory text 
books, for example , us uall y emphasize the acco mpli shments of white men an d mini mize 
those of women and minority groups . See J os hua Brown, Into the .\finds of Babes: .-!.Journey 
Through Recent Children's H istol)' Books, 25 R.·\ DI CAL HI ST. REv. 127 ( i 98 l ). Practical 
courses , such as industrial arts, ass ociated wi th the working clas s, are ran ked as inferior 
to theo ret ica l courses. See Giroux, Reproduclwn 111 Eduwlion, supra note 159. at 268. 
622 
Thus, th e importance of the hegem onic curri cu lum li es in both what it in-
dudes- with its emphasis on Wes tern hi storv, science, and so fo rt h- and 
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culture and punish those who rebel. 167 Finally, schools inculcate 
students with an ideology that replicates the current distribution of 
power. 168 For example, knowledge acquisition is evaluated as a 
matter of individual competition rather than as a collective process. 
In contrasting the traditional American learning process with that of 
the Amish, the Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder recognized the 
ideological aspect of schooling: 
The [public] high school tends to emphasize intellectual and sci-
entific accomplishments , self-distinction , competitiveness, worldly 
success, and social life with other students. Amish society empha-
sizes informal learning-through-doing, a life of "goodness" rather 
than a life of intellect; wisdom, rather than technical knowledge; 
community welfare, rather than competition; and separation from, 
rather than integration with, contemporary worldly society. 169 
The powerful attempt to control not only the interpretation of 
existing knowledge, but also the way people approach new knowl-
edge. We can tackle new information critically or assimilate it into 
the old categories of thinking. The oppressor's sovereignty de-
pends on how well people adapt to the prevailing order and how 
little they question it. 170 Those in power therefore employ a 
pedagogy designed to ensure that the oppressed absorb the domi-
nant world view without resisting. 171 Paulo Freire describes this 
pedagogy as the oppressive "banking" approach to education, 
which merely deposits information into the brains of receiving ob-
jects, discouraging critical and creative thinking. 172 Although the 
Title X regulations controlled knowledge dispensed in a clinic 
what it excludes-feminist history, black studies , labor hiswry, in-d epth 
courses in the a rts , and o ther forms of kno wledge important to the working 
class and other subordina te groups. 
!d. a t 269. 
167. See Arons & Lawrence , supra note 160, at 330-31 (telling th e storv of a group of 
Black high school students whose school demanded that they "walk and talk and wear 
the ir clothes in a way that made their white teachers comfo rtable " ). 
168. Giroux, Reproduclwn In Education, supra note 159, a t 258; see also J ean An yo n , 
Jl!orkers, Labor and Eco nomic His/or)', and Textbook Co rllenl, 111 IDEOLO GY AND PRA CTICE JN 
SC HOOLI NG, supra note 159, at 37-60 (de monstratin g the legitimation o f powe rful grou ps 
and denial of wo rkin g class ide ntity in 17 high school history books); Arons & Lawrence. 
supra note 160, at 323 (presenting a First Amendm ent critique of the practi ce of "ex-
pos [ing] children only to values and ideas that buttress th e sta tus quo and legitimize the 
pos ition of those in power") ; Stephen E. Gottlieb , In the X ame of Patriot z.sm: The Constitu-
tionality of "Bending" Histmy in Public Secondary Schools, 62 N.Y. U. L. REv . 497 ( 1987) (p ro -
p os ing implementatio n of a fairness standard for public school textbooks ); cf Sara L. 
Li ghtfoot, Polit1cs and Reasonmg: Through the Eyes of Teachers and Children, 43 l-L\RV. EDU C. 
REv . 197 (1 973) (demo nstratin g that the politica l ideolo gy o f Bbck e lementary schoo l 
teachers affec ts their educatio nal philosophy and prac ti ce). 
169. 406 U.S. at 211. 
170. FR E IR E , supra no te 38, at 63. 
171. See id at 60 . 
172. !d. at 58-66. 
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rather than a classroom, they too adopted this pedagogical ap-
proach. The government deposits limited information about repro-
duction into the minds of poor women. Its "pedagogy," like that 
described by Freire, treats women as objects to be manipulated by 
government policy and not subjects who participate fully in deci-
sions that determine the course of their lives. 173 
C. Oppression and the Control of Sources of Information 
The regulations' most direct consequence was depriving poor wo-
men of their only source of important information about reproduc-
tion. The exclusion from sources of knowledge has played a 
principal role in racial oppression in America. Criminal laws prior 
to the Civil War punished anyone who taught slaves to read or write 
and forbade slaves from meeting together for "mental instruc-
tion." 174 Whites were not allowed to employ slaves to set type in a 
printing office or to give books or pamphlets to slaves. 175 White 
slaveowners blocked the slaves' access to knowledge because they 
feared that a literate Black population would be more capable of 
rebellion. In his narrative, a former slave named Lewis Clarke tells 
why he never learned to read: 
I did not dare to learn. I attempted to spell some words when a 
child. One of the children of Mrs. Banton went in, and told her 
that she heard Lewis spelling. Mrs. B. jumped up as though she 
had been shot. "Let me ever know you to spell another word, I'll 
take your heart right out of you." I had a strong desire to learn. 
But it would not do to have slaves learn to read and write. They 
could read the guideboards. They could write passes for each 
other. They cannot leave the plantation on the Sabbath without a 
written pass. 176 
In 1863, Black illiteracy was over ninety-five percent; less than 
150,000 of the four million emancipated slaves could read and 
write. 177 
173. The regula tions did not seek to provide th e repro ductive information wom en 
need to make decisions about their health. Ra the r , like the " banking" pedagogy, the 
regulations d e termined what informatio n to withho ld fro m wo men to di scourage th em 
from taking a disapproved action. The " educa tion" provided b y clinics under the reg u-
lations was d esigned not to promo te women 's critica l thinkin g, bu t to achi eve the gov-
ernment's policy objectives. 
174. A. LEON HIGGI NBOTHAM, JR. , IN THE MAlTER oF CoLOR: RA CE AND THE AMERI-
CA N LEGAL PROCESS 198 ( 1978); INTERESTING (VfEM OIRS AND DOCUME1\'TS RELATING TO 
AMERI CAN SLAVERY AND THE GLORIOUS STR UGG LE Now !'vl.-\KI :\G FOR C ol\t PLETE EMA NC I-
PATION 239-40 (1969) (hereinafter INTERESTI NG MEV!OIRS OF SLAVE RY). Fo r a d esc rip-
tion of the political struggle ove r slave lit e racy in So uth Caro lina , see j ANET D. 
C OR NELI US, " \VH EN I CA N READ MY TITLE CLEA R" : LITERACY, SLAVERY, AND RELI GIO N IN 
THE ANTEBELLUM SouTH 37-58 (1991). 
175. STAMPP, supra n o te 146, at 208. 
176. INTERESTI NG MEMOIRS OF SLAVERY, supra no te 174, a t 80. Lewis Cl arke 's s tory o f 
his mistress 's violent opposition to his lea rnin g is remarkabl y similar to tha t of Frederi ck 
Do uglass tha t began thi s Article. See supra text accompa nyin g no te I. 
177. Du Bois, supra note 49, at 638. For accounts of the fiv e pe rcent o f slaves who 
managed to learn to read aga inst a ll od ds , see CORI\ F.LI US, supra no te 174, at 59-104; 
EuGEN F: D. G EN OV ESE, RoLL , JoRDAN, RoLL: TII E WoRLD TIIF: SLAVES i\t;.oE 561-66 
(1974 ). 
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After Emancipation, whites saw education for the freed slaves as 
the ultimate absurdity. 178 Most white Southerners regarded pub-
licly-funded education for Blacks at best an unjustifiable waste of 
private property, given that Blacks were thought to be incapable of 
learning, and at worst, a positive social danger. 179 The state-en-
forced peonage system that confined Black laborers to poor-paying, 
menial occupations relied on keeping Blacks ignorant and disorga-
nized.180 The typical sentiment was reflected in the expression, 
"schooling ruins a nigger." 181 
Southern whites violently opposed early efforts to educate Blacks 
and considered teaching Blacks to be an act of treason against the 
white race. Throughout the South, teachers in Negro schools were 
assaulted and threatened with death and schoolhouses were 
burned. 182 " 'Nigger teachers' was one of the most opprobrious ep-
ithets that the Southern vocabulary furnished." 183 Officials sought 
to conciliate whites by closing schools for Blacks, 184 and some Black 
schools remained open only with military protection. 185 W.E.B. Du 
Bois captured Southern animosity to Black education in the follow-
mg passage: 
The opposition to Negro education in the South was at first bitte r, 
and showed itself in ashes , insult and blood; for the South be-
lieved an educated Negro to be a dangerous Negro. And the 
South was not wholly wrong; for educa tion among all kinds of 
men always has had , and will always have, an element of danger 
and revo lution, of dissatisfaction and di scontent. Nevertheless, 
men strive to know. 186 
178. See Du Bois, supra note 49, at 637-48. The remar ks of a white member of the 
resto r ed Louisiana legislature, upo n pass ing one o f the schools established by th e 
Freedman's Bureau in New Orleans, reflects thi s view of Black learning: " ' Is this a 
school?' 'Yes,' was the reply. ' What, for niggers ) ' 'Evidentl y.' He threw up his hands. 
'Well , well,' h e sa id , ' I have see n manv an absurditv in m v life time, but th1s Is the cit max-'· ·· 
!d. at 637 (quoting J.J. Alvord, in R~PORT OF jo{NT CoMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION, 
39th Con g., 1s t Sess. 247 (1866)). 
179. !d. a t 637- 48. 
180 . ALLEN B. BALLARD, THE EDUCATION OF BLACK FOL K: THE AFRO-A~!ER ICAt\ 
STRUGGLE FOR K~OWLEDGE IN WHITE AMERICA 12-1 3 (197 3); DuBOIS, supra not e 49, at 
696-97. 
18 1. Du BoiS, supra note 49, at 645. 
182. Id at 646 . 
183. !d. at645-4 6. For an account of th e Ku Klux Klan's intimidation o f teachers and 
supporters of Black schoo ls, see They ll'ould :Vot Let L's Haue Schools , 111 BucK WOMEN IN 
WHITE Al\IERI CA: A DocuMENTARY HI STORY 11 2 (Gerda Lerner ed., 1973). 
184. In 1862, for exa mple, Edward Stan ley, the provisional governor of North Caro-
lina, closed a Negr o school in New Bern on the grounds that his mi ss io n \,·as to res tore 
the o ld lega l order, which forbad e teaching slaves to read and write. Du Bois, supm note 
49, a t 638 . 
185. Id at 6-!G-47 . 
186. W .E.B. DL· Bors , The Souls of Black Folk. 111 W.E.B. D u Bois: WRITINGS 357-54 8 
(1 986) 
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D. The Symbolic Significance of Exclusion from Knowledge 
The exclusion of the oppressed from knowledge also has symbolic 
significance: It serves as a powerful emblem of their inferior status. 
The denial of education was more than a reflection of stereotypes 
about Blacks' lack of intelligence or an instrument of subordination; 
it was the most powerful reminder of the hierarchical relationship 
between Blacks and whites. I believe it is this metaphoric role of 
ignorance that best explains the violent opposition of Southern 
whites to the efforts of the newly freed slaves to acquire an educa-
tion. Whites resented Black attempts at schooling so bitterly, be-
cause they saw it as an effort by Blacks to become their equals. 18 7 
Education, more than any advance made by Blacks, represented a 
threat to the racial prerogatives of all whites. Indeed, whites were 
more hostile to the establishment of schools for freed slaves than to 
Black ownership of land. 188 While white laborers received an edu-
cation inferior to the private schooling of wealthy whites, it was im-
perative that Blacks remained at the bottom of the hierarchy of 
knowledge. 189 Thus, a Southern Congressman declared in a 
speech: "Woe be unto the political party which shall declare to the 
toiling yeoman, the honest laboring poor of this country, 'Your chil-
dren are no better than a Negro's.' " 190 
The Supreme Court in Brown held that de jure segregation of 
schools was unconstitutional not only because of the tangible inferi-
ority of colored schools, but because of its message of subordina-
tion. 191 Segregated education did more than separate Black 
children from white children; it served to define Blacks as inferior 
and to exclude them from social participation. 192 The opinion in 
B-rown recognized one aspect of the symbolic exclusion created by 
segregation: Separation generated in the minds of Black schoolchil-
dren "a fe eling of inferiority as to their status in the community that 
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be un-
done." 193 It is true that the Court's focus on the psychological in-
jury of racial separation failed to address the institutional function 
of segregation and led to an inadequate integrationist remedy. 194 
18 7. Du Bms, supra note 49 , at 645 . 
188 . !d. a t 647. Eve n som e whites who supported the abo lition o f s lav ery a nd partic i-
pa ted in the Freedman 's Aid Societies to provide the freed s laves with fo od and clothin g 
\Ve re unwillin g to coop erate in any m o vement to educate th e Black communitv. !d. at 
64 6. 
189. See id. a t663. 
190. !d. 
191 . Brown v. Board of Educ. , 347 U .S. 483, 494 (1954 ). 
192. !d.; Cha rles R. Lawrence III, "One ,\.fore R iver to Cross "-Recogn i: zng th e Real hiJW)' 
m Bro wn: .~Prerequis ite to Sh aping New R emedies, in SHADES OF BROWN. supra n o te 50, at 48, 
50-54 [he reina fter Lawre nce, The Real 111J U? )' in Bro wn]; Cha rles R . La wren ce III, If He 
Hollers Let Him Go: Regulatzng Rawt Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 43 1, 4 39- 4 0 (inter-
preting segregated education as speech and Brown as the rejection o f its m essage tha t 
"blac k childre n are an untou chable caste" ). 
193 . Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. 
!94 . See DER RICK BELL, Th e Chro nicle cf the Sacrificed Black Schoo!chitdren. 111 AND \NE ARE 
N oT S AVED: T HE EL USI VE Q.u EST FOR RACIALjusTICE 107-118 (198 7) (discus sin g an a l-
te rna ti ve educa tiona l po licy tha t emphas izes Black control ove r its o wn sch oo l fun d s and 
adminis tra ti o n ra the r th an pup il deseg rega tion); HAROLD C RUS E, PLUR AL BUT EQU.-\L: A 
626 [VOL. 61 :587 
Rust v. Sullivan 
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW 
Yet the Brown decision stands as a landmark in constitutional juris-
prudence because the Court identified the connection between edu-
cational exclusion and racial domination. The Court in Rust, 
however, failed to see the symbolic significance of excluding mil-
lions of poor women from knowledge deemed essential to the 
health and autonomy of the privileged. This form of exclusion, 
more than any other, reinforces their inferior status and signifies 
society's disregard for their humanity. In the following Part, I will 
discuss how this exclusion is related to dependency on government 
funds. 
IV. Knowledge and Dependency 
A. Government Gratuities and the Meaning of Dependency 
In his groundbreaking article, The New Property, 195 Charles Reich 
described a critical feature of the dominant conception of govern-
ment aid, which he termed the "gratuity principle." 196 This princi-
ple holds that because "[g]overnment largess has often been 
considered a 'gratuity' furnished by the state[,] ... the state can 
withhold, grant, or revoke the largess at its pleasure." 197 The gratu-
ity principle accords to government in its role as dispenser of public 
funds the same status as a private giver. The recipients hold this 
wealth conditionally rather than absolutely, subject to confiscation 
by the state. 198 The gratuity principle thus creates a feudal relation-
ship between the government and grantees: "Just as the feudal sys-
tem linked lord and vassal though a system of mutual dependence, 
obligation, and loyalty, so government largess binds man to the 
state." 199 
CRITICAL STUDY OF BLACKS AND MINORITIES AND AMERICA'S PLURAL SOCIETY 244-57 
( 1987) (criticizing the NAACP's advocacy of public school integration rather than local 
control of schools); Lawrence, The Real!ryury in Brown, supra note 192, at 56-62 (arguing 
that the simple reassignment of pupils, teachers, and administrators ignores the systemic 
nature of segregation). 
195. Reich, supra note 84. 
196. !d. at 740. 
197. !d.; see also William W. Van Alstyne, The Demzse of the Rzght-Privilege Dzstinctzon 111 
Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439, 1440 (1968) (critiquing Justice Holmes's dis-
tinction between constitutionally protected rights of private citizens and unprotected 
government-granted privileges) . 
198. Reich, supra note 84, at 770; see also Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U .S. 587, 604-05 
( 1987) ("Congress is not, by virtue of having instituted a social welfare program, bound 
to continue it at all, much less at the same benefit level."). 
199. Reich, supra note 84, at 769-70. For another perspective on the relationship 
bet\veen dependent people and the modern welfare state, see JoEL F. HANDLER, TJIF. 
CoNDITIONS OF DISCRETION: AuTONOMY, CoM~v!UNITY, BuREAUCRACY ( 1986), and Han-
dler, supra note 111. Professor Handler proposes a cooperative, dialogic model of 
agency and client decisionmaking that preserves autonomy and dignity rather than 
domination. 
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The gratuitous nature of state assistance to the poo r is an impor-
tant feature of oppression. Paulo Freire explained how sta te aid in 
the context of oppression always manifests itself in a false generos-
ity: It never goes beyond the oppressor's "attempt to 'soften' [its] 
power ... in deference to the weakness of the oppressed." 200 The 
government's charity does not change the underlying power struc-
ture that sustains and justifies the state's mercy. Rather, "[a]n un-
just social order is the permanent fount of this 'generosity', which is 
nourished by death, despair, and poverty."201 Freire distinguished 
this false generosity of oppression with the true generosity that en-
ables liberation: "True generosity consists precisely in fighting to 
destroy the causes which nourish false charity."2 0 2 
The dependent status of the poor in America is reinforced by an 
ideology th<J.t separates and stigmatizes them as morally weak and 
"different from us." 203 Recent discourse increasingly has attributed 
the problems of the poor to their own behavior and has based pov-
e rty reform on correcting their social deviance through programs 
such as workfare-requiring welfare recipients to work for their 
benefits-aDd mandatory paternity laws.204 The rhetoric of poverty 
categorizes people who receive government aid as either "deserv-
ing" or "undeserving."205 The deserving are considered entitled to 
government assistance either because their impoverished condition 
resulted from forces beyond their control or because they earned 
benefits through previous work. 206 The undeserving, on the other 
hand, have no claim to public funds because they are considered 
responsible for their plight. 207 Thus, the public views disaster relief, 
disability benefits, and social security as entitlements, while it views 
welfare as charity. 2 0 8 
200. FREIRE, supra no te 38 , a t 28-29. 
201. !d. 
202. !d. 
203. See Ross, supra no te 66, a t 1502-03 (describing the rhe toric of poverty in Ame ri-
can culture and Suprem e Court decisions). 
204. See Martha L. Fin em an , Images of ;VI others m Poverty Discourses, 1991 DuKE L.j. 274 , 
277-85 (discussing povert y reform discourse as applied to single mothers): Lu cy A. Wil-
liam s, The Ideology of Dz vision: Behavior l'vfodification Welfare Reform Proposals, l 02 YA LE LJ. 
71 9 ( 1992) (criticizing recent welfare reform initiatives tha t focus on the d ev iance o f the 
poor). 
205. See M 1cHAEL B. KATZ, TH E UN DESERVI NG Poo R: FR OM THE \VAR o :--~ PovERTY TO 
TH E WAR ON WELFAR E 9-1 6 (1989). 
For another 3nal ys is of d ep endency in the context of th e Rust d eci sio n. see Wendy E. 
Parmet & Mary E. O 'Conn ell , Gag-Rules and Gra tuiti es : Why R ust Won't Go Awav (un-
publish e d paper on fil e with the author). The authors argue that the main func tio n o f 
the ideological distinction be tween earned and unearn ed benefits is to "insulate[ ] all of 
us fr om a recognition of th e d epth of our own dependence o n government , or th e neces-
sity o f the welfare sta te." !d. a t 14. 
206. Parmet & O'Co nn e ll , supra note 205 , at 14-1 5. 
207 . fd at J4. 
208 . See, e.g , J effe rso n v. H ackne y, 406 U .S. 535, 549 (1 972) (upho ld ing we lfare 
sche me that distm gUi shecl be tween undeservm g, able -bod1 ed poo r , and d ese rvmg , dJ s-
abl ed, and aged poor); cf. William H. Simon , Rights and Redistribution in the f!'elfare System, 
38 STAN . L. REV· 143 1, 15 16 (1 986) (describing the New Contrac t ve rs io n of priva te law 
welfare jurispruden ce whi ch "accords the highes t and most secure status to no mi na ll y 
priva te wealth, such as pension s, the second hi ghes t to soc ial m surance , and the lowes t 
to p ubli c assistance" ). 
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Black women on welfare are considered "undeserving" because 
of both their race and their gender. Blacks have experienced the 
precarious state of dependence more than any group in America-a 
condition Patricia Williams describes as "defining blacks as those 
who ha[ ve] no will ."209 As slaves, they were deemed chattel owned 
by others with virtually no protection by the law. T heir physical and 
mental well-being-indeed their very lives-were subject to the 
whim of white masters , as well as the brutality imposed by law. 2 10 
Slavery inflicted , in addition to individual white masters ' violence , 
the terrorism of the entire state. Because Blacks remain subordinate 
to whites in many ways-for example, many Blacks' dependency on 
the welfare system for survival-Black nationalist scholars have 
characterized the modern Black experience as a form of domestic 
colonialism. 2 11 Poor Black women 's reliance on government welfare 
makes them particularly vulnerable to government control of their 
reproductive decisions. 212 T he popular mythology about the social 
degeneracy of Blacks and the causes of their poverty places the poor 
Black community within the "undeserving" category of the poor. 2 13 
209 . See PATRICIA]. WILLIAMS , On Being the Object of Property, in T HE A LCHEMY OF RACE 
AN D R IGHTS 2 16, 219 ( 199 1). 
210. See Pa tricia J. Willi ams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstmcted 
Rzghts, 2 2 HA RV. C.R.-C. L. L. REv. 40 I , 421 (198 7). See generally GE NOVESE , supra n ote 
177, at 3 - 49 (discussing the paternali sm o f slavery and the hegem onic functi o n of sla ve 
la w); STA MPP, supra n o te 146, a t 14 1-9 1 (d escribing the ways in which m aste r s con tr o lled 
th e i1· s laves); id. at 192-236 (discu ss ing the legal e nfo rcement o f white d o mina ti o n o f 
s laves). Alan Watson con cl udes tha t " in English America on e mi g h t a lm os t say th a t a 
slave b e longed to every citi zen-at leas t h e was subordina te to every white. " ALAN W .\T-
SON, SLAVE LAw IN TH E AMERICAS 66 (1 989). Under the Fugitive Sla ve Act of 1793 , for 
example, even if a s lave managed to escape his m as te r , he was su bj ec t to captu re bv 
a n von e. See STAM PP, supra no te 146, at 153. Free Blacks in the North and South we re 
a lso subo rdina te d bv law. See IRA BERLI N, SLWES WITH OUT MASTERS 336-40 ( 1974 ) (d is-
cuss in g d e n ia l o f the r ights of fr ee Blacks in the Sou th ); LE ON F. LITWACK, NORTH OF 
SLAVERY : THE N EGRO IN THE FREE STATES 1790-1 860 , a t 64-186 (1 96 1) (discu ss in g p o lit-
ical, educat io n a l, and econ o mic repression against Blacks in the free s ta tes). R obi n West 
a rgu es that it is precisely thi s "dual sove re ignty" wh ic h the Fourtee n th Ame ndm e nt was 
intend ed to abo li sh. See Ro b in W est , Toward an .-J bolitzonzst l ntnpretation of the Fourteenth 
.·Jmendment. 94 W . VA . L. R Ev. 111 , 132 (1 99 1) . 
211. See. e.g., R oBERT BuuN ER, RAC IAL OPPR ESS ION IN AMER ICA 83 -89 (19 72) (ex-
plainin g th e fo ur bas ic com ponents o f co lo nizatio n and h o w th e expe ri e nce o f th e Amer-
ican co mm u nities fit s within these); I-1.-'. ROLD CRUSE, R EB ELI.ION OR R EVOLUTION) 76-77 
(1 968) (declaring that " the Ameri ca n Negr o has ex is ted as a co lo ni a l being" from the 
beginnin g, and th a t "the on ly fac to r whi ch diffe re nti a tes the Negro's s ta tu s from tha t of 
a pure colon ia l s ta tu s is tha t hi s pos it io n is m a inta ined in close pro ximit v to the 
do minan t racia l g ro up " ). 
212. See Roberts, supra no te 18, a t 1432 -3 6, 144 0 - 44 , 1457 n.l 9 7 (di scus sin g the vul-
nerability of poor Blac k wo men to prosecution fo r d rug use dunn g pregnancv, s te riliza-
ti o n abuse, forced cesarian sec ti o n s, and re mo va l of the ir children for n eglect d ue to lhc 
fac t tha t the ir assoc ia ti on s with welfa re age ncies p lace th e m under g rea te r government 
supe r vis iOn). 
2 13 . See K.-'.TZ , supra no te 16 1, at 23 -29 ; supra notes 148 -53 a n d accompa n ying tex t. 
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The distinction between deserving and undeserving poor is con-
structed according to gender, as well as race.214 Men are entitled to 
compensation by social insurance programs for their prior participa-
tion in the labor force, while women-especially single mothers-
are treated as dependent clients of the welfare system. 215 As unpaid 
caregivers, many women lack the relationship to the work force nec-
essary to entitle them to benefits. In addition, society blames them 
for perpetuating poverty by deviating from the norm of marriage to 
a male breadwinner.2I6 
This categorization of those who receive government assistance 
profoundly affects the way we view dependency. Because social wel-
fare programs are based on mere altruism, rather than any sense of 
collective obligation, it is likely that in times of economic hardship 
the "undeserving poor" will lose what meager support they have.217 
Dependency on the part of the "undeserving" has come to signify a 
lack of entitlement to the basic conditions of human dignity and 
membership in society. The current ideology of poverty, race, and 
gender links this form of reliance on the government with the forfei-
ture of a claim to constitutional protection. 218 Our society does not 
recognize any i~ury in violating the autonomy of the propertyless. 
It tolerates laws such as the regulations at issue because it cannot 
imagine poor Black women as self-determining people, seeing them 
as having no will. 
B. Dependency and the Constitutional Role of Property 
The preceding view of dependent people is a corollary of the 
Constitution's protection of property. The Court in Rust appeared 
to conceptualize speech rights as individual property, which could 
be owned by citizens or the government. 219 The government essen-
tially owned the knowledge at issue in Rust because it paid the sala-
ries of the doctors who dispensed it. Accordingly, the Court was 
214. See Fineman, supra note 204, at 283-84: NANCY FRASER, Women, Welfare, and the 
Politics of Need Interpretation, in UNRULY PRACTICES: PowER, DiscouRSE, AND GENDER IN 
CoNTEMPORARY SociAL THEORY 144 (1989). 
215. See Fraser, supra note 214, at 151-53. 
216. See Fineman, supra note 204, at 289-93 (linking the view of single motherhood as 
pathological to patriarchal ideology). I would add to Professor Fineman's identification 
of patriarchy in the images of single mothers in current poverty discourse, the racist 
devaluation of Black mothers. See supra note 152. 
217. See Richard Delgado, Zero-Based Racwl Politzcs: An Evaluation of Three Best-Case Ar-
gwnents on Behalf of the A'onwhite Underclass, 78 CEo. LJ. 1929, 1936 ( 1990). Two exam-
ples of the weakening of altruistic suppon for the poor are the recent termination of the 
Michigan general assistance welfare program and the passage of legislation in New 
Jersey denying additional benefits to children born to women on welfare. See Wayne 
King, Florio Signs an Overhaul of H'elfare, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1992, at B 1 (discussing Nevv" 
Jersey legislation); Don Terry, To A.void Deficit, ;\ifichigan Ends IVelfare to Some Adults, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 7, 1991, at AI. 
218. Not all forms of reliance on government funds entail this forfeiture of freedom. 
Our society views the millions of Americans who receive social security, Medicare, tax 
deductions, and other "earned" benefits as fully entitled to constitutional protection. 
See Parrnet & O'Connell, supra note 205, at 5-ll (discussing the ways in which "we are 
all recipients of government subsidies"). It is only the "undeserving" recipients of gov-
ernment charity who have lost their claim to self-determination. 
219. See Balkin, supra note 102, at 401 (observing that access to forums depends on 
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able to deny poor women this knowledge because they lacked any 
property right on which to base a claim. Once the government es-
tablished its claim to ownership of the speech, it won the right to 
restrict its use.22o 
The legal institution of property occupies a critical position in 
both liberal and republican constitutionalism. The interest in pro-
tecting private property structured the Constitution's concept of in-
dividual rights, as well as the limits of republican participation. 221 
Liberalism views property ownership both as the object of affirma-
tive government protection and as the shield from government 
abuse. 222 The centrality of private property in liberal thought 
originates in the Lockean view of human nature governed by perfect 
the state's enforcement of its own private property rights) ; cf Rand E. Rosenblatt , Legal 
Entitlement and Welfare Benefits, in THE PoLITICS OF LAw: A PROGR ES SIVE CRITIQUE, supra 
note 159, a t 262, 266-67 (discussing the "metaphor of private ownership") ; PATRICIA J. 
WILLIAMS, Gilded Lilies and Liberal Guill, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS, supra note 
209, at 15, 35 (discussing the "notion of privately purchased public rights"). For a cri-
tique of the view of rights as a kind of individual property, see Staughto n Lynd , Commu-
nal Rzghts, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1417, 1423-24 (1984); Cass R. Sunstein, Government Co ntrol ol 
Infomzation, 74 CAL. L. REv. 889, 916-18 ( 1986) (rejecting property-based not ions of in-
forma tion ownership as justifying broad restrictions on speech by government 
employees) . 
220. The Rust Court's treatment of speech as government propert y is reminiscent of 
the Court's rationale nearly a century ago in Davis v. Mas sachusetts , !67 U.S. 43 (! 897), 
which upheld a Bosto n ordinance banning any public address on public g rounds without 
a p e rmit. The Court adopted the reasoning of Oliver Wendall Holm es, then-Justi ce of 
the Mas sachuse tts Supreme Judicial Court: " 'Fo r the legisla ture absolutely or concli-
tiona ll y to forbid pubiic speaking in a highway or public park is n o more an infringemen t 
of the rights of a member of the public than for the owner o f a priva te ho use to fo rb id it 
in hi s ho use.' " !d. a t 47 (quoting Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N .E. 11 3 (Mass. 1895)). 
The Supreme Court rejected this vi ew forty years later in Hague v. Committee for In-
dustrial Organiza tion, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) ("Wherever the titl e of streets and parks 
may rest , they have immemoriall y been held in trust for th e use of the public."). But sre 
Adde rley v. Flo rida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966) (upholding state's d enial of access to jail 
entrance and driveway fo r student d emons tration: "The s ta te , no less than a priva te 
owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its contro l for the use to 
whi ch it is lawfullv dedicated."). 
22 1. For an ex~mination of America's property-based trad ition of co nstitutionalis m , 
a ttrib uted primaril y to james Madison , see jENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND 
THE LEviiTS OF AMER ICA N CONSTITUTIONA LI SM : THE MADISONIAN FR AMEWORK AND ITS 
LE GACY 141-202 (1 990). Professor Nedelsky argues tha t th e original focus on propert y 
crea ted a Co nst itution structured a round ine qua lit y by n eglec ting issues o f popular par-
tici pa tion in government and the rel a tionship be tween economic and politica l power. 
The Madiso nian Cons titution favors civil ri ghts ove r political rights as a means of secur-
ing property from the republican threa t of the propertvless majori tv. "For the Frarners. 
the p rotec tion o f property meant the protection o f unequal pro perty and thu s the ins ula-
tion o f both pro perty and inequality from democratic transformat ion .· · !d. at 2. For a 
con servative d efens e of the primacy of constitutional propert y ri ghts as the guarantee of 
pol it ica l liberty , sec jAMES W. ELY, JR ., Ttl £ GuARD L\!\ OF EvERY OTHER RIGHT: A C o!\ -
STITUTI ONAL HI STORY OF PR OP ERTY RIGHTS ( 1992) . 
222. See Rei ch, sujmz note 84 , a t 779. 
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freedom and equality to appropriate private property. 223 Tradi-
tional liberal theory excludes the poor by making no provision for 
the actual realization of their choices. The liberal connection be-
tween property and freedom ultimately dehumanizes those without 
property: "Locke objectifies the propertyless as 'things' to be man-
aged and controlled by the state, as mere means to the 
propertyholders' end of happiness."224 
Charles Reich used property's integral role in our constitutional 
system of individual rights as the basis for his redistributive 
claims .225 Private property affords individuals an essential base 
from which to assert their individuality and claim their rights. Be-
cause private property largely has been replaced by government lar-
gess and no longer can perform its protective function, Reich 
argued, society must recognize "New Property" private rights to 
public funds: "Only by making such benefits rights can the welfare 
state achieve its goal of providing a secure minimum basis for indi-
vidual well-being and dignity in a society where each man cannot be 
wholly the master of his own destiny. " 226 
Civic participation, the foundation of republicanism, also depends 
on material security. Only citizens who owned property were con-
sidered authentic members of the community capable of independ-
ent deliberation about the common good. 227 The best suited to 
govern were, in James Madison's words, " 'men of intelligence, pa-
triotism, property and independent circumstances.' " 228 Classic re-
publicanism considered the poor to be corrupt because they are 
subject to the will of another for existence; the dispossessed, there-
fore, were excluded from the public dialogue. 229 T he republican re-
vival has suggested instead that the connection between property 
223 . Cook , supra no te 19, a t 993-9 6 ; C RAWFOR D B. MACPHERSON , TH E PoLITICAL THE-
ORY OF POSS ES SIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBB ES TO LOC KE 3 ( 1964); see also j o hanna Brenn er, 
Feminist Politica l Discourses: Radical Versus Liberal Approaches to the Femini:at10n of Poverty and 
Comparable Worth, 1 G EN DER & Soc'y 447 ,448 (1987) (o bse rving that under libe ral po lit-
ical th ought equality is equal oppo rtunit y, and " fa irness exists when th e distributio n of 
individuals within unequal pos itions refl ec ts th eir indi vidua l qua lities") . 
224. Cook , supra no te 19, at 995; see also FREIRE , supra note 38 , a t 136 (including 
among the oppresso r's indispensabl e myths "the m yth o f private property as fundam en-
tal to pe rsonal human developme n t, (so lo ng as o ppressors a re the o nl y true human 
beings)"). 
225 . See Reich, supra note 84, a t 771-7 8 . 
226 . !d. at 785. Fo r a criti q ue of usin g New Pro pe rt y rights, rathe r than need , as a 
bas is fo r wel fare refo rm , see Simo n , supra n o te 208 , at 1486-5 15; Simo n . wpra no te 17, 
a t 23- 37 . Pro fessor Simon a rgues tha t th e New Property is antiredistri butive becau se it 
prov ides no bas is to challenge the confli ctin g clai ms of o ld p ro perty r ights, and it d is-
courages collec ti ve ac tio n by the poor. 
227. Frank I. Michelman , Possession vs. Distnlmtlon zn the Constltu t/Onal ldea of Property, 72 
10\VA L. REv. 13 19, 1328-29 ( 1987) (s uggest ing reaso ns fo r the o ri g ina l focus o n prop-
e rt y as the o bj ect of cons tituti ona li zed priva te rights). 
22 8 . NED ELSKY, mpra no te 221, a t 51 (qu o ting J ames i'vladison lette r to Tho mas J e ffe r-
son , 5 l!'ritzngs 66 (Dec. 9 , 178 7)). 
229 . See Akhil R. Amar , Forty .-l cres and a Jl ule. ,-1 Republican Theo1y of ;\ /inimal Entitle-
ments, 13 HARV. J.L. & PuB . Po r.'v 37 , 38 ( 1990); Derrick Bell & Preeta Bansal , The R epub-
llwn Revival and Racial Poli tics, 97 YALE L.J. 1609 , 16 12 & n.12 ( 1988); Linda K. Ke rber , 
M aking Republican ism Useful, 97 YAL E L.J 1663, 1665 ( 1988) (" [T ]he absence o f th e de-
pendent classes-defined by race, gender. and property-was essential to th e re publican 
view o f the wo rld , no t an eas il y co r rectable acc id ent. ") . But see l'vli che lrnan , supra no te 
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and political participation requires redistribution of wealth to pro-
vide individuals with the material prerequisites of civic virtue. 230 
For liberals, property is the barrier that protects the private 
sphere of individual liberty from the reach of government power. 
For republicans, property is the assurance of independence that en-
ables civic engagement. Both theories concerning the constitutional 
role of property demonstrate how dependence on government aid, 
viewed as mere charity, places human freedom in peril. 231 
C. Dependency and the Control of Knowledge 
The state's false generosity and the dependency it fosters com-
bine with the control of knowledge to perpetuate hierarchies of 
power. The gratuitous nature of government aid ensures continued 
dependency on the government, which, in turn, allows the state 
greater control over what knowledge is made available to dispos-
sessed communities. Government charity merely placates the poor, 
rather than providing the knowledge and other resources necessary 
to change their status. Freire explains, "[i]ndeed, the interests of 
the oppressors lie in 'changing the consciousness of the oppressed, 
not the situation which oppresses them'; for the more the oppressed 
can be led to adapt to that situation, the more easily they can be 
dominated. " 232 
The interdependence of discourse and material dependency re-
minds us that power does violence to both the body and the mind. 
227, at 1332-34 (arguing that the founders' focus on possessive property rights reflected 
a democratically inclusive republican conception given the country's economic and so-
cial circumstances of "a modest proprietary competence lying within reach of all"). Of 
course, Michelman's "all" does not include Black slaves who did not share the real pos-
sibility of property ownership. 
230. See, e.g., A mar, supra note 229; Michelman, supra note 227, at 1330-50; Frank I. 
Michelman, Property as a Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097, 1112 (1981). 
231. The embrace of the link between inclusion and property by both liberal and 
republican scholars demonstrates how deeply it is embedded in American culture. See, 
e.g., Amar, supra note 229, at 37 (arguing that socialism, in which the state controls all 
resources, is incompatible with individual liberty and democracy because "the citizen 
would have no ground of her own on which to stand, to define herself, and to resist 
government tyranny"); Charles A. Reich, Commentary, 100 YALE L.J. 1465, 1468 (1991) 
(arguing that "the idea of a propertyless people in a democratic society" is unaccept-
able). For a discussion of the "mythic power of property" in American society, see 
NEDELSKY, supra note 221, at 246-50. Nedelsky attributes the enduring force of property 
in American constitutionalism to a deeply embedded "psychological" belief that "prop-
erty rights bear a special relation to liberty." !d. at 250. 
232. FREIRE, supra note 38, at 60 (quoting SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, LA PENSEE DE 
DROITE, AujORD'Hui ( 1908)). This dual control reinforces society's dehumanizing image 
of the oppressed. See id. at 45 (stating that "the more the oppressors control the op-
pressed, the more they change them into apparently inanimate 'things'"). 
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Although ideology is a powerful instrument of domination, domina-
tion is grounded in more than ideology.233 It has a material founda-
tion that often leaves the dispossessed at the mercy of those with 
money and status. The metaphysical aspects of power/knowledge 
do not entirely explain the subordination of poor women of color. 
They lack reproductive autonomy not only because of the ideologi-
cal construction of dependency and opposition to abortion, but also 
because their material conditions place concrete barriers in their 
way. Their poverty prevents them from paying for the information 
they need; their dependency on the government makes them espe-
cially vulnerable to the government's antiabortion message. 
T hese coordinated tools of power are at work in the Rust decision. 
The Court held in Rust that poor women of color are not entitled to 
knowledge that the rest of society deserves. 234 It reasoned that their 
constitutional entitlement is to rely on the conditional generosity of 
the state, rather than to change the material conditions of their 
lives. 235 The Rust decision keeps these women in a state of igno-
rance that makes it more likely that they will adapt to social control 
of their reproduction. Both methods-the state's false generosity 
and the promotion of ignorance-serve to entrench the poor Black 
community further into the structure of oppression. 
V Knowledge and Liberation 
The relationship between knowledge and power is not unidimen-
sional. Knowledge is not merely an instrument of domination; it 
can also be a liberating force, a means of human freedom. 236 While 
the powerful use knowledge to dominate, the oppressed use knowl-
edge to survive, resist, and gain power. Knowledge, then, is not cre-
ated exclusively by the powerful and imposed from above. It is a 
contested terrain in which members of society struggle to determine 
the meaning of social events and relations. Thus, the connection 
between power and knowledge contains the seeds of both repres-
sion and emancipation. 2 37 
233. See Cook, supra note 19, at 992 (recognizing that subordinated people may be 
"limited by the existential constraints of enslavement, apartheid, intimidation, or pov-
erty that make meaningful social struggle difficult if not impossible"); see also Giroux, 
Reproduction m Educatzon, supra note 159, at 273 (discussing the concrete constraints on 
working class students as to academic freedom and privileges); Matsuda, Voices, supra 
note 63, at 1399 (describing the material and ideological dimensions of accent 
discrimination). 
234. Rust v. Sullivan, IllS. Ct. 1759, 1766-71 (1991). 
235. See id. at 1768-69 (stating that Title X patients were not entitled to government 
funding of abortion counseling). 
236. See PATRICIA H. CoLLINS, BLACK FEMI NIST THOUGHT 221 ( 1991) (discussing 
"Black women' s emerging power as agents of knowledge"); CORNFORTH, supra no te 135, 
at 189 ("[M)en are free not when their actions take place without causes but when th eir 
ac tions are determined by their knowledge of their own requirements and how to realise 
them."). 
237. See JANSEN, supra note 103 , at 7; cf Karst, supra note 155, a t 109 (observing that 
freedom of expression "is a mixed bless ing" for subordinated groups because it is part 
of the system of domination but also necessary for emancipation). Nor is the other half 
o f the relationship-power-a unitary concept. Power is also a human capacity that may 
be used to maintain oppressive institutions or to create more egalitarian ones. Black 
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The oppressed use knowledge in several ways. First, their obser-
vations of the oppressor's use of knowledge to secure power helps 
them to negotiate their own mechanisms for survival. 238 The op-
pressed are not completely fooled by the official story. Their knowl-
edge of how the system really operates, acquired from their own 
experience of enduring poverty and subordination, becomes a criti-
cal weapon of resistance. 239 
Second, the oppressed create their own counter-stories that resist 
and subvert the dominant version of reality. The oppressed have 
always known that their "[s]tories, parables, chronicles, and narra-
tives are powerful means for destroying mindset. " 240 Indeed, they 
appropriate for their own purposes the very ideologies intended to 
oppress them. For example, African slaves reinterpreted conserva-
tive Christianity as an affirmation of their humanity and a call to rev-
olutionary action. 241 Far from understanding the Bible as a 
feminist writers have stressed this alternative vision of power. See, e.g. , CoLLINS , supra 
note 236, at 224 (distinguishing between power as domination and power "based on a 
humanist vision of self-actualization , self-definition, and self-determination"); BELL 
HOOKS, Changing Perspectives on Power, in FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER 83-
92 (1984) (asserting that power can also mean women's ability to act to resist exploita-
tion and work towards transforming society); see also West, supra note 132, at 50-52 
(describing the "insurgency model" of Black intellectual activity which recognizes , in-
stead of the "ubiquity of power," "the possibility of effective resistance and meaningful 
social transformation"). The same point has been made about the connection between 
language and power. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 
96 YALE L.J. 1860, 1902 (1987) ("Language not only can express and confirm power but 
also can challenge and claim it."). 
238. See HOOKS, Introduction, supra note 237, at ix ("Living as we did-on the edge-we 
developed a particular way of seeing reality. We looked both from the outside in and 
from the inside out. We focused our attention on the center as well as on the margin. 
We understood both."); Minow, supra note 71, at 68-69 (discussing biculturalism as "a 
strategy of resistance and as a method for exposing the workings of power"). This mul-
tiple consciousness is expressed in the slave song: "Got one mind for white folks to see, 
'Nother for what I know is me; He don't know, he don't know my mind." LAWRENCE W. 
LEVINE, BLACK CuLTURE AND BLACK CoNSCIOUSNEss: AFRO-AMERICAN FoLK THOUGHT 
FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM at xiii (1977). 
239. See Cover, supra note 22, at 1608 (arguing that ideology is more effective at justi-
fying an order to those who benefit from it than it is at hiding the nature of the order 
from its victims); Lucie E. White, Goldberg v. Kelly on the Paradox of Lawyenngfor the Poor, 
56 BROOK. L. REv. 861, 885-86 ( 1990) (discussing how people in th e welfare rights 
movement learned to revalue their skills and abiliti es acquired from the experience of 
subordination and to us e them in the struggle for welfare rights ). 
240. Delgado, supra note 77, at 2413. 
Feminist consciousness-raising, wherein women construct a shared reality by telling 
stories about their personal experiences, is an example of resisting dominant ideology 
through narrative. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNO N, TowARD A FEMI NIST THEORY OF THE 
STATE 87 ( 1989) (describing consciousness-raising as a process that "gives both content 
and form to women's point of view"). For a discussion of femini st views on knowledge 
and power, see, for example, Drucilla Cornell, The Doubly-Prized H'or!d: A!yth, Allegm)' and 
the Feminine, 75 CoRNELL L. REv. 644 , 687 (l990) (affirming the ro le of myth in feminist 
theory as a way of "confirm[ing] a different view of the world"); MA CKINNON, supra note 
63, at 169 (defining feminism "in a way that connects epistemology with power as the 
politics of women's point of view"). 
241. Cook, supra note 19, at 1018. Anthony Cook gives a fa sc ina ting accoun t of the 
1993] 635 
legitimating text, slaves saw in scripture divine condemnation of 
their earthly subjugation: "To the surprise and fear of many whites, 
slaves transformed an ideology intended to reconcile them to a 
subordinate status into a manifesto of their God-given equality. " 242 
The act of creating an alternative version of the world helps to 
heal the anguish of oppression. It constructs a mental space where 
one can live somewhere in the past or in the future, free from the 
debilitating assault of oppression. Spirituals served this purpose 
during slavery. The slaves' religious songs created a sacred time 
and space that made their visions of the Biblical past and heavenly 
future immediate. 243 Lawrence W. Levine explains that, for the 
slaves , the sacred did not represent "a rejection of the present world 
but ... the process of incorporating within this world all the ele-
ments of the divine."244 This creative act is also the first step toward 
liberation. As Audre Lorde observed, "the true focus of revolution-
ary change is never merely the oppressive situations which we seek 
to escape, but that piece of the oppressor which is planted deep 
within each of us ."245 
T he counter-stories of subordinated groups serve not only to re-
sist the dominant culture, but also to create their own identity. 246 
Black women have a strong tradition of creative res istance to the 
dominant culture's norm of womanhood that denied thei r identity: 
"[B]lack women have had to learn to construct themselves in a soci-
ety that denied them full selves."247 For the women in Zora Neale 
ways that slaves used Christian ideology as the basis for surviving the brutalities and 
indi gnities of slavery. ld. at 1015-23. See generally GENOVESE, supra note 177 , a t 161-284 
(offering a critical assessment of slaves' adoptio n of Christianity); LEVIN E, supra note 
238, at 3-80 (describing the religious aspects of slaves). 
242. Cook, supra no te 19, at 101 8. 
243. LEVINE, supra no te 238, at 37. Africans also resisted enslavement by more con-
crete ac ts of rebellion and escape. See GENOVESE, supra no te 177, at 648-57 (describing 
the experience of hundreds of slaves who ran away to the North, Canada, and Mexico) ; 
STAMPP, supra note 146, at 132-40 (describing Nat Turner's rebellion and Denmark Ve-
sey's conspiracy). Black women res isted slavery through acts of rebellion aga inst their 
maste rs, such as assault , arson, poisoning, theft , participation in slave r evolts, and run-
ning away. See SARAH BRADFORD , HARRIET TuBMAN, THE MosES OF H ER PEOPLE (3d ed. 
1961); Eli zabeth Fox-Genoves e, Strategies and Forms of Resistance: Focus on Slave Women In 
the Uniied States, in IN RESISTANCE 143 (Gary Y. Okihiro ed., 1986) (describing 
slavewomen's participation in armed rebellions, as well as dai ly resistance aga inst their 
masters); Betty Wood, Some Aspects of Female Resistance to Chattel Slavery in Low Country 
Georgia, 1763-1 815, 30 HrsT.]. 603, 620-22 (1 987) (discussing the mul tiple imprison-
ments of three slavewomen in Savannah , Georgia, for their acts of resistance aga ins t 
the ir enslavement). 
244. LEVINE, supra note 238 , a t 3 1. 
245 . AuDRE LORDE, Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Dijference, in SrsTER 
O uTSID ER 114, 123 (1984). 
246. CJ Martha Minow , Identities, 3 YALEJ.L & HuMAN. 97,98-100 (199 1) (explorin g 
in works of fiction and judicial opinions how people negotiate the ir identitie s in the 
context of social and political structures of power). 
24 7. Harri s, supra note 18, at 6 13 (discussing the writings o f Zora Neale Hurs ton); see 
aL<o CoLLIN S, supra note 236, at 222 (discussing "subjugated knowledges, such as a Black 
women's culture of res istance") ; e. ch risti cunningham, Unmaddem.ng: A Response to Profes-
sor Angela Harris , 4 YALE J.L & FEMIN ISM 155 , 156 (1991) (arguing that Black vvomen's 
multiple conscious ness "sho uld no t be m ore than an intermediary s tep to the goal of 
whole , self-defined id entit y") ; Roberts , supra note 18, at 1468-69 (arguing thac affirm ing 
Black ·•.vomen's constitutional claim to personhood is especiall y su ited for challenging 
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Hurston's novels, "[t]he dream is the truth."248 Thus, the culture 
and identity of oppressed peoples is not simply the product of domi-
nation; it is forged from the constant battle over knowledge. 
This liberating aspect of knowledge is reflected in the camp~ign 
waged by freed slaves to acquire education during ReconstructiOn. 
Blacks' desire to improve their condition by means of edu~atic:n 
generated the fir~t mass movement for publicly funded education m 
the South. 249 Pnor to the abolition of slavery, there was no general 
education sy~tem suppor~ed by public taxation in t_he Southe2~~ states; educatiOn was considered a luxury connected with wealth. 
W.E.B. DuBois observed the remarkable contribution that the freed 
slaves made to the expansion of education in the South: 
Public education for all at public expense, was, in the South, a 
Negro idea ... . It was only the other part of the laboring clas~, the 
black folk, who connected knowledge with power; who believed 
that educatio~ was the stepping-stone to wealth and respect, and 
that wealth Without educa tion was crippled. Perhaps the very fact 
that so many of them had seen the wealthy slaveholders at close 
range, and knew the extent of ignorance and inefficiency among 
them, led to that extraordinary mass demand on the part of the 
black laboring class for e ducation. And it was this demand that 
was the effective force for the establishment of the public school 
the devaluation o f_ Black won: en and reinforcing their tradition of willful self-definition). 
Druolla Cornell, m her cnuque of Catharine MacKinnon's idenuficauon of femmm e 
desire with masculine constructs, makes a similar point about all women: "I am not 
advoca tmg that we d en y male powe r. 1 am only suggesting that we not make the mascu-
line our world by insisting that we are only what men have made us to be. " Cornell , 
supra note 240 , a t 693. 
248 . ZoRA N. HuRSTON, THEIR EYES WERE WATCHING GoD 9 (Il lini Books 1978) 
(1937). 
249. DuBo is, supra no te 49, at 63 7-69. Booker T. Washington poignantl y desc ribed 
the former slaves' yearn ing for ed ucation: 
Few people who were not right in the midst of the scenes can form any exact 
Idea of the mtense desire which the people o f my race showed for educatiOn . 
It was a whole race trym g to go to school. Few were too young , and no ne 
too old , to make the attempt to learn. As fas t as any kind of teachers could 
be secured ,_ not onl y were day-schools fill ed, but night-schools as well. 
!d. at 64 1. For a discuss io n of Black w omen's contribution to the movement for educa-
tion, see BLACK WoMEN IN \A/HiTE AMER ICA: A DocuM ENTARY HISTORY, supra note i 83, 
at 92 -11 8 . 
. The drive for educat ion after Ema ncipation was a continuation of Blacks' struggle fo~ 
literacy dunn g slavery . See generally CoRNELIUS, supra note 174 (descnbmg th e pohuca . 
and rehgw us context of Black \I,teracy durin g slavery). For enslaved Blacks, hte racy was 
the key to sclf-determma uon: Reading and writing, above all , pomted the wa y to free-
dom-first of all 111 the mmd and spirit , and often in the body .... [A)cqumng readm g_ 
and wn tmg ski ll s was an act of res istance aga inst the slave svstem and an assert ion ol 
identity by the litera te slave." I d. at 6 1. ' 
250. Du Bo is, supra note 49, at 638-41. Th e es tablishment of a free p ublic school 
svstem was stymied not only by the elite 's belief that education interfered with the ex-
ploita tion of laborers, bu t also by the fa ilure of white lab o re rs to demand it. The white 
laboring class relied on the poss ibility of becoming slaveholders themselves as the ir 
means of upward socia l mobilit y. ld. at 64 1. 
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in the South on a permanent basis, for all people and all 
classes.251 
Du Bois believed that the establishment of Negro schools built an 
"inner culture" that enabled Blacks to withstand the white reaction 
to Reconstruction. 252 Blacks had not acquired a sufficiently stable 
economic stake in land and capital in the ten years since Emancipa-
tion. Instead, it was their knowledge that allowed them to resist the 
effort to drive them back into slavery. 
The Black community's desire to gain control over knowledge has 
been manifested in recent decades in the demand for local control 
of education. Malcolm X, for example, understood school segrega-
tion within the context of racial domination: "A segregated school 
system produces children who, when they graduate, graduate with 
crippled minds. But this does not mean that a school is segregated 
because it's all black. A segregated school means a school that is 
controlled by people who have no real interest in it whatsoever."253 
He advocated as the solution, not integrating Black and white 
school children, but liberating schools that teach Black children 
from white control. 254 Popular movements for community control 
over schools in poor urban neighborhoods such as Harlem and 
Ocean Hill-Brownsville in New York City and Adams-Morgan in 
Washington, D.C. in the 1960s were attempts to implement this 
view.2ss 
Black people's resistance to the dominant interpretation ofknowl-
edge has been directed at legal ideology, as well. Within the strug-
gle for racial justice, there lies a tradition of reconstructing the 
Cons titution as a text of liberation. Frederick Douglass broke with 
Garrisonian abolitionists who rejected the Constitution as a slave-
holding instrument to adopt his own radical cons titutionalism. 256 
Douglass gave the following account of his decision to embrace the 
Constitution: 
By such a course of thought and reading I was conducted to the 
25 1. !d. at 638 , 641. 
252. !d. at 667; see also BALLARD, supra note 180, a t 22 -26 (discussing the accomplish-
ments of the first Black colleges). Blacks made remarkable progress in education during 
Reco nstructio n . In the period between 1860 and 1880, the propo rtion of Blacks who 
were literate grew from 10% to 30'/'o, and of Black ch ild ren who attended public 
schools, from 2% to 34'/'o. BELL, supra note 2, a t 288 n.S. 
253. MALCO LM X, MALCOLM X SPEAKS 42 (George Breitman ed., 1965). 
254. !d. 
255. See Robert C. Maynard, Black Natwnalisrn and Commwuty Schools, in COMMUNITY 
CoNTROL OF ScHOOLS 100- 11 (Henry M. Levin eel., 1970); Peller, supra note 52, a t 800-
0 1 & n. 89. Some Black educators advoca te th e adoption of an Afrocentric curriculum as 
a means of asserting community control over predominantly Black sch ools and increas-
ing the se lf-esteem of Black students. See, e.g., Molefi K. Asante, The .-l.jrocentric Idea in 
Education, 60]. NEGRO Enuc. 170 (1991); Sonia R.Jarvis , Brown and the Afrocentric Curric-
ulwn, l 0 1 YALE L.J. 1285, 1293 (1 992); Serge ~'! adhere, Self-Esteem of African American 
Preadolescents: Theoretical and Practical Considerations, 60 J. NEGRO Eouc . 47 (1 99 1) . 
256. See Cover , supra note 66, at 37 -38; Matsuda, supra note 19, at 334-35 , 34 1 
(describ ing Frederi ck Douglass ' interp retation of the Cons titution as a " blueprint for 
fundame ntal social change"). 
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conclusion that the Constitution of the United States-inaugu-
rated "to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure do-
mestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the 
general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty"- could not 
well have been designed at the same time to maintain and perpet-
uate a system of rapine and murder like slavery, especially as not 
one word can be found in the Constitution to authorize such a 
belief Then, again, if the declared purposes of an instrument are 
to govern the meaning of all its parts and details, as they clearly 
should, the Constitution of our country is our warrant for the abo-
lition of slavery in every State of the Union .257 
The liberating dimension of Douglass' constitutional interpretation 
was his redemptive vision-"a vision of an alternative world in 
which the entire order of American slavery would be without foun-
dation in law."258 A century later, Martin Luther King, Jr. offered 
the civil rights movement a transformative vision of the Beloved 
Community. 259 Dr. King envisioned a rule of law, rooted in the ex-
perience of the oppressed, that rejected the liberal subordination of 
human freedom to the security of property and required the state to 
remove both public and private obstacles to liberation.260 
For Dr. King, the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happi-
ness meant that "all individuals everywhere should have 'three 
meals a day for their bodies, education and culture for their 
minds, and dignity, equality and freedom for their spirits.' " T his 
vision required that the state affirmatively create the institutions 
necessary to realize these natural rights. 26 1 
Pedagogy can also be liberating. Henry Giroux criticizes the re-
production theory of education for discounting the possibility of 
resistance and thereby "offer[ing] little hope fo r challenging and 
changing the repressive features of schooling. " 262 In fact, schools 
do not simply transmit ideology onto blank slates; they often en-
counter resistance by teachers, students, and parents. Giroux chal-
lenges radical educators to develop a critical pedagogy that not only 
unravels the processes of reproduction, but also examines the dy-
namics of social transformation. 2 63 This task requires analyzing stu-
dents' oppositional behavior as possible acts of res is tance 
manifesting moral and political indignation. 2 64 
257 . DouGLASS , supra note 1, at 267. 
258. Cover, supra note 66, at 38. 
259. See Cook, supra note 19, at 1033-41. 
260. See id. 
26 1. !d. at 1034-35 (quoting Martin L. King, Jr. , Nobel Pri::.e Acceptance Speech, reprinted 
111 NE G RO HrsT. BuLL. , May 1968, at 21). 
262. Giroux, Reproduction in Education, supra note 159, at 259. 
263. !d. at 289-93. 
264 . /d. ; GIROUX, I DEOLO G Y OF S CH O O LI NG , supra note 159 , a t 79- !09 . 
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Paulo Freire similarly advocates an alternative pedagogy of libera-
tion that rejects the banking approach to education. His model re-
places the educational method of depositing information with 
posing problems concerning people in their relations with the 
world. 265 This liberating pedagogy encourages students both to ex-
amine the historical roots of oppressive institutions and to imagine 
the implementation of new structures; students are not docile listen-
ers, but are jointly responsible with teachers for a process in which 
they all grow. 266 This critical consciousness leads oppressed people 
to understand oppression as a historical reality that they can change. 
VI. Liberation Theory: The Government's Affirmative Duty to 
Provide Information 
What lessons can we learn from this account of the oppressive 
and liberating potential of knowledge? What insights can it lend to 
our reconstructive project? This Part explores using the study of 
oppression and liberation as a focus for progressive constitutional 
doctrine. It accepts Dr. King's liberationist understanding of liberty 
that requires the state affirmatively to remove the public and private 
constraints on freedom and to create institutions supporting the 
ideals ofliberty and equality. 267 It shares Frederick Douglass' vision 
of an alternative constitutionalism in which racial subordination is 
without foundation in law. 268 A liberation theory would be aimed at 
ending the oppressive control of knowledge available to the Black 
community and ensuring the information necessary for Black eman-
cipation. T he preceding examination of dependency and the con-
trol of knowledge suggests two features of a liberating constitutional 
vision: It would recognize the importance of information for self-
determination, and it would place an affirmative obligation on the 
government to provide this information to people who are depen-
dent on government funds. 
265. FREIRE, supra note 38, a t 66-68; Paulo Fre ire , The Problem-Posing Concept of Educa-
twn as an Instrument fo r Liberation, in EDUCATION AND AMERICAN CULTURE 392-93 (Eliza-
be th Steiner et a l. , eds., 1980) . For Paulo Freire's thinking o n the ro le of educa tio n in 
libera tion s tru ggles, see PAULO FREIRE, THE Po LITICS OF EDUCATION: CuLTUR E, Po wER , 
AN D LIBERATION (1985). J o hn Dewey's philosophy of d e mocra tic education similarly rec-
ognized the potential role of schools in developing s tudents' critical capacities tha t 
would enable them to p art icipa te in the d e mocra tic process. See JOHN DEWEY, DEMOC-
RACY AND EDUCATIO N (1916); see also AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATIO N (1987) (dis-
cussing the d emocra tic ideal that all children must be taught enou g h to be ab le to 
participate in the political process). 
266. FRE IR E, supra note 38, a t 66-68. 
267. See supra n otes 259-61 and accompan ying text. 
268. See supra no tes 256-58 a nd accompa nying text; see also Robin Wes t, The Idea l of 
Liberty: A Comment on Michael H. v. G erald D. , 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1373, 1380 (1991) 
(suggest ing a possible unde rsta nding o f libe rty as " libera tio n from any number of perni-
cious constra ints, whethe r impo sed by th e state , private persons , or nature"); West , 
supra note 210 , at 149 (interpreti ng the Fourteenth Amendment as a "charte r o f positive 
liberty or a charter pro tec ting o ur righ t to be self-governing, autonomous, free of o ther 
rulers, mas ters, or superio rs, within the confines of the rul e of law "). 
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A. Knowledge and Liberation 
The essential ingredient of liberation is the participation of the 
oppressed in the revolutionary process. 269 The oppressed must 
take responsibility for the struggle against their subordination by 
shedding their status as dominated and alienated objects and assum-
ing the status of subjects who act to achieve their full humanity. 
This emancipatory transformation clearly encompasses the acquisi-
tion of the information at issue in Rust. Our society has determined 
already that medical information is essential to human dignity and 
self-determination. The common law doctrine of informed consent 
requires the physician's complete disclosure of the risks involved in 
a recommended treatment and of all reasonable medical alterna-
tives.270 Ideally, the doctrine protects the patient's autonomy by en-
suring her informed participation in a cooperative decisionmaking 
process. 271 In addition, the medical profession recognizes in its eth-
ical canons the patient's right to receive disclosure of medical risks 
and alternatives. 27 2 The Supreme Court recognized the constitu-
tional importance of the patient's interest in autonomy over medical 
decisionmaking in Cntzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health. 273 
Information about reproduction is especially critical to women's 
self-determination. The denial of information about abortion de-
prives women of the knowledge necessary to take control of their 
lives and to transform their own reality. The systematic, institution-
alized denial of reproductive freedom has been a principal means of 
Black women's subjugation throughout their history in America. 274 
269. See, e.g. , FREIRE, supra note 38, at 54; BELL HOO KS , TALKING BACK: THI NK ING FEM-
INIST, THI NKIN G BL-\CK 43 (1989). 
270. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. ), cerl. denied, 409 U. S. 
I 064 ( 1972). Courts have applied the doctrine of info rm ed consent to medical decisio ns 
re lating to childbirth and abortion. See, e.g., Harbeson v. Parke Davis , Inc., 746 F.2d 
5 17, 523-24 (9 th Cir. 1984) (holdin g that the doctrine of informed consent requires 
d iscl osure of the material ri sks o f continuin g Dilantin during pregnancy); Phillips v. 
United States, 566 F. Supp. l (D.S.C. 198 1) (holding physicians liable for failing to in-
form parents of child with Down's Syndrome of availability o f amniocentesis). See gener-
ally ANNA S, mpra no te 58, at 83 -10 3 (discussing the doctrine o f informed consent as one 
of th e righ ts of patients) ; PA ULS. APP ELBA UM ET AL., INFORMED CoNSENT: LEGAL THEORY 
AND CLIKI CAL PRACTICE ( 1987) (discussing the theory, legal requirements, and p ractice 
o f in fo rmed consen t). 
271. T he ideal of info rmed consent , however, has no t been reali zed in th e actual 
practice of medicine . See KATZ, supra no te 58, a t 48-84. 
27 2. See. e.g., AMERICAN MEDICAL AssoCIATION, CuRRE NT O PI NIONS OF TH E CouNCIL 
ON [THI C.-\L AND j UD ICIAL AFFAIRS OF THE AMER I C A~ MEDICAL :\S SOC IATI ON, ~ i 8.08, at 32 
( 1989) ; see a[so PRESIDENT'S COMMI SS ION FOR TH E STUDY OF ETHI CA L PROBLEMS IN 
MEDI CINE AND BIOMEDICAL AN D BEHAVIOR.-\L RESEARCH: MAKING H EALTH CARE DECI-
SIONS l.f 9- 50 (1982) (discussing the ethica l values underlying info rmed consent). 
273 . .f97 U.S . 26 1, 270 (1 990) (recognizin g a co nstitu tiona lly pro tected liberty inter-
est in re fus ing unwanted medical treatmen t) . 
274. Robert s, supra no te 18, at 1436-50 (desc ribin g the hi storica l devaluat ion of Black 
motherhood). I have criticized the focus of mainstream feminist reprod uctive rights 
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A liberating constitutionalism would invalidate the promotion of ig-
norance among poor Black women that denies them control over 
their reproduction and would seek to provide the information nec-
essary for them to experience true reproductive liberty . 
Both liberal and republican constitutional theory support a gov-
ernment duty to provide information. Constitutional scholars be-
longing to both schools have suggested First Amendment 
approaches rejecting the abstract focus on ideas that characterized 
the Rust opinion. Rather, their systemic models analyze the role of 
freedom of speech within the social structure and in relation to a 
broader vision of social justice. 
Liberal scholars have argued that the aim of freedom of expres-
sion is to ensure individual autonomy. 275 This model argues that 
individual liberty, rather than the free trade of ideas, deserves pro-
tection from government interference. 276 It values expression, not 
because it leads to the "truth," but because it fosters the individual's 
self-determination.277 Under this view, government censorship is 
the primary evil because it "stunts the individual's growth as a 
human being and shows disrespect for the individual's ability to 
make her own informed decisions. " 278 This approach suggests that 
the government's power to restrict speech should be subject to spe-
cial scrutiny where it is used to influence constitutionally protected 
choices, such as the decision to terminate a pregnancy.279 The reg-
ulations violate the liberty model of free expression because they 
impermissibly infringe upon poor women's autonomy, denying wo-
men information critical to a decision that will significantly impact 
the course of their lives. Abortion counseling respects a woman's 
autonomy by providing her with the information necessary to make 
a decision about pregnancy that best contributes to her well-
being.280 
lite rature o n abo rtion rights for neglec ting the broader range of reproductive health 
is sues that affect poor women of color. See id. at 1461-62 . 
275. See, e.g., BAKER , supra note 88, a t 58-59 (describing a liberty m odel of free ex-
pression); THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESS ION 6 (1970) 
(describin g the First Amendment's protection o f "individual self-fulfillment"); Martin H. 
Red ish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591 , 593 ( 1982) (d iscuss in g "self-
rea li zation" as the purpose of free speech); Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Ex-
pression, 1 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 204 (1972) (arguing that the First Amendment p rotects 
autonomy); cJ. Matsuda , Voices, supra note 63, a t 1389 (a rguin g that the idea of to lerance 
in liberal thought suppo rts recognizing the language rights o f individuals; " ( w )e hurt 
ourselves when we exclude th e possible knowledge that diversity in participation can 
brin g") . For the classic liberal defense o f freedom of exp ressio n as a guarantee of ind i-
vidual autonomy, see MILL, supra note 39, at 30-40. 
276 . See BAKER , supra note 88, at 12-17 (using m odern social theory to critiq ue th e 
dominant ma rke tplace o f ideas ra tionale for freedom of speech). 
277. Jd at 59. 
278. Redish & Lippman, supra note 110, at 281. 
279. See Jane t Benshoof, The Chas tity Act: Govemment .\.!anipulatwn of ;ibortion Jnfonna-
tion and the First . .J. mendment, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1916, 193 1 (1988). The Court's trea tment 
of the Fifth Amendment issue in Rust did add ress clinic pa tients' ab ility to m ake ra tional 
dec isions abou t abortion. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. C t. 1759 , 1777 ( 199 1 ). A major fl aw 
in the Court's ana lys is is that it separated the First Amendment d iscuss io n from the 
ques tion of women's auto nomy. 
280 . See Ruth Calker, Feminism, Th eology, and Abortwn: Toward Laue, Compassion, and 
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Civic republicanism centers on citizens' participation in collective 
deliberation. Rather than rely on individual rights to protect against 
wrongful state action, republicans propose continuing dialogue 
within the community as the methodology for achieving the com-
mon good. 28 1 Republican theory justifies free speech as the founda-
tion fo r self-government through deliberative democracy. T his 
conception of the First Amendment, associated with Thomas J effer-
son and Alexander Meiklejohn, ensures the ability of citizens to ful-
fill their decisionmaking role as the true rulers in a republican 
society .282 It is premised on the belief that intelligent determination 
of public issues requires widespread and informed popular delibera-
tion . 283 Free speech allows citizens to gather the information neces-
sary to make rational decisions about public issues and to 
communicate with others in the deliberative process. 
T hus, republican thought historically has seen popular education 
as essential to self-government. 2 84 Education serves not only to 
prepare citizens for deliberation, but also to pro tect citizens against 
government corruption . Early constitutional thinkers believed that 
Wisdom, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1011 , 1067 (1989) (criticizing the Court in Roe v. Wade fo r cur-
ta iling any state regulation o f abo rtion counseling during the first trimester and sug-
ges ting that "the Court should e ncourage states to develop programs that co uld 
imp rove a woman's delibe rative process about abo rtio n" ); see also Sarah Buttenweise r & 
Reva Levine , Breakmg Silences: A Post-Abortion Support l'vlodel, in FROM ABO RTION TO RE-
PRO DUCTIVE FREEDO J\1: TRANSFO RMING :\ MOVEM ENT 12 1-28 (Marlene G. Fried ed ., 
1990 ) (describing the benefits o f a pos t-abortion sup po rt g roup fo r wo m en expe ri encing 
e m o tio na l s truggles in making and living with abo rtio n d ecisio ns); Terry N. S te inberg, 
Abortion Counseling: To Benefit !VIaternal Health, 15 AM.j.L & MED . 483-51 7 (1989) (dis -
cuss ing im portance of abortion co unseling to the em o tio nal health of women and advo-
ca tin g state law~ requiring abortion counseling). It is criti cal, however, that abort ion 
counseling be offered in a way tha t respects women's autonom y, ra ther than ove rr idin g 
it. See Akro n v. Akron C tr. for Repro d . Health, 462 U.S. 4 16, 44 3-44 (!983), overruled by 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 11 2 S. Ct. 2791 ( 1992) (s triking d own "informed con-
sen t" regulation designed no t to info rm the woman's co nsent , but to persuad e her to 
withhold it altogether) . 
28 1. See Frank I. Michelman , The Supreme Court 1985 Tenn, Foreword: Traces of Self-Gov-
ernment, 100 H ARV . L. R Ev. 4, 17-33 (1986) (d escrib ing th e ro le o f civic virtue and se lf-
governm ent in the republican tradition); Cass R. Suns te in , Beyond the Republican Revtval, 
97 YALE L.J. I 539 , 154 1 (1 988) (identifying delibe ra tion in government , po litica l equal -
ity , unive rsali sm , an d citizenshi p as the central republican com mitments) . 
282. See Sunstein , supra note 72, at 26 3 (" [T ]he Firs t Amendment is fund am en ta ll y 
aimed at protecting democratic se lf-government. " ); Suns tein , supra note 219, at 890-9 1; 
see also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Vi rginia, 448 U .S. 555, 587 (1980) (Brennan, J. , 
concurring) ("[T]he First Amendment ... has a stmctura l role to play in securing and 
fos te ring our republican sys tem of self-government. "); Owen M. Fiss , Why the State?, I 00 
HARV. L. REV. 78 1 (! 987) (argu ing tha t the Fi rst Amendment pro tec ts co llec tive se lf-
dete rmination ra the r than ind ividua l express ion) . Alexander lvle iklejo hn p resen ted his 
theory o n the function o f free speech as a g ua ra ntee of cit izen de li bera tion abo u t publ ic 
issues in ."'. LEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEEC H A;\ID ITs RE LATI ON TO SELF-GovERNMENT 
( 1948). For a d iscuss io n of J efferson's views o n publi c del ibe ratio n , see l-!A i':Nc\11 AR-
ENDT. ON REVOLUTION 234 -42 (1 963) . 
283 . Suns tc in, supra no te 2 I 9, at 890-93 . 
284. See Akhil R. Arn ar, The BILl of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YAL E L.J . 113 1. 1210 
(!991) . 
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government had an obligation to educate the populace because edu-
cation was "[t]he most obvious republican instrument for ... incul-
cating virtue in a people. " 285 This educative function is critical to 
Akhil Reed Amar's structural account of the Bill of Rights as the 
popular majority's protection against self-interested government.286 
Professor Amar demonstrates how the concept of popular education 
emanates throughout the Bill of Rights: Each of the intermediate 
associations it protects-church, militia, and citizen jury-can be 
understood as "a device for educating ordinary Citizens about their 
rights and duties."287 
Modern republican scholars have used traditional republican phi-
losophy to establish the populace's affirmative claim to the basic ne-
cessities that are prerequisites for genuine self-government.288 
Frank Michelman's work on the distributive implications of republi-
can theory places on democratic society the responsibility of provid-
ing its members with these prerequisites of political participation.289 
Citizens cannot contribute effectively to public deliberation without 
the basic necessities of life to sustain them and without an under-
standing of the issues at hand. 290 Michelman asks: 
Without basic education-without the literacy, fluency, and ele-
mentary understanding of politics and markets that are hard to 
obtain without it-what hope is there of effective participation in 
the last-resort political system? ... [W]hat about life itself, health 
and vigor, presentable attire, or shelter not only from the ele-
ments but from the physical and psychological onslaughts of so-
cial debilitation? Are not these the universal, rock-bottom 
prerequisites of effective participation in democratic representa-
tion? . . . How can there be .. . sophisticated rights to a formally 
unbiased majoritarian system, but no rights to the indispensable 
means of effective participation in that system? 291 
Michelman argues that the legitimacy of majoritarian republicanism 
implies a duty to ensure against bias arising out of the distribution 
285. GoRDON S. Wooo, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 , at 426 
(1969). The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, for example. declared : "Wisdom and 
knowled ge, as well as virtue, diffused generally among the body of the people , being 
necessary for the preservation of th eir rights and liberties; as these depend on spreading 
the opportunities and advantages of educa tion ... it shall be the duty of legis latures and 
magistra tes to encourage [these ends]." MAss. CoNST. of 1780, pt. II , ch. V, §II. 
286. See Amar, supra note 284 at 1132-33, 1208. Professor Arnar identiftes the 
"agency problern"-the problem of government officials following se lf-inte rested poli-
cies that fail to refl ec t th e views and protect the liberties of ordinary citizens-as one of 
the principal co ncerns of the Bill of Rights. !d. at 1206. The Supreme Court' s validation 
of the regulations and President Bush's veto of congressional legislat ion o verturning 
the m is a glaring example of the profes sional judiciary and the executive branch collabo-
rating to den y the will of citizens expressed by their e lected represe ntatives. See Adam 
Clymer, President r·etoes Bill on .-lbortion; Oven1de Bid Falls, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1991, at 
Al. 
287. Amar, supra note 284, a t 1210. 
288. See, e.g., ld.; Frank I. ivtichclman , ll'eljare R1ghts 1n a Conslllutlonal Democracy, 1979 
WASH. U. L.Q 659, 677. 
289. Michelman , supra note 288, a t 677. 
290. !d. 
291. !d. 
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of unmet needs .292 His theory gives specific support to welfare 
rights and regulations designed to equalize political access.293 
These republican concerns also justify substantial restrictions on 
government secrecy. 294 When the government withholds informa-
tion from the public, it hinders public deliberation and dramatically 
increases the risk of self-interested representation and of corruption 
in government processes by powerful private factions. Cass Sun-
stein concludes that the republican theory of free expression re-
quires a right of access to information held by the government. 295 
This republican model of free speech supports the government's 
obligation to provide abortion counseling. The regulations degrade 
the citizenship of poor Black women by limiting their ability to par-
ticipate in the public sphere. A constitutional guarantee of the ne-
cessities for republican self-government would invalidate the 
regulations' obstruction of information critical to the public debate 
on abortion and to citizens' knowledge of their rights. 296 
Both liberal and republican theories of the First Amendment ex-
plain the constitutional importance of knowledge. Taken together, 
they support the value of self-determination, embracing both the 
liberal ideal of individual autonomy and the republican ideal of par-
ticipation in collective decisionmaking. C. Edwin Baker's theory of 
fundamental, progressive change as a central function of rights pro-
tected by the First Amendment integrates both ideals. Baker argues 
that human progress requires transforming the social conditions 
that link liberalism's normative content-the values of human equal-
ity, self-determination, and self-realization-with its oppressive in-
stitutional content-historically manifested in the capitalist market 
292. !d. at 684 . 
293. Seeid. ; Frank I. Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 , 1495 (l988) (argu-
ing that republican constitutionalism inherently involves an ongoing revision o f norma-
tive history in order to include in the political community those who have been 
excluded); Michelman , supra note 227, at 1340-50 (d iscussing redistribution in the con -
text o f political speech) ; see aLso Sunstein , supra note 72. at 263-300 (advoca ting a " New 
Deal" for speech protec ting democratic efforts to promote popular sovereignty); Sun-
stein, supra not e 281 , at 1577 (arguing that a republican approach to the First Amend-
ment supports campaign finan ce regulati on in order to achieve politica l equality) . 
294. See Sunstein , supra note 2 19, at 894; cj. Vincent Blas i, The Checking 1/alue in Fint 
Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FoU ND. REs. J. 521 (suggesting that an important function 
of the First Amendm ent is to check government abuses by ensuring citizen access to 
info rma tion). 
295 . Sunstein, supra no te 21 9 , at 921. 
296. Cass Sunstein, however , exempts Rwt from these republican concerns o n the 
ground that " it involved a limita tion on a governmentally funded private counseling 
program ," ra ther than " public, po litical speech ." See Sunstein , supra note 72 , a t 299 
n.1 36 . Suns tein 's priva ti zation of the speech invo lved in Rust igno res the po litical 
dime nsions I attempt to demonstra te in thi s Articl e . I believe that Sunstein's theory of 
th e ro le of speech in protectin g popular sovereignty support s the go vernment' s duty to 
provide abo rtio n co un seling as a po litica l resource. 
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and bureaucratic state.297 "Progress results from people engaging 
in popularly chosen, self-realizing, value-integrating practices that 
oppose, transform, or replace alienating institutions." 298 The rights 
embraced by the First Amendment provide the structural precondi-
tions for this progressive change by protecting people in expressing 
and living their values and in joining together to create new 
structures. 299 
Baker suggests that the First Amendment's role in providing the 
means needed for progressive change requires not only protection 
from government intrusion, but also requires "the guarantee of ma-
terial resources necessary to allow large numbers of people to en-
gage in self-constitutive political activities."300 Although Baker 
does not elaborate on the extent of such an affirmative guarantee of 
free expression, the process of progressive change would require 
ensuring women's access to information essential to their self-deter-
mination. 301 Reproductive information is a political resource be-
cause it enables women to take control of their lives and to join in 
transforming social institutions. 3 02 
The liberal and republican models of the constitutional role of 
information are strengthened by recognizing the connection be-
tween the control of knowledge and racial subordination. Acknowl-
edging this connection enhances the First Amendment analysis in 
two ways. First, it complicates the fear that both liberalism and re-
publicanism have concerning the concentration of power in the cor-
porate economy and bureaucratic state as the primary threat to 
human freedom. 303 Both the liberal protection of the individual 
297 . See BAKER, supra note 88, at 99-100. 
298. ld. at 120. While Professor Baker's analysis of the collective process of change 
incorporates republican principles, its driving concern seems to be individ ual liberty. 
For example , Professor Baker argues that the concept of speech as a key elem ent of 
democracy is actually premised upon liberty: "[L]iberty implies dem ocracy as a p rocess 
for specifying and implementing people's choices. " ld. at 31. Any attempt at strict cate-
gorization, howeve r, would be futile. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., H'hat is Republican-
Ism , and Is It Worth Reviving?, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1695, 1730-3 1 (1 989) (noting 
commonalities between libera li sm and the theories of republican revival); James G. 
Pope, Republican Afoments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the Amencan Co nstitutwnat 
Order, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 287 , 297 n.38 (1990) (ass erting that "republican a '.1d liberal 
traditions have been intertwin ed since their inceptions") . 
299. BAKER, supra note 88, a t 120-2 1. For other views of the First Amendment's role 
in the struggle for social change, see Pope, supra note 298, at 345-56 (discussin g the 
First Amendment's protection o f direct exercises of popular power); Sparer, supra note 
19 , at 530-35 (defe nding the need for inalienable rights to fr ee speech and political 
di ssent in the struggle to change soc iety). 
300. BAKER, supra note 88, a t 120. 
30 I . Professor Baker argu es elsewhere that the Constitution requires government to 
guarantee the minimum resources n ecessary for a meanin gful daily li fe, bu t not the ful-
fillment o f all personhood-based claims to prope rty. See C. Edwin Bake r, Property and Its 
Relatzon to Constitutionallv Protected Libertv, ! 34 U. PA. L. REv . 741 ,760-64 (1 986). 
302. See LINDA GoRDON, WOi\lAN's ~BoDY , WoMAN's RI GHT: A Soc iA L HISTORY or 
BIRTH CoNTROL IN AM ERI CA 414-18 ( 1976) (" Reproductive self-de termina tio n is a bas ic 
conditio n for ... women to assume full membership in all other human groups.") . 
303. See Am y G utmann , Comnwnltarian Critics of Liberalis111, 14 PHIL. & PuB . AFF. 308, 
32 1 (1 985) ; see, e.g. , BAKER, supra no te 88, a t 92-122 (identifying hierarchi ca l struct ures 
of bureaucracies and capitali st markets as the ta rget for progressi ve change); Re ich, 
mpra note 63, at 1409 (" Exist ing cons ti tutional theory is inadequa te to pro tect aga inst 
the cease less and rap idly increas in g encroachments of organized powe r." ). 
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against the state and the republican protection of the majority 
against self-interested government ignore the context of social 
power, defined by race, gender, and economic status, in which these 
conflicts occur. The state is not a monster that strikes arbitrarily 
simply to enhance its might. Rather, it wields its power in ways that 
have historically supported the subordination of particular groups 
of people. The alienation of all citizens in the capitalist, bureau-
cratic state cannot explain the particularly brutal oppression of the 
Black community. The liberal and republican approaches also dis-
count the possibility of using the power of government to destroy 
illegitimate social domination. 
Second, the connection between knowledge and subordination 
brings into question the faith that both liberalism and republicanism 
have in an ideal government process, a faith that neglects the need 
to eradicate these forms of subordination. 304 Republicanism relies 
on the notion that reasoned deliberation, divorced from private in-
terests, will lead to community consensus as to the common 
good. 305 The republican reliance on dialogue may provide insuffi-
cient protection against repression of minorities. 306 The model of 
civic deliberation presents the danger that outsiders' freedom of ex-
pression will be sacrificed on the basis of the dominant group's per-
ception of the common good. Subordinated voices typically have 
been silenced on the ground that their speech is not worthy of par-
ticipation in the public debate. 307 When a subordinated group chal-
lenges the social order it is more likely to generate violent conflict 
than reasoned deliberation.3os 
The history of racial domination in America demonstrates that 
304. An important exception is civic republicans' recognition of systemic bias due to 
the in equalities of wealth. See, e.g. , Michelman, supra note 288 , a t 684 . 
305. See Bell & Bansal, supra note 229, at 1610 ("Republicanism, through its faith in 
the existence of shared values and the possibility of a common good, assumes at the 
base that a social consensus will emerge from 'reasoned' deliberation by individuals who 
are thinking 'ra tionally.'"); Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Con-
stitutional Law, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1441 , 14 76-85 (1990) (critiquing Michelman 's reliance on 
rational argumentation). 
306. Bell & Bansal, supra note 229, at 1610-1 I; see also Delgado , supra note 217 , a t 
1939 (noting that dialogic arrangements often increase preexisting power differentials 
among participants); Michael A. Fitts, Look Before You Leap: Some Cautionary Xotes on Civzc 
Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1651, 1658-62 (1988) (arguing that civic republican reforms 
may bias the political system in favor of the status quo). 
307. Cf MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 282, a t 25 ("What is essential is not that everyone 
sha ll speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said."). 
308. See Karst, supra note 155, at 96 ("When a subordinated group challenges a domi-
nant community of meaning, those expressions are bound to arouse strong emotions, 
for they threaten th e individual ident ities of the people who live inside the boundaries of 
the dominant culture ."). For an alte rnative view of republican political theory that fo-
cuses on periodic outbursts of direct popular power, see Pope, supra note 298. Accord-
ing to Professo r Pope, it is during these " republican moments" that groups that are 
underrepresented in liberal interest-group bargaining are able to achi eve social change 
through extra-institutional forms of politica l participation. !d. at 320. 
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Blacks are particularly vulnerable to exclusion. For most of Ameri-
can history, Blacks were barred by law from civic participation, m-
cluding voting, holding public office, and serving on juries.309 
For centuries in this country ... blacks have served as the group 
whose experiences and private needs have been suppressed in or-
der to promote the "common good" of whites. Indeed, the 
"shared values" in which the antifederalists laid faith included a 
historically constant and (for whites) a unifying belief in the infer-
ior and subordinated position of black Americans. 3 10 
The common good is an elusive goal when one group defines its 
interests in terms of the continued subordination of another. Liber-
ation is a precondition for true republicanism. 3 11 
Liberalism depends on neutral government decisionmaking that 
protects rational individual choice . The experience of group op-
pression, however, teaches that the dehumanization of the individ-
ual is connected to the subordination of the group. 3 12 The 
individual's ability to make autonomous decisions is circumscribed 
by the material conditions of her life, including the community to 
which she belongs. For members of subordinated communities, 
protecting individual autonomy necessarily involves the struggle for 
group liberation. These individuals recognize a positive aspect of 
group membership that corresponds with communitarians' faith 
309. Karst, supra note 155, at 112-13. See generally Scott v. Sandford , 60 U.S. (19 
How.) 393,412 (1857) ("[Blacks] have never been regarded as a part of the people o r 
citizens of the State, nor supposed to possess any politica l rights which the dominant 
race might not withhold or grant at their pleasure."); C. VANN WooDWARD, THE 
STRANGE CAREER OF jiM CRow 67-109 (3d ed. 1974) (describing the creation and imple-
mentation of jim Crow statutes following Reconstruction); Randall Kennedy, i\Iartin Lu-
ther King's Constitution: A Legal History of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, 98 YALE LJ. 999, 
I 006-07 ( 1989) (discussing segregation in the public sphere). 
310. Bell & Bansal, supra note 229 , at 1610-11 ; cf. Iris .ivl. Young, Polity and Group 
Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Ci tizenshi,tJ, 99 ETHICS 250, 253 (1989) (provid-
ing, by analogy, the feminist critique of civic republicanism focus ing on its imposition of 
" universal values and norms whi ch were derived from specifically m asculine experi-
ence"). The new republicans have repudiated the elitist tradition o f republican thought 
and propose a republican vision that includes direct participation by all citizens, espe-
cially the historically dis empowered . See, e.g., Michelman , supra note 293, a t 1505-06; 
Sunstein, supra note 281, at 1569-7 1. 
311 . See Radin & Michelman , supra no te 49, at 1041 ("How can we hope to approach 
o r preserve a state of undominated dialogue without <:>.concerted assault on [race , gen-
der and class] stratifications?"). 
3 12 . See Roberts, supra note 18, at 1480. The communitarian understanding that the 
individual identity is determined at least in part by the community, may be tter explain 
this experience. See Alex M.J ohnson,Jr., The New Voice of Color, 100 YALE L.J. 2007, 2052 
( 1991) (arguing that a communitarian perspective is preferable to libera li sm as a method 
for advancing the goals of people of color); see, e.g., MICHAEL]. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND 
ITs CRITICS 6 ( 1984) ("[T]he story of my life is always embedded in the story of those 
communities from which I derive my id entity."). Relational feminists al so have criticized 
liberalism for presenting a masculine view of the indi vidual as separate , competitive, and 
atomistic, rather than caring and connec ted to o thers. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Civic 
Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional fld;udication, 72 VA. L. REv. 543 (1986); Wes t, 
j urisprudence, supra no te 20. I have argued, however , that the recognition of these con-
nections between the individual and the community are not inheren tly inconsiste nt with 
the no tion of autonomy. See Roberts, supra note 18, at 1478 & n. 297 ; see also Linda C. 
McClain , "Atomistic !'v!an" Revisited: Libera lism, Connection, and Fermnist J urispmdence, 65 S. 
CAL. L. REv. 1171 , 11 74-75 ( 1992) (contesting the feminist "caricature" of liberalism as 
a tomistic) . 
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that "freedom might encompass an ability to share a v1s10n of a 
good life or a good society with others."313 In contrast to the liberal 
emphasis on individual freedom, many Blacks see their historically 
created community as the basis for social identity and the source of 
liberation. 314 The existence of liberating aspects of both liberalism 
and communitarianism affirms the inevitable interdependence of in-
dividual autonomy and community membership-"the affirmation 
of free human subjectivity against the constraints of group life, 
along with the paradoxical countervision of a group life that creates 
and nurtures individuals capable of freedom." 315 
The systemic nature of racism in American society suggests that 
rational processes will fail at social transformation without a more 
deliberate eradication of racial subordination. 31 6 Liberal and re-
publican theories do not address the invidious potential for govern-
ment to perpetuate racial subordination by controlling knowledge 
available to the Black community. The power to control knowledge 
not only limits individual women's ability to engage in self-deter-
mining activity, it also keeps entire communities of people in igno-
rance. This critical nexus between freedom of speech and racial 
equality strengthens the affirmative claim to information. 
B. Knowledge and Dependency 
Although the reasoning of Rust was premised on the gratuity prin-
ciple, I believe the decision is a powerful endorsement of govern-
ment's affirmative obligations to the dispossessed. The violence of 
the regulations and the ease with which the Court overlooks that 
violence demonstrates the dangerous potential of the state's false 
313. ROBERT N. BELL<\H ET AL. , HABITS OF THE H EART: INDI VID UALISM AND COMMIT-
MENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 24 (1985). Mo reover, subo rdina ted groups have expe ri en ced 
the process o f dialogic sharing as empo wering. See CoLLI NS, supra n o te 236, a t 212-13 
(discussing the use of di a logue in Afri can and Afri can-American culture); FREIRE, supra 
note 38, at 66-68 (discussing a liberating dialogue be tween teache r and student); MAc K-
INNO N, supra note 240, a t 87 (discussing the femini s t m e thod o f con sciousn ess-raising 
which focu ses on specific incidents and dialogue) . 
314. See Pe ller , supra no te 52, at 794-95. 
315. Duncan Kennedy , Critical Labor Law Theory .i Comment. 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 503, 
506 (1981); see also Duncan Kennedy , The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BuFF. L. 
REv. 209, 212-17 ( 1979) (di scussing th e "fundamental contradi cti o n " embodied in the 
" collective as pects of o ur individuality"). 
316. Fo r ano the r critique of both indi viduqli s ti c and communitari an perspec ti ves on 
the rights o f e thnic mino rity groups, see Adeno Add is , Individualism, Communitananism, 
and the Rights of Ethnzc ;'v!inorities, 67 No TR E DAME L. REv . 615 (1 991). Professo r Addis 
proposes ins tead a mode l o f "critical pluralism," whi ch is "concern ed not only with pro-
viding resources for min o riti es so as to en able them to maintain and d evelop th e ir cul-
ture , to pro duce and te ll their stories, but [which l seeks also to d evelop ins titutional 
s tructures tha t will e nable the mino rity cultures to e ngage the domina nt culture in a 
dialogue ." !d. at 649-50. 
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generosity. Giving government aid the status of a mere gratuity af-
fords government intolerable power to perpetuate the powerless-
ness of subjugated commumt1es, particularly by limiting the 
information available to them. I argued earlier that we have ac-
cepted this power structure based on the underlying belief that de-
pendency entails the forfeiture ofliberty.317 This analysis suggests a 
second element of a liberating constitutionalism-the rejection of 
the prevailing understanding of dependency. We could choose to 
value ensuring autonomy and participation in the community over 
securing private wealth. Once we reject the constitutional primacy 
of protecting property from invasion, we can set about rethinking a 
constitutional structure that affirmatively nourishes self-determina-
tion.318 Consistent with this understanding, people who are depen-
d ent on government welfare would be entitled to information 
necessary for self-determining activities. 319 Rather than view de-
pendency as a bar to autonomy and political participation, society 
would acknowledge its responsibility to foster the self-determina-
tion of its members who are dependent on government assistance. 
Property owners undoubtedly will object to paying for the needs 
of others. Property is a social construct, however, that serves socie-
tal interes ts and its meaning can be revised to accommodate chang-
ing views of justice.32° For example, the most dramatic 
redistribution of property in the name of social justice in American 
3 1 7. See supra Part IV. 
3 18 . See NEDELSKY, supra note 221, a t 273 ; see also Mary A. Glendon , Rights in Twentl-
eth -Centwy Constitutions, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 519, 523 (1992) (noting that most western 
cons tituti ons omit property rights and include affirmative welfare obligations); cf Schn-
ab ly, supra note 140, at 930-31 (suggesting a privacy theo ry that asks how the power of 
the sta te sho uld be deployed to improve the institutional contexts of moral d ecisionmak-
ing, rath er than how individuals may be shield ed from it); Simon, supra note 17, a t 17 
("Rights ... did no t constitute a fortress for the individual against the state, but rather 
an encounter between the individual and th e sta te in which the identity o f each was 
partly up fo r grabs."). For a diametrica ll y opposed view, see Richard A. Epstein, Prop-
c;ty, :3peech, and the Politics of Distmst, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 4 1, 57 (1992) (arguing that "ex-
pansive protection of freed om of speech ... becomes an unambiguous good only when 
paired up with a sys tem of limited government and strong property rights") . 
319. One precedent for the government's affirmative obligation to provid e informa-
tion to dependent people is Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966), which requires 
police to give custodial suspects specific information about their legal rights before in-
terrogation. This obligation arises from the suspect 's dependence o n the gove rnm ent in 
the isola ted and police-dominated stationhouse for kno wledge o f his rights. The Mt-
mnda vvarn ings were designed not only to remedy the inherent coerciveness of police 
interrogation, but also to demonstrate the government's respect for the suspec t's dignity 
and se lf-de terminatio n. See id. , at 47 3 (" [O]nly by effec ti ve and expres s exp lana tion to 
the indigent of this right [to counsel] ca n the re be assurance tha t he was trul v in a posi-
ti on to exercise it. "); Thomas S. Schrock et al. , InterTogatwnal Rights: Reflections on Mi-
randa v. Arizona, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. I, 44 ( 1978) (describing the warnings as 
" communication by the government to the indi vidual of it s recogni tio n that in constitu-
tio nal contemplatio n he is a moral agen t, capable of responsible cho ice" ); Stephen J 
Schulhofer , Recons1denng Miranda, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 435, 44 7 (1987) (asserting that the 
warn ings demonstrate to the suspect that the police know his rights and are prepared to 
res pect those righ ts). For a criticism of the warnings' failure to achieve these objecti ves 
due to the Supreme Court' s gradual e ros ion of .\firanda, see Charles J. O gletree, Are 
Co nf essions Really Good for the Soul?: A Proposal to Jhrandt: e i'vl iranda , l 00 HARV. L. REv. 
1 8 ~6 (! 98 7) . 
3 ~0 . See Baker, supra note 301 , at 743-44 (observing that pro perty rules serve a 
r,umber of social functions; "[Tjhe notion of a comple te set of ti meless , natural , or 
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history was the abolition of slavery. 321 The Thirteenth Amendment 
deprived slaveholders of their property interest in Blacks and gave 
Blacks an inalienable property right to their own persons. 32 2 The 
purpose of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments was not 
only to protect the liberty of individual Blacks, but also to eliminate 
a racial caste system that was deemed intolerable. 323 The work left 
undone by Emancipation demands an equally dramatic modern re-
construction of the social order-one that eliminates the role of 
government gratuity in the perpetuation of that caste system and 
replaces it with an affirmative duty to provide the basic require-
ments of self-determination. Affirming the humanity of everyone 
can no longer be seen as subversion of rights to property. 324 
Conclusion: Utopia and Liberation 
I anticipate two objections to this liberationist theory from those 
who agree with the goal of liberation.325 First, some will argue that 
this theory is internally inconsistent. My very premise that knowl-
edge is an instrument of power dispels the possibility that those in 
power would use their legal knowledge to dismantle the very foun-
dation of their domination. How can oppressed people possibly 
proper property rules is absurd."); Reich, supra note 84 , at 779 (describing the function 
of priva te property to protec t individual liberties). 
321. See Amar, supra note 229, at 39- 40; see also West, supra note 85, at 715 (discussing 
the redistributive directive embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment). The history in 
the United States of revising property rights to serve societal interests also includes the 
oppression of people of color. Indeed , much of the claim to land in this country derives 
from the state 's extinguishing Indian title by conquest and granting titl e to private indi-
viduals or groups. Reich , supra note 84, at 778, (citing Johnson v. Mcintosh , 21 U.S. (8 
Wheat.) 543, 589 (1823) (holding Indian title subordinate to that of United States on 
grounds of "discovery" and "conquest")). 
Jerome Culp observes that , although slavery has influenced American thinking about 
property, legal scholars have large ly overlooked this relationship. See Culp , supra note 
51, at 77 & n.ll5. Professor Culp's comments suggest that we will not be able lO uproot 
our deeply embedded ideas about property and freed om until we trulv confront the 
whole history of racism in America. 
322. U.S. CaNST. amend. XIII. 
323. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (asserting that the T hirteenth 
Amendment abo lishes "all badges and incidents of slavery") ; The Slaughter-House 
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1872) (identifying as the "one pervad ing purpose" of 
the amendments "the freedom of the slave race, the securitv and firm es tabli shment of 
that freedom , and the protec tion of the newly-made freem~n and citizen from the op-
pressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him ") . Akhil 
Reed Amar and Daniel Widawsky emphasize that the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits 
certain state inaction, as well as certain private action: "Hence the broad command that 
slavery shall not exist does more than impose an absolute duty on private would-be enslav-
ers; it also imposes a duty on the sta te to provide an adequate apparatus to enforce the 
emancipation of all persons within its jurisdic tion. " A mar & Widawsky, supra note 82 , a t 
1380. 
324. See FREiRE, supra note 38 , at 45 (observing that humanity is seen as something 
possessed by oppresso rs as an exclusive right, while humanization of "others" appears 
to be subversive). 
325 . T hese questions have plagued me most in writ ing thi s Articl e . 
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trust the oppressor to provide the information they need for a liber-
ating knowledge? Moreover, the theory contains the paradox of 
recognizing an affirmative government obligation to ensure self-de-
termination, while acknowledging the control that dependence on 
government subsidies allows. Would not expanded government aid 
to the Black community simply increase that community's subju-
gating dependence on the government? Even if the claim to gov-
ernment aid is declared a right rather than a gratuity, judicial 
enforcement of welfare rights has limited liberating potential. 326 
The struggle over knowledge does not end with the receipt of in-
formation; that is only the beginning. Dispossessed communities 
must appropriate the information for themselves. The govern-
ment 's obligation to provide information must coexist with an effort 
to promote the community's ability to generate and distribute infor-
mation on its own. At times it will be equally important to resist 
state interference in local sources of knowledge. 327 
My defense of government aid attempts to overcome the dangers 
of dependency in several ways. Government aid should be based on 
collective obligation rather than altruistic charity. It is not a special 
dispensation to the poor; it ensures the fulfillment of the human 
needs of all. Rather than reject state assistance, my approach seeks 
to redefine government aid to eliminate its libe rty-depriving quali-
ties. Moreover, the government must fulfill its affirmative obliga-
tions as part of the pursuit of liberation from oppressive conditions 
that create and perpetuate reliance on the government. The goal of 
state ass istance is to facilitate action by the oppressed, rather than 
simply placating them to ensure the prevailing order. 
Second, some will argue that a liberationist legal th eory, which 
326. For an hi s torica l examination of how the American public welfare system regu-
lates the political and economic behavior of th e poor, see FRANCES F. PIVEN & RICHARD 
A. CLOWARD, RE GULATING THE PooR: THE FuNCTIONS oF Pus u c WELFARE (197 1). Legal 
scholars have criticized welfare ri ghts litigatio n in particular for stunting th e radical po-
tenti al of a grass-roots, welfare-rights movement. See, e.g . Delgado, supra note 217 , at 
194 7 (arguing that civil rights litigation requires claimants to exaggerate vic timhood in a 
manner inconsisten t with human dignity); Rosenblatt, supra no te 2 19 , at 27 1-75 (d iscuss-
ing the limitations of welfare legaliza tion as a s tra tegy for redistributive change); Mark 
V. Tushnet, Dia-Tribe, 78 MICH. L. REv. 694, 708-09 (1980) (book review) (argu ing that 
welfare reform liti gation dimini shes political forces seekin g equalitv). But see Sparer. 
supra note 19, at 562-63 (critiquing Tushnet's assessment on the ground th a t the deci-
sion to pursue welfare rights through litigation was an organizing strategv of the welfare 
righ ts movement) ; White, supra note 239 , at 870-7 1 (d iscuss ing how liti ga ting Goldberg 
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), benefi tted the we lfa re rights movemem). 
327. Regina Austin sugges ts an analogous approach to the state's rol e in faci litating 
th e growth of the informal economy in Black communities. See Regina Austin, "Th f 
Bfack Co mmunzty," Its Lawbreakers, and a Politlcs of ldenti.fiwtlon, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769 , 
1807- 11 (1992). Professor Austin recognizes that a politics of ident ificat io n \,·ith poorer 
Blacks who must " hustle" to survive requires both advocacy of government support for 
Black info rmal ent repreneurship and working " to keep the law a t bay. " !d. at 1808 . She 
d emonstrates that in cases of ri va lry from th e formal econom y, informalitv better pro-
tects the interests of Blacks, such as squatters and sidewalk merchants, working in th e 
informal sector, while the need for credit requires more lega l forma litv. !d. at 1809- l 0. 
Altho ugh this Article advoca tes govern ment support o f se lf- dete rmi nat ion. I do not di s-
coun t th e need sometimes to "keep the law a t bav." See Robert s, supra note JR, a t !449-
50 (oppos in g crimina lizat ion of Black women 's reproducti\C decis io ns \,·hil e advocat ing 
governmen t support for prenatal care and drug treatment ). 
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implies economic redistribution and affirmative government duty, is 
purely utopian-irreconcilable with our current legal system and 
impossible to implement. 328 These ideas are deemed incongruous 
with the accepted market economy and negative vision of constitu-
tional rights. Those in power have always aimed to destroy utopian 
ideas that challenge the system sustaining their dominance. 329 They 
characterize utopian ideas as absolutely unrealizable even though 
these ideas are unrealizable only within the present order. 330 They 
drain these ideas of revolutionary potential by integrating them 
within the prevailing world view. Thus, as I discussed in an earlier 
section, 331 the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine has served as a 
way of integrating the recognition of economic inequality within the 
existing constitutional order that rejects affirmative government ob-
ligations. 332 The Rust opinion hides not only the repressive func-
tion of the law, but also the possibility of a more liberating 
interpretation of the Constitution. 
In describing the martyr's commitment to God's law, even in the 
face of world-destroying pain, Robert Cover reminds us of the 
human capacity to imagine a just social order despite the effects of 
dominant ideology. 333 The slave songs enabling Blacks to imagine 
freedom despite their chains and the dreams of Black women told 
by Zora Neal Hurston confirm the power of vision. 334 The effect of 
th is realization is profound. It frees us to consider the possibility of 
a more radical constitutional vision. We may no longer be able to 
res ist the question buried in our consciences: How can we tolerate 
the lawfulness of the intolerable? How can we tolerate laws that 
force women to travel in desperation from city to city in search of an 
328. See Torres, supra note 52, at 1045-46 (discussing the difficultv of making plausi-
ble arguments for redistribution of social resources within current legal ideologv). For a 
discussion of utopian ideas, see MANNHEIM, supra note 139, at 192 ("A state of mind is 
utopian when it is incongruous with the state of reality within which it occurs."), and 
utopian constitutionalism, see Cover, supra note 66, at 39. 
329. MANNHEIM, supra note 139, at 193. 
330. !d. at 196. 
331. See supra Part II.B. 
332. Conservatives similarly have usurped the progressive rhetoric of tolerance. 
color-blindness, and equal opportunity to confine the possibilities of reform. See Peller, 
supm note 52, at 762. 
333. Cover. supm note 22, at 1604-05. Drucilla Cornell similarlv has celebrated the 
utopian potential of the feminine: "Feminism calls us to the dream of a utop1a of sensu-
ous ease in '.vhich the real1ly of the castrated subject appears as a nightmare from which 
we are trving to awaken. Feminism calls us all to wake up and to 'see' the cloublv-prizecl 
world which might be ours." Cornell, supra note 240, at 699; see also Cornell, supm note 
132. at 1229 (challenging us to accept the "invitation to realize the potential inherent in 
the 'would be's' of our social reality"); Minow, supra note 237, at 1867 (explaining an 
alternative meaning of "rights" that people imagine. even though thev have not been 
formaliv recognized or enforced). For a story about a Black South African \·illage's 
struggle for justice. grounded outside the South African law, see Lucie White. To Lmrn 
ond Tmrh. Lessonsjiom Dnejonle1n on Lawycnng and Power, 1988 Wrs. L. Rn. 699. 7! 9-:3 8. 
334. See supm notes 243-48 and accompanying text. 
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honest answer about their health? How can we tolerate laws that 
lead women to spend their last penny for an abortion in an unli-
censed clinic when safer, less expensive ones are available? How 
can we tolerate laws that deliberately deny poor women of color the 
knowledge they need for self-determination? Freed to ask these 
questions, we may then imagine an alternative constitutional order 
in which this inhuman treatment has no foundation in law. 
While vision is an essential part of a liberating legal theory, it is 
inadequate for worldly redemption.335 Without social action, the vi-
sion will remain mired in some "moral heaven. " 336 Social change 
requires resistance and creation by people willing to live according 
to the vision. It requires lawyers and legal scholars willing to col-
laborate with social movements to assist in constructing, defending, 
and implementing the vision. 337 Because the conventional political 
and legal process is biased in favor of the prevailing order, radical 
visionaries must use unorthodox means. Masses of people must re-
pudiate their participation in institutions of domination and refuse 
to obey unjust laws. 338 They must collectively force their vision to 
the forefront of political discourse through mass demonstrations, 
militant protest, strikes, boycotts, and other forms of direct popular 
335. See Cover, supra note 66, at 38 (contrasting Garrisonian perfectionism that per-
mitted the pursuit of pure nomos without a polity with Douglass' redemptive vision of 
slavery without foundation in law) . 
336. I borrow this phrase from Frank Michelman. See Michelman, Protectlng the Poor, 
supra note 17, at 58 (discussing the need for a standard in order for the duty of minimum 
protection to be enforced). 
33 7. I do not presume that the vision is created exclusively by legal scholars, divorced 
from social action. Rather, it must be forged by a collaborative effort of academics, 
lawyers, activists, and ordinary citizens. For a case study of a lawyer's collaboration with 
a Black South African village to resist forced removal from their homes, see White, supra 
note 333. Arthur Kinoy's career as a movement lawyer provides another illustration. See 
ARTHUR KINOY, RIGHTS ON TRIAL: THE ODYSSEY OF A PEOPLE's LAWYER ( 1983). 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to explore fully the relationship between law and 
liberation. A comprehensive analysis would include a historical and normative examina-
tion of the form of legal discourse that best critiques the present social order and de-
scribes the vision of a new one; the role of law in the process of achieving social change, 
particularly the possibility of using the legal system as a vehicle for fundamental change 
and the work of lawyers and legal scholars in social movements; and the role of law in 
the new social order. For scholarship addressing some of these issues, see, for example, 
Richard L. Abel, Lawyers and the Power to Change, 7 L.>.w & PoL'Y 5 (1985) (asserting that 
progressive lawyers have significant power to change the law, the legal system, and soci-
ety); JoEL F. HANDLER, SociAL MovEMENTS AND THE LEG .. \.L SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAw 
REFORM AND SociAL CHANGE (1978) (examining the possibilities and limitations for so-
cial movements' use of courts to achieve social change); GERALD P. LoPEZ, REBELLIOUS 
LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO's VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE ( 1992) (describing 
the work of progressive lawyers within subordinated communities). The role of legal 
academics in the process of social change requires further examination. See Radin & 
Michelman, supra note 49, at I 019 (calling for self-inquiry as to "preciselv how ... we 
imagine that cur scholarship might work to move the world closer to whatever it is we 
mean to be contending/or"); Pierre Schlag, .\'onnat1uity and the Politics of Fonn, 139 U. PA. 
L. REv. 801 , 879 (1991) (criticizing normative legal scholars for omitting ··any sense of 
how th[ eir] prescription[s] might realize [themselves] in the social sphere"); Symposium 
on Feminism in the 90s: Bridging the Gap Between Themy and Practice, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 
l (1991 ). 
338. See BAKER, supra note 88, at Ill (describing a non-hierarchical, noninstrurnental 
process of progressive change). For an account of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s philoso-
phv of nonviolent civil disobedience, sec Adam Roberts, .\!art1n Luther King and .\'on-
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power.339 Their goal may be legislative implementation of their vi-
sion rather than the creation of judicially enforceable rights. 340 
The regulations were met immediately with resistance. Women's 
and health organizations mobilized to force Congress to pass legis-
lation invalidating the regulations. 341 Clinics stated that they would 
refuse to give women misleading information; they would forgo 
government funding rather than abide by the government's oppres-
sive law. 342 Most important, Black women have formed their own 
organizations, such as the National Black Women's Health Proj ect, 
to share information about reproduction and otherwise empower 
themselves to take control of their health. 3 4 3 Those engaging in 
Violent Resistance, m MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.: CIVIL RIGHTS LEADER, THEOLOGIAN, ORA-
TOR 759 (David Garrow ed ., 1989) (3 vols). For a defense of revolutionarv counte rvi -
ole nce as the only means of liberation from violent colonialism, see F ANON, supra note 
38 , a t 85-106. 
339. See Pope, supra note 298, at 293 (defining "Direct Popular Power" as the form o f 
political participation cha racteristic of social movements that is inclusive and outs ide the 
formal structure of representative democracy). Such mass movements have perio di ca ll v 
compelled the Court to increase protection of speech rights. See David Kairys, Freedom of 
Speech, in THE PoLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE , supra note 159, at 140, 141. 
For a discussion of the tension within the civil rights movement of militant, "direc t 
action" versus legalistic, litigation-oriented strategies, see Peller , supra note 52, a t 826-
30. See generally THOMAS R. BROOKS , WALLS COME TuMBLING DowN: A HISTORY OF THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS MovEMENT, 1940-1970 (1974) (describing the rifts that develope d in th e 
civil rights coalition betwee n non-violent integrationists and militant Black powe r ad vo -
cates) ; ALDON D. MoRRIS , THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MovEMENT: Bu.cr: C0 1>-I-
MUN ITIES ORGANIZING FOR C HANGE ( 1984) (describing te nsion between burea ucra ti c 
organizations and local community groups) ; RoBERT WEISBROT, FREEDOM BouND : A 
HISTORY OF AMERICA 'S CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1990) (describing the conflict between 
the liberal coalition and Blac k ac tivists). 
Strategic use of the legal system nevertheless contributes to social struggl e by ex-
p a nding the movemellt's tacti cal options, protecting its ability to engage in direct ac ti o n. 
a nd providing a forum to express its vision. See, e.g., White, supra note 239; \Nes t, supra 
note 22, at 1799-800 (describing the defensive work of radi cal lawyers within th e ex -
isting legal system; "This work , although often demora li zing , se rves as an importan t lin k 
to past victories and as a basis for the next wave of radical ac tion."). 
340. See Michelman, supra n o te 69 , at 98-99 (proposing a vi ew of liberty that im o h·es 
judicia l respect for governme nt ac tions designed to provide a id. rather than jud icia lh· 
e nforceable entitlements to gove rnment aid); W es t, supra no te 210, at !52-55 (sug-
ges ting that legislatures, ra th e r tha n courts , impleme nt the a bolitionist inte rpre ta tion o f 
the Fourteenth Amendme nt); \Ves t , supra note 85, at 717 (characterizing the "p r•.')gres -
sive interpretation of the co ns titutio nal guarantees o f liberty and equality as po iiti ca i 
idea ls to guide legislatio n , ra the r than as legal restra ints o n legislation"). 
341. See Philip J Hilts, House Votes to Overturn Lzmit on Abortion Adrnce, N.Y. TlO.I f.S, ;<ov. 
7, 1991, a t A24. President Bush ve toed this legislation, and the House failed bv 12 \'Otes 
to o verride the veto. See C lyme r, supra note 286. 
342. See supra note 37 and acco mpanying text. Plann ed Parenthood's South Bro nx 
clini c re fused about $37,000 in T itle X funds so that it could continue to provi d e infor-
m a ti o n a bout abortion . Feli city Ba rringer, Ban on .1. bortion Co unseling Is St ruck Dozl'n, ~~. Y . 
T IMES, No v. 4, 1992, a t A29. 
343. See Byll ye .-\ve ry, Empowennent Through il'ellneJS, 4 Y.-\LEj.L. & FD II NIS i\1 l -P . l ·:\7 -
150 (1 99 1) (statement b y Found ing Pres ident o f the Na tiona l Bl ack \Vome n 's Hc·a lth 
Proj ec t) (describing th e origins o f the Na tional Black W o me n 's Health Proj ec t ); Hrpro -
ductive Rights Posztzon Paper: .Vatlona/ Black J!'om en 's Health Project, zn FRO 'VI .-\ BO RT i oN TO 
R EPROD UCTIVE fREEDOM: T RAN S FORMING A MOVEMENT, supra n o te 280, at 291. 
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popular struggle declare: "[O]ur lives constitute bridges between 
the reality of present official declarations of law and the vision of 
our law triumphant." 344 In this way, we may craft a vision of law 
that, far from promoting ignorance and pain in outcast communi-
ties, will foster the knowledge necessary for their liberation. 
344. Cover, supm note 66, at 47. See genna!l\· Svmposzz11n on Lawyers and Civil Dzsobedi-
ence, 52 U. PnT L. RE\'. 723 (1991) (discussing lawvers' role in social change). For 
accounts of \\·omen's resistance to laws controlling reproduction, see NINL\ BAEHR , 
ABORTION WITHOuT APOLOGY: A RADICAL HISTORY FOR TilE 1990's ( 1990) (describing 
the evolution of the radical, grass roots movement for reproductive control); Lvnn \1. 
Paltrow, Women .. -lbortzon and Civzl Dzsobedience, 13 Nm·A L. REv. 4 71 ( 1989); Roberts, supra 
note 18, at 1439-40 (describing ways in which Black women struggled to resist efforts of 
slave masters to control their reproductive lives). 
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